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On Jun 30, 2013, at 12:44 AM, James A. Donald <jam...@echeque.com> wrote:
> Silent Circle expects end users to manage their own keys, which is of course
> the only way for end users to be genuinely secure. Everything else is snake
> oil, or rapidly turns into snake oil in practice. (Yes, Cryptocat, I am
> looking at you)
>
> However, everyone has found it hard to enable end users to manage keys. User
> interface varies from hostile, to unbearably hostile.
>
> Silent Circle publish end users public keys, which would seem to create the
> potential for a man in the middle attack.
>
> I would like to see a review and evaluation of Silent Circle's key management.
This isn't quite correct. You have the gist of it, though.
Silent Phone uses ZRTP, which is ephemeral DH with hash commitments for
continuity, in the style of SSH. The short authentication string is there for
explicit MITM protection. There's no explicit public key.
Silent Phone uses SCIMP, which is also a EDH+hash commitment protocol, and also
has no explicit public keys. The problem there is that unlike a voice protocol
when you can use a voice recitation of a short authentication string, there's
no implicit second channel in a text protocol. We're working on improvements
there.
There's a SCIMP paper up on silentcircle.com. Please look at it.
Jon
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