We also added entropy based on device attach times. Measurements show this gives at least 4 bits of entropy per device (usually a lot more), and in the worst case we saw, 32 devices were measured.
On 22 October 2013 08:45, Joachim Strömbergson <joac...@strombergson.com>wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > Aloha! > > coderman wrote: > > FreeBSD's CSPRNG also allowed for certain stochastic sources, deemed > > to be "high-quality", to directly supply the random(4) device > > without going through Yarrow. With recent revelations over possible > > government surveillance and involvement in the selection of these > > "high-quality" sources, it is felt that they can no longer be > > trusted, and must therefore also be processed though Yarrow. > > This is imho a really good move. No entropy should go straight from > collection to application, but always feed a good CSPRNG. But we also > need to be able to (securely) sample the entropy source as well as > (securely) inject test data into the CSPRNG. Both of these to be able to > observe and test the combined entrpoy+CSPRNG chain. > > > > Future work is now going ahead with the implementation of the > > Fortuna algorithm by Ferguson and Schneier as an upgrade or > > alternative to Yarrow. Initially a choice will be presented, and > > decisions on the future of the CSPRNG processing algorithms in use > > will be made in the future as needs arise. > > Nice! FreeBSD ftw. ;-) > > - -- > Med vänlig hälsning, Yours > > Joachim Strömbergson - Alltid i harmonisk svängning. > ======================================================================== > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.18 (Darwin) > Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org > Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ > > iEYEARECAAYFAlJmLQMACgkQZoPr8HT30QHTGwCdFlIDwh6he8QBKZB9RGLk8J6X > 7ToAn3X2Mc+efSjHoaQPbxJBMIr1+m+T > =5f0H > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > _______________________________________________ > cryptography mailing list > cryptography@randombit.net > http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography >
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