The Navy has shot down a proposal to adopt a Russian missile.
In March 1999, U.S. Navy officials decided against a contract
between Boeing and the Russian Zvezda-Strela State Science and
Production Center.  The Russian proposal was to supply the Navy
with up to 300 modified Kh-31A 'Kripton' (Mod 2) medium range
air-to-surface anti-ship and anti-radar missiles over the next
five years.

The titanium Kh-31 was built in 1988 by Zvezda-Strela for the
former Soviet Union.  In 1997, the U.S. Navy test fired four of
the ramjet powered, titanium cruise missiles.  In 1998, the
Clinton administration gave Boeing/Douglas and Zvezda-Strela
engineers additional funding to improve the Russian missile's
range to over 100 miles.

In 1998, Zvezda and Boeing circulated reports of an agreement
between Russia and the U.S. Navy to purchase up to 300 Kh-31s.
According to Zvezda, Boeing was to convert the weapons into
MA-31 supersonic aerial targets (SSST) for the U.S. Navy (Janes
Defense Weekly 14 October 1998).  According to Janes Defense,
28% of any sale would go directly into the bank accounts of the
Russian Army Generals.

The U.S. Navy now plans to purchase no more than five MA-31
missiles from Boeing in 1999.  According to a letter written by
Undersecretary of the Navy, H. Lee Buchanan, the Navy plans to
only fund $2.8 million for "a limited number of MA-31 targets."

Despite the Boeing claims of 50 to 100 nautical miles the real
performance of the MA-31 is poor at best.  According to the
actual test results obtained from Boeing, the Russian MA-31 can
fly only a mere 16 miles.  In fact, one test conducted by Boeing
recorded the MA-31 ran out of fuel and fell into the sea after
traveling only 8 miles.

Navy plans not to purchase the MA-31 have also placed the
extended-range option on hold.  Congressional sources stated
that they are "not keen on funding any option" that could be
used by the Russians to improve the Kh-31 weapon version.  One
Congressional military attache stated "we intend to keep a close
eye on this project."

The move is seen as a victory for U.S. aerospace workers, the
U.S. taxpayer and national security.  Vice President Al Gore was
alleged to support the purchase of the Kh-31 by the Navy.  There
were reports that Gore made several promises to Russian Generals
during his frequent visits to Moscow.  The Russian maker
Zvezda-Strela is backed by Gore supporters, Cassidy Associates
and IBP International.

Cassidy Associates is a Washington D.C. based lobby firm that
has made hundreds of thousands of dollars in political donations
to the Clinton/Gore campaign.  According to FEC records, Cassidy
Associates made over 2,500 political contributions between 1991
and 1998.

Cassidy Associates was also linked to the Ron Brown trade
missions.  Cassidy Associates sent Maely Tom, a radical-leftist
and DNC donor, to the far east on a Ron Brown trade mission to
Indonesia.  The same mission included Charlie Trie, Pauline
Kanchanalak and Nora Lum.  Lum has already been convicted of
illegal campaign contributions.

The other Zvezda supporter is IBP International, a firm based in
London and McClean Virginia run by Gore backer Judith De Paul.
IBP successfully lobbied NASA to select the Russian Tu-144 and
Boeing/Douglas for high speed test flights.  IBP also lobbied
unsuccessfully for the Zvezda-Strela K-36 jet fighter ejection
seat for NASA T-38 Astronaut trainer jets.

In many ways, the Zvezda Kh-31 represents why the Soviet Union
lost the cold war.  It is far too expensive for active service
unless you also happen to have a 1980s Soviet Army budget.  The
Kh-31 is constructed almost entirely from titanium.  The metal
is expensive to form, and the missile requires special tools for
maintenance.  The cost of building, maintaining and firing the
Kh-31 far exceeds its effective combat capability.

Simply put, a dent, ding or even the wrong tool can ruin the
entire missile.  The Kh-31 is not something that the Iraqi Army
could pack in a truck and bury in the desert.  The Kh-31 was
originally developed to kill radars, either on the ground on in
an airborne U.S. AWACS plane.  It was the best the Soviet
engineers could fabricate.

Several western missiles such as HARM, Phoenix, Sparrow, Shrike
and AMRAAM are more capable in both range and accuracy for the
anti-air and anti-radar modes.  None use large quantities of
titanium.  The Kh-31 threat here is limited to the decaying
Russian air force.

Recognizing the Kh-31 shortcomings, Zvezda modified the missile
to an anti-shipping role.  However, anti-ship missiles fly at
only a few feet above the water to avoid detection.  The Kh-31
was designed to fly at high altitude and thus, cannot travel
very far in the thick air, close to the ocean surface.  The
Russian Navy selected the much larger Raduga 3M80 Moskit SS-N-22
"Sunburn" to serve the anti-ship role because it is designed to
fly low, fast and far.

