At 12:19 PM 12/16/2002 -0500, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
something that is plugged into the ach/atm networkIf they could get plugged into the ACH/ATM network, it might work there as well, so you could also sell it to banks, if they're buying.
1) those "gift" (stored-value magstripe cards at checkout counters .... operate over the same POS terminal that credit, debit, ach, atm already work over. basically large percentage of infrastructure already supports ... as part of the basic point-of-sale infrastructure ... credit, debit, and stored-value.
nacha has already demonstrated (digitally signed) aads debit transactions working in the network
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/index.html#aads
the issue is generalized routing of x9.59 digitally signed transactions ... whether they are debit, credit, or stored-value ... and issues like POS terminals supporting hardware token (7816 contact or 14443 proximity) interfaces capable of digital signatures.
with that then there would also be generalized support for debit & stored-value in non-face-to-face, non-POS, and internet type environments .... aka signed x9.59 transactions whether they are credit, debit or stored value. credit was relatively straight-forward translation to the internet since it already had relatively similar risk factors accountable for with MOTO transactions. digitally signed transactions would reduce some amount of the risk .... enabling debit & stored-value to also be used in unsecure, non-face-to-face environments like the internet (also translating existing debit from shared-secret PIN paradigm to a non-shared-secret public key paradigm).
slightly related discussion in sci.crypt ng
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002p.html#52
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002p.html#50
and part of related matters with threads in internet-payments
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm12.htm#60
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#65
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#66
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler [EMAIL PROTECTED], http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
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