Dean, Bruce,
Apologies for not spotting this sooner. Can you please confirm if this
is the email that was sent to the public list to start the discussion
period?
https://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/cscwg-public/2023-December/001141.html
If this is the only email that was sent to start the discussion period,
I'm afraid it is not compliant with the Bylaws because when the official
discussion period started, the ballot did not include two endorsers.
Instead, it seems that it went straight to voting, per
https://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/cscwg-public/2024-January/001145.html.
Again, sorry for not discovering this earlier and I would definitely
need another pair of eyes to confirm this.
Dimitris.
On 17/1/2024 6:36 μ.μ., Dean Coclin via Cscwg-public wrote:
Resending to the list…
*Dean Coclin *
*From:*Dean Coclin
*Sent:* Friday, January 12, 2024 4:26 PM
*Subject:* Ballot CSC-22: High Risk Requirements Update
Voting has concluded on Ballot CSC 22 and the results are as follows:
Certificate Issuers:
Yes: (7) Digicert, eMudra, Entrust, Globalsign, HARICA, Sectigo,
Viking Cloud
No: (0)
Abstain: (0)
Certificate Consumers:
Yes: (1) Microsoft
No: (0)
Abstain: (0)
Quorum was achieved. Therefore the ballot passes.
*Dean Coclin *
CSCWG Chair
*From:*Cscwg-public <[email protected]> *On Behalf Of
*Bruce Morton via Cscwg-public
*Sent:* Friday, January 5, 2024 3:02 PM
*To:* [email protected]
*Subject:* [Cscwg-public] Voting Period begins - Ballot CSC-22: High
Risk Requirements Update
*Purpose of the Ballot*
This ballot updates the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and
Management of Publicly‐Trusted Code Signing Certificates“ version 3.4
in order to clarify language regarding Signing Service and signing
requests. The main goals of this ballot are to:
1. Remove references to High Risk Certificate Request, since the
CSBRs do not provide any actions for a high risk application.
2. Remove references to High Risk Region of Concern, since the CSBR
appendix has never been populated.
3. Remove rules for a Takeover Attack to require the Subscriber to
generate keys in a crypto device, since crypto device key
generation is now a baseline requirement for all code signing
certificates.
4. Remove option to transfer private key which has been generated in
software.
5. Cleanup to remove Subscriber key generation option which expired
effective 1 June 2023.
6. Cleanup to remove “any other method” to verify the Subscriber key
was generated in a crypto device, since this option expired 1 June
2023.
The following motion has been proposed by Bruce Morton of Entrust and
endorsed by Tim Hollebeek of DigiCert and Ian McMillan of Microsoft.
*MOTION BEGINS*
This ballot updates the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and
Management of Publicly‐Trusted Code Signing Certificates” ("Code
Signing Baseline Requirements") based on version 3.4. MODIFY the Code
Signing Baseline Requirements as specified in the following redline:
https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/e0da5532ab81e35e2e92536c1bc9ea3c36765b26...50871dc08d39102daf6c93fa556a869790643fb6
<https://url.avanan.click/v2/___https:/urldefense.com/v3/__https:/github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/e0da5532ab81e35e2e92536c1bc9ea3c36765b26...50871dc08d39102daf6c93fa556a869790643fb6__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!eGQ4FLzNANTdAsLaGTDHePbCY7_W0AsXx1qTmmyTqiyaSVcoj5VGsgK7r7e1D0YQaI5U-YDAzAAi90kRle47DpUbNXxd$___.YXAzOmRpZ2ljZXJ0OmE6bzpkNzM2ZWY2OTUzNWVhMjY4M2JhMWY5ZDQ5ZmY0MjRkODo2OjNmNzk6OWNkNzk0NTVmM2U3NTY4NGE1NWE4MmI0M2ZjMmE1YzU0MGZiMDljODdiYzFhZTdhMDdhYTJiODZmZDM3OWQ5ZjpoOkY>
*MOTION ENDS*
The procedure for this ballot is as follows: Discussion (minimum 7 days)
* Start Time: 2023-12-15 00:00 UTC
* End Time: 2024-01-05 20:00 UTC
Vote for approval (7 days)
* Start Time: 2024-01-05 20:00 UTC
* End Time: 2024-01-12 20:00 UTC
/Any email and files/attachments transmitted with it are intended
solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they are
addressed. If this message has been sent to you in error, you must not
copy, distribute or disclose of the information it contains. _Please
notify Entrust immediately and delete the message from your system._/
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