Hi Folks -- I was wondering to what extent the folks on this list have taken a look the PunchScan voting scheme:
http://punchscan.org/ The site makes the following claims: >> End-to-end cryptographic independent verification, or E2E, is a >> mechanism built into an election that allows voters to take a >> piece of the ballot home with them as a receipt. This receipt >> does not allow voters to prove to others how they voted, but it >> does permit them to: >> >> * Verify that they have properly indicated their votes to >> election officials (cast-as-intended). >> * Verify with extremely high assurance that all votes were >> counted properly (counted-as-cast). >> >> Voters can check that their vote actually made it to the tally, >> and that the election was conducted fairly. Those seem at first glance to be a decent set of claims, from a public-policy point of view. If somebody would prefer a different set of claims, please explain. PunchScan contains some nifty crypto, but IMHO this looks like a classic case of too much crypto and not enough real security. I am particularly skeptical of one of the FAQ-answers http://punchscan.org/faq-protections.php#5 Several important steps in the process must be carried out in secret, and if there is any leakage, there is unbounded potential for vote-buying and voter coercion. The Boss can go to each voter and make the usual silver-or-lead proposition: Vote as I say, and then show me your voting receipt. I'll give you ten dollars. But if I find out you voted against me, I'll kill you. The voter cannot afford to take the chance that even a small percentage of the ballot-keys leak out. 1) It would be nice to see some serious cryptological protection of election processes and results. 2a) I don't think we're there yet. 2b) In particular I don't think PunchScan really solves "the" whole problem. 3) I'd love to be wrong about item (2). Does anybody see a way to close the gaps? --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]