On Wed, Feb 01, 2006 at 02:03:10PM -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: | Anne & Lynn Wheeler pointed out: | | > Face and fingerprints swiped in Dutch biometric passport crack | > http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/01/30/dutch_biometric_passport_crack/ | | Didn't the EU adopt the same design that the US uses?
Passport standards are written by the International Air Travel Association (IATA). | Am I right to presume that the passport RFID chip used by the Dutch is the | same -- or functions the same -- as the one used in the new US digital | passports? | | >From what I've read, it seems that the sequential numbering scheme the | Dutch use on their passports may have made this attack easier -- but it | was already feasible, and will be against the passports of other nations | which did not so helpfully minimize their obfuscation technique with | sequential numbering? | | Anyone got more details than those offered in the Rinscure press release? | Thoughts? The papers explain the attack in fair detail. I blogged every useful linksI could find a few days ago at http://www.emergentchaos.com/archives/002355.html, and there's more links in comments. Adam | _Vin | | | > | > The crack is attributed to Delft smartcard security specialist Riscure, | > which explains that an attack can be executed from around 10 metres and | > the security broken, revealing date of birth, facial image and | > fingerprint, in around two hours. | > | > .. snip .. | | | --------------------------------------------------------------------- | The Cryptography Mailing List | Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED] --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]