Hi, >> BTW, what we do not address is an attacker sending us many forged chains >> and/or traces. We don't want clients have to register with our server >> and obtain an identity. That's a sore point. > > Aren't the certs of interest those that chain to a well-known root? > So they could be validated, and those that don't could be efficiently > discarded. At that point, the attacker is reduced to effectively doing > an SSL DoS on you which is likely to grow old quickly.
Yes, the certs are the lesser problem. The problem is that hunting tasks can be pulled by anyone from the server and results sent back. This is still not too bad DoS-wise, but it allows to send forged traceroute results. Ralph -- Ralph Holz Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität München http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/ PGP: A805 D19C E23E 6BBB E0C4 86DC 520E 0C83 69B0 03EF
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