At 12:55 AM -0500 on 12/17/02, John R. Levine wrote:
> Micropayments have two problems. > The minor one is that technically we have no idea how to implement > them. The major one is that users hate the idea. Oddly enough, and speaking of the Financial Cryptography conference :-), Nicko's running a panel this year: http://ifca.ai/fc03/index.php?page=schedule <...> Monday, 27-Jan-2003 <...> 14:00 - 15:30 Panel: Does anyone really need MicroPayments? Moderator: Nicko van Someren (nCipher) Participants: Bob Hettinga (IBUC), Andrew Odlyzko (University of Minnesota) and Ron Rivest (MIT, PepperCoin) Many cryptographers have tried to develop special technology for transferring tiny amounts of value; the theory being that the computational and/or administrative costs of other payment schemes render them unsuitable for small value transactions. In this panel we will discuss two major questions: firstly are the existing systems really not useful for small values and secondly might other models such as flat rate or subscription systems be more suitable anyway, and be possible without the need for small payments? By the way, statistical process control is nothing new, and probabilistic settlement is one of the first things they teach you in elementary economics classes to explain the use of statistics -- railroads billing each other statistically for boxcar hauling by sampling bills of lading,= as the canonical example. Cheers, RAH Who, having just seen who else Nicko's put the panel, can't wait to see Andrew and Ron discuss, um, things in light of the the list traffic this morning... -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
