On Fri, Jun 24, 2005 at 10:00:55AM +0100, Ben Laurie wrote:
> > - Find reasonably efficient masking strategies, that assume
> > that side-channel attacks are here to stay, and randomly choose
> > one of many isomorphic ways to perform the computation. The
> > masking would have to eliminate key/data correlation from all
> > "observables" other than the final output.
>
> If it does that, why do you want to choose one of many? Surely a single
> one will do?
>
The idea is that each choice leaks side-channel information about its
algorithm, but the attacker does not know which one was chosen. And,
repeated observations do not on average (over all algorithms) show
correlation between the key or data and side-channel information (other
than the final output). Is this possible? There is a paper that claims
no correlation with any any single intermediate result, is that strong
enough?
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