Joe Ashwood writes: > Except for RIPEM there were known to be reasons for this, MD5 was > known to be flawed, SHA-0 was replaced because it was flawed (although > knowledge of the nature of the flaw was hidden). Even with RIPEM (and SHA-1 > for the same reason) I have plans in place (and have had for some time) the > move away from 160-bit hashes to larger ones, so the attack on RIPEM had > little effect on me and my clients...
A minor terminology correction: the hash is RIPEMD, the more recent (and still unbroken) version being RIPEMD-160. RIPEMD is the RIPE Message Digest, where RIPE is the EU's RACE Integrity Primitives Evaluation project, and I haven't been able to find out what RACE stands for. RIPEM was an old implementation by Mark Riordan of the PEM (Privacy Enhanced Email) standard which preceded S/MIME. Hal Finney --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
