Military Fears Image May Be Damaged
By JOHN DIAMOND
.c The Associated Press
WASHINGTON (AP) -- Military officials worry that the lofty status gained by
air power in the Persian Gulf War declines with each day that ethnic
atrocities continue in Kosovo despite daily NATO airstrikes.
Air Force officers and an active fraternity of retired air commanders bitterly
blame the Clinton administration for returning to the incremental use of force
that failed to bring Hanoi to heel in the Vietnam War.
``When you fly less than 50 bombing sorties per day for seven days, you're not
serious about what you're doing,'' said retired Air Force Gen. Buster Glosson,
one of the key planners of the Persian Gulf War air campaign. ``At best it's
sporadic bombing.''
Officers, particularly in the Air Force, see the reputation of air power at
risk in a mission laden with restrictions imposed from the White House. And
they are growing increasingly concerned as television images from refugee
camps provide vivid evidence that the airstrikes are not preventing the human
suffering of the Kosovar Albanians.
``I'm worried about us being blamed once again for being over-promisers,''
said one Air Force strategic planner who spoke on condition of anonymity.
No one in uniform will publicly criticize the commander-in-chief over the
campaign against Yugoslavia. But Lt. Gen. Ron Marcotte, commander of the 8th
Air Force, underscored preconditions for success from the air.
``We've got to be in it for the long haul, ensure that we use all our
capabilities to the fullest extent possible and ensure that our airmen have
the support they need,'' Marcotte said.
The implication was clear enough: Without that support and full exploitation
of capabilities, the Air Force should not be blamed for failure.
As strikes on Yugoslavia intensified this week, so did the rhetoric from
Washington warning against expecting too much from bombs and missiles.
``With respect to stopping the ethnic cleansing, we never supposed or reported
that we had a silver bullet that would bring that to a halt,'' said Vice Adm.
Scott Fry, operations director for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Appearing Wednesday night on CBS's ``60 Minutes II'' program, President
Clinton said he was aware of the military's concern over how air power is
being applied.
``I understand the frustration of some of our people in the Pentagon,''
Clinton said. ``I have worked very hard with them to give them the maximum
possible leeway, showing sensitivity only to targets that might have marginal
benefits but cause a lot of collateral damage. I don't want a lot of innocent
Serbian civilians to die because they have a man running their country that's
doing something atrocious.''
Clinton urged Americans to ``have a little resolve here'' and added, ``We
cannot view this as something that will be instantaneously successful.''
Within the Air Force, sensitivity to criticism stems in part from suspicion
and distrust in other services of doctrines extolling the decisive role of air
power, a debate that dates back to Army airman Billy Mitchell's promotion of
bombers in the 1920s and '30s.
Retired Army Gen. Colin Powell this week warned that the Clinton
administration may not be able to end the Kosovo crisis without inserting
ground forces into the region. ``At the end of the day, if you wish to seize
the initiative, you may have to do that,'' Powell said.
In interviews with active and retired Air Force officers, the Vietnam analogy
came up again and again. Glosson couldn't mention the word, saying only that
the ``gradualism'' of the campaign against Yugoslavia ``reflects an era we'd
all rather forget.''
The Air Force strategic planning officer likened the Yugoslav bombing to
President Johnson's ``Rolling Thunder'' air campaign over Vietnam that was
designed to force Hanoi to the negotiating table. Then as now, such a campaign
puts the initiative in the hands of the enemy, he said -- a view echoed by
Powell.
Dan Kuehl, a professor at the National Defense University and an air strike
planner at the time of the Gulf War, said, ``The air power folks -- and I'm
one of them -- are very sensitive to the criticism that, `Oh, well, it's been
six days and the Serbs haven't stopped.'''
Air Force Lt. Col. Peter Faber said the current thinking within the Air Force
sees airstrikes as a way ``to create mental concussion and paralysis'' in an
enemy with simultaneous strikes that disrupt communications, electricity,
infrastructure and other links that connect citizens and military forces to
leadership. But the campaign must operate intensively, around the clock. ``The
paralysis school requires constant pressure.''
Retired Air Force Col. John Warden, author of ``Air Campaign,'' an influential
book on air power strategy, said Clinton opposed the Vietnam War but
apparently neglected to study the military lessons in that campaign.
Clinton, according to Warden, ``concluded that that's the way we go to war. We
do things like escalating. We do things like signal-sending, like
gradualism.'' Warden was one of the developers of the idea of stunning and
confusing an enemy with simultaneous attacks on an enemy's support structure,
an idea first tested in the Gulf War.
Though more violent in the short run, Warden said such a campaign may end a
conflict sooner, and save lives.
