On 10/6/13 at 8:26 AM, crypto....@gmail.com (John Kelsey) wrote:
If we can't select ciphersuites that we are sure we will always
be comfortable with (for at least some forseeable lifetime)
then we urgently need the ability to *stop* using them at some
point. The examples of MD5 and RC4 make that pretty clear.
Ceasing to use one particular encryption algorithm in something
like SSL/TLS should be the easiest case--we don't have to worry
about old signatures/certificates using the outdated algorithm
or anything. And yet we can't reliably do even that.
We seriously need to consider what the design lifespan of our
crypto suites is in real life. That data should be communicated
to hardware and software designers so they know what kind of
update schedule needs to be supported. Users of the resulting
systems need to know that the crypto standards have a limited
life so they can include update in their installation planning.
Cheers - Bill
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