A new paper on the Tor network, entitled "Users Get Routed: Traffic Correlation on Tor by Realistic Adversaries".
https://security.cs.georgetown.edu/~msherr/papers/users-get-routed.pdf Quote to whet your appetite: We present the first analysis of the popular Tor anonymity network that indicates the security of typical users against reasonably realistic adversaries in the Tor network or in the underlying Internet. Our results show that Tor users are far more susceptible to compromise than indicated by prior work. [...] Our analysis shows that 80% of all types of users may be de- anonymized by a relatively moderate Tor-relay adversary within six months. Our results also show that against a single AS adversary roughly 100% of users in some common locations are deanonymized within three months (95% in three months for a single IXP). Fur- ther, we find that an adversary controlling two ASes instead of one reduces the median time to the first client de-anonymization by an order of magnitude: from over three months to only 1 day for a typical web user; and from over three months to roughly one month for a BitTorrent user. This clearly shows the dramatic effect an adversary that controls multiple ASes can have on security. Disclaimer: one of the authors (Micah Sherr) is a doctoral brother. Perry -- Perry E. Metzger pe...@piermont.com _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography@metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography