Piers Bowness wrote: > This is concept is surprisingly complex. Once the attacker sees the "secure" dialog, > what prevents them from using the same techniques and/or code to create a visually > > identical spoof?
(Hi Piers!) I actually dealt with this in a former job, where I wrote a proxy for Xwindows which did similar decoration for trusted and untrusted X clients. The trick is to invert the indicators - your rendering engine (whether an Xwindows server, browser, or a windowing OS) has final say over the outermost frame of all windows. You mark the *untrusted* ones in the outer frame - a malicous client can do whatever it wants inside its windows, but it can't overwrite and hide the untrusted indicators in the outer frame. (We put a fat black border around them). Of course, if you run on an OS where any app can modify any binary, you're SOL. Peter Trei --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]