> On Feb 27, 2016, at 12:27 PM, John Young <[email protected]> wrote: > > It's good to see The Intercept and others smell a rat with the fake fight > between > Apple and the USG (hardly only the FBI)
Please provide support for your point that it is a “fake fight”. The implication is that Apple is conspiring with the DOJ in the matter of the FBiOS. Given the extreme nature of your accusation, extraordinary proof is required. > Most peculiar that almost no defensive measures > have been released, although Snowden may have insisted on not releasing > those as threats to US national security. Alternatively, Snowden had access to files associated with the code breaking/SIGINT side of the NSA. Or NSA’s defenses are a bit beyond the ability of regular people to acquire and implement? Or the most important news was that everyone in the US is subject to suspicionless, warrantless surveillance? Or that the NSA documents provide the basis for cases like Jewel to proceed, etc.? > Snowden's alleged demand that outlets check with USG before releases > to assure no national harm is institutionalized in national security > reporting, but is also required by fear of prosecution of outlets and > their investors such as Omidyar, Slim, Bezo, all the major media. What is the allegation, who made it, and on the basis of what evidence? > It would not be off-base to accuse the Snowden handlers of what > Apple and the USG are doing, engaging in a fake fight "in the public > interest" for pecuniary gain. Privacy and civil liberties are being > peddled as commercial products, cheered yesterday by Apple > investors. Accusation without facts in support of it seems quite off-base, as is the repeated allegation without the support of facts of a “fake fight”. If the accumulation and spending of money constitutes taint in proportion to the mass of $, please note the budget of the US government, or at least that of the military-intelligence complex, compared with the sum of global spending on privacy protection/computer security. > The DNI's Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board is as much > a marketing scam as the American Civil Liberties Union, same > kind of people populate both, testify in Congress, meet with > POTUS, work the lecture circuit. Is there no “scam” in this regard in the persons of the president, congress people, the intelligence community including the intelligence committees of congress, the FBI, the media, those who assail Apple and Snowden, those who sell the idea that attempting privacy is futile or dangerous to national security, some **for big money**? If there are unreleased files that Snowden passed on, I’d like to see them. But I’m really grateful for the extraordinary surveillance perspective that has entered the global public consciousness directly as a result of his whistle-blowing, and I will not whine about what has yet to be released like a petulant child complaining that his free cone of ice cream is dripping. If you don’t like fat budget “secret keepers”, and if you agree that the USG is the greatest among them, can’t you say a simple “thanks” to Mr. Snowden? > At 11:05 AM 2/27/2016, you wrote: >> John Young wrote: > USG is not USA. Apple is not its buyers. USG v Apple is >> not about citizens and privacy. It's about secretkeepers against the public. >> Therefore, except for members of âthe publicâ who have no secrets (no >> credit card PINs, no private medical conditions, no private relationships, >> no private future plans, no private original ideas, no private and unpopular >> political views, etc.), âitâs about secretkeepersâ against themselves? >> I suppose then we should all file amicus briefs on both sides? John Young >> wrote: > Govs may concede crypto public protection to assure other means >> remain effective. Promoting public crypto as a cloak appears to be the >> campaign underway, now as in the 1990s, so beguiling to crypto advocates to >> claim a win (for the industry-org-edu to continue doing openly and secretly >> what it does best). This has been addressed previously and yesterday by an >> article at The Intercept. >> https://theintercept.com/2016/02/26/fbi-vs-apple-post-crypto-wars/ > After >> the 2013 Snowden revelations, as mainstream technology companies started >> spreading encryption by putting it in popular consumer products, the wars >> erupted again. Law enforcement officials, led by FBI Director James Comey, >> loudly insisted that U.S. companies should build backdoors to break the >> encryption just for them. > > That wonât happen because what these law >> enforcement officials are asking for isnât possible (any backdoor can be >> used by hackers, too) and wouldnât be effective (because encryption is >> widely available globally now). Theyâve succeeded in slowing the spread of >> unbreakable encryption by intimidating tech companies that might otherwise >> be rolling it out faster, but not much else. > > Indeed, as almost everyone >> else acknowledges, unbreakable encryption is here to stay. > > Tech privacy >> advocates continue to remain vigilant about encryption, actively pointing >> out the inadequacies and impossibilities of the anti-encryption movement, >> and jumping on any sign of backsliding. > > But even as they have stayed >> focused on defending encryption, the government has been shifting its focus >> to something else. > > The ongoing, very public dispute between Apple and >> the FBI, in fact, marks a key inflection point at least as far as the >> puublicâs understanding of the issue. > > You might say weâre entering >> the Post-Crypto phase of the Crypto Wars. Think about it: The more we learn >> about the FBIâs demand that Apple help it hack into a password-protected >> iPhone, the more it looks like part of a concerted, long-term effort by the >> government to find new ways around unbreakable encryption rather than try >> to break it. Withoutt Ed Snowdenâs whistle-blowing, Glenn Greenwaldâs, >> Laura Poitrasâ and Ewen MacAskillâs journalism, reporting by the >> Intercept and by the Washington Postâs Bart Gellman, and Appleâs >> refusal, âthe publicâ would not be discussing this at all. >> _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list >> [email protected] >> http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography > > > _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list [email protected] http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
