[EMAIL PROTECTED] ("Hal Finney") writes: >The idea of putting a TPM on a smart card or other removable device is even >more questionable from this perspective.
It's not just questionable, it's a really, really bad idea. TPMs are fundamentally just severely feature-crippled smart cards. That is, they're optimised for doing DRM/secure boot/whatever-you-want-to-call-it, but in practice not much good for doing anything else (even if there are paper and Powerpoint-slide claims to the contrary). So you have something with all the drawbacks of a smart card (external widget that needs to be bought at extra cost and plugged in) and none of the advantages. >Possibly with Vista's BitLocker disk encryption we will see more use of TPMs. BitLocker just uses the TPM as a glorified USB key (sealing a key in a TPM is functionally equivalent to encrypting it on a USB key). Since BitLocker isn't tied to a TPM in any way (I'm sure Microsoft's managers could see which way the wind was blowing when they designed it), it's not going to be TPM's killer app. Peter. --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]