On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 3:34 PM, Ben Laurie <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 22 August 2013 10:36, Phillip Hallam-Baker <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Preventing key substitution will require a combination of the CT ideas >> proposed by Ben Laurie (so catenate proof notaries etc) and some form of >> 'no key exists' demonstration. > > > We have already outline how to make verifiable maps as well as verifiable > logs, which I think is all you need. > http://www.links.org/files/RevocationTransparency.pdf. >
Yeah, I think it is just a matter of being clear about the requirements and making sure that we fully justify the requirements for email rather than assume that email is the same. -- Website: http://hallambaker.com/
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