>>> but also a proof that the source code one has is the source of the implementation.
This is an unsolved problem for code in tamper-resistant devices. There are precious few procedures to, for example, determine that the CAC card that was issued to Pfc. Sally Green this morning bears any relationship whatsoever to the code that went through FIPS certification. (A hash of the code is meaningless since the card will simply burp up the right answer.) I have seen one such procedure but I have never seen any such procedure implemented in real cards. And to Marcos' point, not only do certification labs not look for backdoors but I once had an employee of such a lab tell me that even if they found one the are not obliged to enter this in their report unless, of course, they had been explicitly requested to test for the absence of backdoors. In that regard, I have never seen a security profile that contained a claim of no backdoors. And I guess you know who is paying big bucks for the certification report. Smart cards from F. TPMs from C. A 'sleep at the wheel. Cheers, Scott --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]