>[The >question isn't some sort of mystification of identity -- it is being >able to know that you're talking to the same "Dear Abby" your friends >have talked to and that you talked to last week.
Here you're talking about "reputation of nyms", which doesn't require third parties or certs, just well-kept secret keys of a PK pair. If the remote entity keeps using the same PK keys, you can reasonably update reputation based on that alone. (They're essentially signing their behaviors.) [Moderator's note: I fully agree. I was disputing only the notion that unauthenticated connections were sufficient. Authentication does not require certificates or third parties -- see the way SSH handles keys for example. --Perry] >Now that MIM attacks >have been automated they don't even need sophistication to conduct. --Perry] Since a signed cert is useful for recovering ZERO dollars from the signer, if you've been defrauded by some entity, the end result is the same if a MIM defrauds you. A *trusted* signer would solve the confidentiality loss problem but not the financial liability problem. But given that signers will sign *anything* (and why not, they have no financial liability and little useful reputation to lose) this is a small difference. dh --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
