On 04/27/2014 07:43 AM, ianG wrote:

There is a slight problem with goals here.  PKI was never designed for
ordinary users.  If you read the original documentation of how PKI was
organised before the web-PKI was invented, it talks about how each
relying party has to enter into a contract and verify that the CPS
provides the answer they are looking for.

In this context, it was reasonable to talk about the relying party
trusting the results, because they had actually gone through the process
of developing that trust.  According to the theory.

When they did the web-PKI however they threw away all of the reliance
contract requirements, or buried them, but kept the language of trust.
As you point out, they had to do this because ordinary users won't go
through the process of CPS and contract review.

So the result was trust-but-no-trust.  We are not using PKI as it was
designed and theorised.

I concur.  If you consider that the early writings on PKI had more legal
language and lawyers involved [1], [2] and [3], it becomes clear that
PKI was designed more for B2B transactions than B2C.  That it is being
contorted for B2C transactions - without the consumer being sufficiently
educated to understand the technology, personal responsibility and
implications - is where PKI went down a slippery slope.

The dozens of PKIs I have setup over the last 15 years have been fairly
successful, primarily because the RP is also the issuer of the digital
certificates (they are closed PKIs for internal use only).  In those
rare cases where PKI is being used for TLS ClientAuth across companies,
it has been for B2B transactions where preexisting contracts exist.

Arshad Noor
StrongAuth, Inc.

[1] http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/science_technology/2013/dsg_tutorial.authcheckdam.pdf [2] http://www.amazon.com/Secure-Electronic-Commerce-Infrastructure-Signatures/dp/0130272760
[3] https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3647.txt
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