on Mon, Jan 21, 2002 at 09:55 AM -0500, Trei, Peter ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote: > > Karsten M. Self[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] writes: > > > > Note that my reading the language of 1201 doesn't requre that the work > > being accessed be copyrighted (and in the case of Afghanistan, there is > > a real question of copyright status), circumvention itself is > > sufficient, regardless of status of the specific work accessed: > > > 17 USC 1201(a)(1)(A): > > No person shall circumvent a technological measure that > > effectively controls access to a work protected under > > this title. > > I'm sure I'm picking nits here (and I praise God every day that > I Am Not A L*wy*r), but what does 'effectively' mean? If it can be > broken, was it effective? What level of work is required to make > it an 'effective technological measure'? If the standard is 'anything, > including rot13', then why is the word present in the rule at all? > > Technological measures can range from violating the CDROM > standard and introducing deliberate errors to confuse some > readers, all the way up to full real-time, online, 3-factor > authentication. > > The inclusion of the word 'effectively' presumes the existance of > 'ineffective' technological measures, which it would be no crime > to circumvent. Where, then, is the distinction? > > I'm reminded of a humorous button I've seen at some SF > conventions: "Anything not nailed down is legally mine. Anything > I can pry up wasn't nailed down in the first place."
I'd taken some time to run 'round that logical circle myself. I believe the NY 2600 case dealt with this issue. Kaplan, at least, wasn't convinced. I've attached Wendy Seltzer's comments to the dvd-discuss list. Peace. -- Karsten M. Self <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://kmself.home.netcom.com/ What part of "Gestalt" don't you understand? Home of the brave http://gestalt-system.sourceforge.net/ Land of the free We freed Dmitry! Boycott Adobe! Repeal the DMCA! http://www.freesklyarov.org Geek for Hire http://kmself.home.netcom.com/resume.html
--- Begin Message ---At 06:03 PM 2/7/01 +0100, Tom wrote: >On Wed, Feb 07, 2001 at 08:53:35AM -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > #3 is the most dangerous. My professional opinion is that the creators of > > CSS are incompetent and could have benefited from reading some of the IEEE > > journals and Sol Golomb's book. It is fortunate that they were. Triple DES > > would have really complicated the matter especially if the key were > > embedded in an ASIC that took cipher text in and spit out plaintext out. > >do we have an uncontested expert statement in evidence that CSS is, in >fact, pretty crappy? It doesn't matter. Kaplan's interpretation of ''effectively controls access to a work'' may have been the only sound part of his opinion -- replace with 'has the effect of controlling access' not 'stands up to attack'. The whole point of Section 1201 is that the TPM is backed by law, not strong encryption. CSS could have a hole the size of Texas and still import 1201's hellfire against those who "broke" it -- hence the need to break 1201. Anything we say about how weak CSS is will most likely be misinterpreted as a flawed claim that it's "ineffective," so I'd stay away from that line. --Wendy Wendy Seltzer -- [EMAIL PROTECTED] Fellow, Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/seltzer.html--- End Message ---
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