That's a really interesting idea. I'd love to read your paper when it's available.
On Thu, Jun 6, 2013 at 10:31 AM, Ralph Holz <h...@net.in.tum.de> wrote: > Hi, > > I am currently doing a write-up that dives into some of the more formal > aspects of authentication. In particular, I am wondering when exactly it > was formally proved that two entities A and B cannot establish a secure > channel between them without such a secure channel having been available > to them at a previous point in time. Or, in other words, you cannot > authenticate without already having authenticated credentials for that > purpose. > > To the best of my knowledge, the earliest such proof is the one by Colin > Boyd: > > Colin Boyd. Security architecture using formal methods. IEEE Journal on > Selected Topics in Communications. 1993. > > Does anyone know of an earlier such (formal) proof? > > Ralph > > -- > Ralph Holz > I8 - Network Architectures and Services > Technische Universität München > http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/ > Phone +49.89.289.18043 > PGP: A805 D19C E23E 6BBB E0C4 86DC 520E 0C83 69B0 03EF > _______________________________________________ > cryptography mailing list > cryptography@randombit.net > http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography > -- Tony Arcieri
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