At 10:45 AM 7/29/02 -0700, David Wagner wrote: >On the gripping hand, I don't think this is a real issue in practice. >SHA1 is probably good enough for all practical purposes that I can >think of.
In software. There are not many fast, hardware-efficient crypto hash functions. DES, being extremely hardware friendly, can be (ab)used to make a strong one-way hash. (E.g., raw input into both key and data maps 56+64 -> uniformly distributed 64 bits.) At 03:40 PM 7/27/02 -0700, Joseph Ashwood wrote: >So you've managed to create a true RNG, that provably generates 100% entropy >output, that supports the speeds necessary to support the substantial >throughput of the Sprint US backbone? (several thousand OC-11s) "Whether there is a need for very high bandwidth RNGs" was discussed on cypherpunks a few months ago, and no examples were found. (Unless you're using something like a one-time pad where you need a random bit for every cargo bit.) Keeping in mind that a commerical crypto server can often accumulate entropy during off-peak hours. --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]