Anti-ship missiles in this class are the Talos/Sea Snake, the
French ANF and the Russian SS-N-22 "Sunburn" and they are all
much larger than the Kh-31.  They are designed to fly in the
thick air.  Even the smallest of the three, the French ANF, is
twice the size of the Kh-31.  None of the real "threat" missiles
use large amounts of titanium.

It is no surprise that Zvezda has been unable to re-sell the
Kh-31 to any foreign buyer.  China, asian and middle eastern
customers have balked because of the difficult maintenance and
handling requirements for titanium.  Chinese clients have shown
little interest because they cannot duplicate the missile.
Middle eastern customers prefer the French Exocet and are
awaiting the Mach 2 ANF.  The Kh-31 "threat" does not exist.

Recent moves at Zvezda indicate the Russian missile bureau has
decided to face market pressures and change product lines to
subsonic anti-ship missiles.  The recent sale of Zvezda Kh-35
"Switchblade" missiles to Algeria is a prime example.  The
"Switchblade" is a copy of the U.S. Harpoon subsonic anti-ship
missile.  Zvezda has also moved what few remaining engineers
they have (that have not sought jobs at BMW Moscow) to a project
in China, copying the subsonic U.S. "Tomahawk" missile.

The improved Kh-31, called the MA-31 target drone, was slated to
become the Clinton pick for a long delayed Navy high-speed
target program (SSST).  The Clinton selection of the Russian
missile raised many political and security questions.  The move
was also expected to force the closure of an Allied Signal
production plant in Indiana that builds a superior product.

In March 1999, Softwar submitted an open request with the Navy
to interview Undersecretary Buchanan, including a specific list
of questions.  Within days of the Softwar request, the U.S. Navy
opted to delay the project.  This author intends to continue to
pursue this story.

The delay is reported to have a logical reason.  The U.S. Navy
is now reported to be seeking the "French solution."  Navy
officials are trying to reduce the project costs by favoring a
U.S. defense contractor who is slated to team with French
missile maker Aerospatiale, maker of the Exocet and ANF.

French and NATO Navies (such as the Royal Navy) will need a
target drone that duplicates ANF.  The joint Franco/American
project could open the door between Europe and the U.S. for a
wide variety of target drones for all NATO services.  The move
could also improve the strained relations between the U.S. and
France.

France has sold the ANF predecessor, Exocet, to virtually every
nation with sea power.  Iraq, Iran and Argentina have
successfully used Exocet in combat during its long term of
service.  In a perverse form of imitation as "flattery", China
recently introduced its own illegal copy of the Exocet, the
C.801 missile.

French officials are anxious to sell the Exocet follow-on ANF to
a wide variety of customers around the globe, many of them
hostile to U.S. national policy.  The Exocet threat exists and
the U.S. Navy has every reason to fear the proliferation of ANF.

Yet, several all-American firms are anxious to win the tiny Navy
contract - which totals less than $100 million.  Some of their
innovative designs are legends of Area-51 UFO lore.  These new
and radical, low cost, options can imitate the French ANF,
Sunburn or any other threat.  They not only offer innovation but
security against proliferation and investments that strengthen
the U.S. industrial base.

The tiny price for such benefits puzzles me.  We have certainly
spent far more than $100 million investigating the many Clinton
scandals.  The Clinton scandal industry, both government and
private, can take credit for much of the recent economic growth.
The price of this key project is so small in Washington terms
that most on Capitol hill scoff at even discussing it.

There is no question that the Navy, starved for funds by the
many years of Clinton neglect, sought any answer that did not go
on the books.  Navy objections to a deal with Russia fell on
deaf ears bent by political contributions.  It was the added
attention by the public, press and finally, the Congress that
killed the MA-31 deal.

The extra attention may result in a tiny increase in budget from
a President suddenly eager to look tough on defense.  In fact, a
mere $10 million could purchase the remaining 30 American
Talos/Sea Snake missiles and provide our Navy with a badly
needed stop-gap until the new SSST project is on line.

Either way, with France as an ally or alone, open competition in
what was formally a "done" deal, is now generating the finest
designs at the lowest cost.  The troubled SSST project, once a
political plumb that Clinton and Gore offered to corrupt Russian
Generals, appears to be back on track.  Our Navy, and perhaps
the Navies of our trusted allies, can now patrol the troubled
waters of the next century, knowing they are ready for any
threat.

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1 if by land, 2 if by sea.  Paul Revere - encryption 1775
Charles R. Smith
SOFTWAR         http://www.softwar.net      [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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SOFTWAR EMAIL NEWSLETTER                            03/22/99
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