I guess I should've said what my use case is: I want a boot system that unlocks a partition where everything is checked to prevent an evil maid attack. I can sign / check everything but the key and the integrity checker. However, someone could replace gpg with a version that logs to something. I could use some system like tripwire to check the files but this just moves the vulnerable component to something else.
Maybe it's possible to use a signed kernel module that does the integrety checking of the files via a hash that could be compiled into the kernel? Again, this is for a boot system. So I'm in initramfs at this point (shouldn't matter but just thought I'd mention it). On Wed, May 29, 2013 at 1:58 AM, Erick Staal <elst...@xs4all.nl> wrote: > Herewith my 2c: > > - run static code analyzer against GPG source code (e.g. llvm's scan-build). > Verify GPG source code against keys provided after downloading. (Of course > is manual inspection also a possibility, but at least for our team > scan-build catches more errors than the humans involved). > - Question: do you trust your toolchain?. > - Compile from inspected source on a different (never Internet connected and > cleanly installed) system. > - generate checksums on binary and other related files. > - generate GPG keys. > - burn GPG binary and GPG keys to CD. > - mount CD (read-only) on system-at-risk using a cd-player without writing > capability. > - run GPG from CD. > > Caveat: doesn't protect against e.g. live in-memory attacks on running GPG > and/or on data presented to user on screen, but minimizes the risk for a lot > of other possible mischief. > Criticisms concerning cookbooklet above more than welcome. > > Sincerely, Erick > > > > > > > On 05/29/2013 07:20 AM, shawn wilson wrote: >> >> This is sort of a trusting trust question. However, is there a way to >> have gpg verify it has not been altered? Maybe by compiling it with an >> internal key file and it asking for a password before decrypting >> itself and then presenting some type of verification. I'm asking >> whether something like this exists or is possible? Ie, how does >> malware do integrety checking / try to thwart people from running it >> if something is amiss? Can this type of thing be put into gpg? >> _______________________________________________ >> cryptography mailing list >> cryptography@randombit.net >> http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography >> > _______________________________________________ > cryptography mailing list > cryptography@randombit.net > http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
