On Sep 8, 2013, at 7:16 PM, james hughes wrote:
> Let me suggest the following.
>
> With RSA, a single quiet "donation" by the site and it's done. The situation
> becomes totally passive and there is no possibility knowing what has been
> read. The system administrator could even do this without the executives
> knowing.
An additional helper: Re-keying. Suppose you send out a new public key,
signed with your old one, once a week. Keep the chain of replacements posted
publicly so that someone who hasn't connected to you in a while can confirm the
entire sequence from the last public key he knew to the current one. If
someone sends you a message with an invalid key (whether it was ever actually
valid or not - it makes no difference), you just send them an update.
An attacker *could* sent out a fake update with your signature, but that would
be detected almost immediately. So a one-time "donation" is now good for a
week. Sure, the leaker can keep leaking - but the cost is now considerably
greater, and ongoing.
-- Jerry
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