On 18 September 2013 15:30, Viktor Dukhovni <cryptogra...@dukhovni.org>wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 17, 2013 at 11:48:40PM -0700, Christian Huitema wrote: > > > > Given that many real organizations have hundreds of front end > > > machines sharing RSA private keys, theft of RSA keys may very well be > > > much easier in many cases than broader forms of sabotage. > > > > Or we could make it easy to have one separate RSA key per front end, > signed > > using the main RSA key of the organization. > > This is only realistic with DANE TLSA (certificate usage 2 or 3), > and thus will start to be realistic for SMTP next year (provided > DNSSEC gets off the ground) with the release of Postfix 2.11, and > with luck also a DANE-capable Exim release. > What's wrong with name-constrained intermediates? > > For HTTPS, there is little indication yet that any of the major > browsers are likely to implement DANE support in the near future. > > -- > Viktor. > _______________________________________________ > The cryptography mailing list > cryptography@metzdowd.com > http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography >
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