On Sun, Sep 8, 2013 at 10:05 PM, coderman <coder...@gmail.com> wrote: > ... > none of these are compelling reasons to not release raw access to the > entropy stream from hardware noise sources.*
* i meant to add, there have been various justifications put forth. again, none of them compelling. for every potential risk to the RDRAND / RDSEED consumers, there is a trivial way to reset / reseed / refill the system in a way that could accommodate both raw access to the entropy bits while retaining the assurances of RDRAND / RDSEED. and for every claim that such a transition represents an opportunity for DoS, there is a trivial elevated permissions which could accommodate such transitions only when authorized. and so forth and so on, to no effect. the lines have been drawn, and nothing will convince Intel to release raw access to the entropy source. _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
