Aloha! Ian G wrote: > However I think it is not really efficient at this stage to insist on > secure programming for submission implementations. For the simple > reason that there are 42 submissions, and 41 of those will be thrown > away, more or less. There isn't much point in making the 41 secure; > better off to save the energy until "the one" is found. Then > concentrate the energy, no?
I would like to humbly disagree. In case of MD6 the fix meant that a bugger had to be doubled in size (according to the Fortify blog). This means that the memory footprint and thus its applicability for embedded platforms was (somewhat) effected. That is, secure implementations might have different requirements than what mighty have been stated, and we want to select an algorithm based on the requirements for a secure implementation, right? -- Med vänlig hälsning, Yours Joachim Strömbergson - Alltid i harmonisk svängning. ======================================================================== Kryptoblog - IT-säkerhet på svenska http://www.strombergson.com/kryptoblog ======================================================================== --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majord...@metzdowd.com