On Thursday 26 May 2005 22:51, Hadmut Danisch wrote: > Hi, > > you most probably have heard about the court case where the presence > of encryption software on a computer was viewed as evidence of > criminal intent. > > http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctappub/0505/opa040381-0503.htm > http://news.com.com/Minnesota+court+takes+dim+view+of+encryption/2100-1030_ >3-5718978.html > > > > Plenty of research has been done about information hiding. > But this special court case requires "algorithm hiding" as a kind of > response. Do you know where to look for papers about this subject? > > What about designing an algorithm good for encryption which someone > can not prove to be an encryption algorithm?
I don't agree with your conclusion that hiding algorithms is a requirement. I think there is a much better direction: spread more algorithms. If everyone is using crypto then how can that be "relevant" to the case? I would suggest that the best way to overcome this flawed view of cryptography by the judges is to have the operating systems install with GPG installed by default. Some of the better ones already install SSH by default. (In fact the thrust of the argument was flawed as the user's PC almost certainly had a browser with SSL installed. As HTTPS can be used to access webmail privately and as we have seen this was an El Qaeda means of secret communication, the presence of one more crypto tool as "relevent" is a stretch.) iang -- Advances in Financial Cryptography: https://www.financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/000458.html --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
