Anton Stiglic wrote:
> > The statement was for a plaintext/ciphertext pair, not for a random-bit/ > > random-bit pair. Thus, if we model it terms of a bijection on random-bit > > pairs, we confuse the different statistics for plaintext, ciphertext, keys > and > > we include non-AES bijections. > > While your reformulation of the problem is interesting, the initial question > was regarding plaintext/ciphertext pairs, which usually just refers to the > pair > of elements from {0,1}^n, {0,1}^n, where n is the block cipher length. The previous considerations hinted at but did not consider that a plaintext/ciphertext pair is not only a random bit pair. Also, if you consider plaintext to be random bits you're considering a very special -- and least used -- subset of what plaintext can be. And, it's a much easier problem to securely encrypt random bits. The most interesting solution space for the problem, I submit, is in the encryption of human-readable text such as English, for which the previous considerations I read in this list do not apply, and provide a false sense of strength. For this case, the proposition applies -- when qualified for the unicity. Cheers, Ed Gerck --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]