-Caveat Lector- Library: Risk prevention and the political control of genetic engineering: lessons from a participatory technology assessment on transgenic herbicide-resistant crops Wolfgang van den Daele Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Reichpietschufer 50, D-10785, Berlin, Germany Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ABSTRACT The review describes the political experiment of a participatory technology assessment which was organized in Germany to test whether the endless battle over genetic engineering could be transferred from the public arena to a dialogue of rational argumentation. Transgenic herbicide-resistant crop plants were the topic of the technology assessment. The claim that such plants pose particular risks because they have been genetically modified could not be defended in an exchange of arguments. The critics continued to reject the technology, but on different grounds, arguing that there was no acceptable social need for herbicide-resistant plants, since better alternatives were available. This shift seemed to indicate that the real issue behind the conflict over genetic engineering is not the prevention of risk, but the quest for more democratic control of the dynamics of technological innovation. The critics refused, however, to ratify this finding as a result of the dialogue and thus avoided the redefinition of the conflict in the public agenda. Putting risk arguments to test In July 1998 the Swiss citizens rejected the claim that an unconditional ban on the release of genetically modified organisms into the environment should be included in the Swiss constitution. It remains to be seen whether, with this referendum, the long argument over the risks of genetic engineering which have dominated the public debate, particularly in German-speaking countries, will finally come to a halt. We had earlier put the arguments to the test of a participatory technology assessment organized by the Science Center for Social Research from 1991-1993 on transgenic herbicide-resistant crop plants. This technology assessment was specific for two reasons. Firstly, it was participatory. It involved some 50 persons from environmental groups, industry, regulatory agencies and the scientific community, giving full representation and a fair share of resources (for commissioning expert reports) to the critics of the technology. Secondly, it was discursive. Participants were expected to collect and discuss all available arguments in an ongoing process of communication and interaction. For that purpose they attended a series of conferences which lasted more than 10 days in all. Discourse in such a social setting is remarkably different from the so-called "public" discourse pursued in mass communication. Participants in mass communication tend to use the rhetoric of arguments but rarely observe the disclipine of argumentation. They normally confine themselves to the statement of their own strongest points, neglecting countervailing arguments or selecting for consideration only those which they can easily refute. In contrast, the participants in our technology assessment were bound to take the rules of argumentation seriously. The presence of advocates of opposing views guarantees that the full range of arguments and counterarguments are considered. Selectivity cannot be maintained. The participants may well be committed to restrictive positions and strategic interests, but as long as they participate in the process of communicative interaction they can hardly ignore requests to substantiate reasons, to take objections into account, to present the empirical evidence for a statement, and to consider counter-evidence. Discussions over risks proceeded through various stages in our technology assessment: from recognizable risk with predictable consequence to hypothetical and unknown risks with unforseeable consequences from the isolated assessment of risks involved in genetically modified plants to a comparison of risk between transgenic and non-transgenic plants from the need to substantiate suspected risk to a reversal of the burden of proof; the absence of risk should be demonstrated from arguments over risks to arguments over social benefits; socio-economic need should be a prerequisite for the introduction of new technology. All these aspects had been raised in the public debate before. What the technology assessment showed was that there is a logical order or pattern of transformation, to which the criticism of genetic engineering will be submitted if put to the test of argumentation. Comparing the risks of transgenic and non-transgenic plants Basically, no risks from transgenic herbicide-resistant plants were recognizable which were not already known from non-transgenic plants. Recognizable risks were "normalized" through comparison. They no longer appeared dramatic if compared to the risks which are accepted with conventional agricultural crops and practices. The participants in the technology assessment agreed that it was not enough to consider risks which can be described and tested. The real issue with transgenic plants might well be that we do not know the risks. However, it was pointed out that in conventional breeding too one can neither foresee nor control what the physiological impact of new genes might be, given the genetic background of the host plant. Unexpected and undesirable side-effects are abundant and must be coped with through testing and selection in the further development of new varieties. Thus, comparison with conventional plants not only "normalized" the recognizable risks of transgenic plants, but also the uncertainties and the hypothetical risks which might be implied by the fact that we have limited foresight of the possible consequences of such plants. The critics had two arguments as to why it was not legitimate to compare conventional breeding and the construction of transgenic plants. More serious side-effects should be expected with the latter because: (1) transgenes insert at random and may cause insertional mutations in the host genome which can trigger changes in the transformed plant that are unrelated to the information coded in the transgene; and (2) genes can be transferred across species barriers and introduce metabolic pathways which have never belonged to the host plant species. Both arguments refer to hypothetical risks. There is no empirical evidence yet that more serious side-effects do in fact occur in transgenic plants, nor is it possible to anticipate such effects theoretically in any detail. It is, however, held that, as one critic put it, one can infer from the "specific quality" of genetic engineering that transgenic plants present a "specific type of uncertainty". In our technology assessment, the first of the above arguments was invalidated through comparison, by pointing out that insertional mutations (and pleitropic effects) are not specific to genetic engineering. They also occur with conventional breeding techniques and when natural transposable elements, which are known to exist in most plants, and also insert at random, jump around in the plant genome. The second argument was considered as valid in principle, but again weakend through comparison. While it may be true that the probability of side effects is theoretically higher in transgenic plants, because (and if) new metabolic pathways are transferred, it can also be argued that the probability of side effects is theoretically lower in transgenic plants, because with genetic engineering a single, identifiable gene product is transferred, whereas with crossing techniques an uncontrolled number of undetermined genes may be exchanged, all of which can interact with the existing metabolism. Thus, the assumption that transgenic plants will have more unexpected side effects than non-transgenic plants seemed as only as good in theory as the contrary assumption that transgenic plants have less unexpected side effects than non-transgenic plants. The critics of genetic engineering finally retreated to the argument that even if our present knowledge does not warrant the assumption that transgenic plants involve specific and more severe risks than non-transgenic plants it is still theoretically possible that such risks do in fact exist and may become apparent later. This argument could only be effectively turned against new technology if the rule that risk assumptions have to be substantiated was abandoned and the burden of proof shifted from those who claim risks to those who claim safety. At this point of the debate our technology assessment proceeded beyond the established framework of risk prevention and raised fundamental issues of the politics of innovation. Socio-economic need and the quest for democratic control of innovation It became quickly apparent in our discussions that a full reversal of the burden of proof is not an operational rule. The unsubstantiated assumption that there may be unknown risks can easily be raised against any new technology and can hardly be refuted. No innovation would survive under such a rule. Consequently, the critics of genetic engineering made the next step and demanded that only those innovations should be admitted for which there is a clear socio-economic need. They concluded that transgenic herbicide-resistant plants had to be prohibited under this test, because such plants represented no ecological advantage and little if any agronomic use; efficient weed control could be achieved in almost all cases using available selective herbicides, and non-chemical methods of weed control would be the ecologically preferable alternative, anyhow. Arguments as to whether transgenic herbicide-resistant plants are useful and satisfy a proper need were accepted as a necessary and legitimate topic of inquiry (and controversy) in the technology assessment. The proposal, however, to make "socio-economic need" a legal prerequisite in the regulation of the technology was rejected by most participants. It was argued that this would replace market mechanisms with political decision-making and that the decline of the socialist countries had demonstrated that no model for an efficient economy exists in which decisions on innovation and investment are the domain of politics. The critics conceded the problems but insisted that nevertheless some revisions of the established institutional balance between market mechanisms and democratic control of innovation were necessary and that the question of whether we really need a new technology must be put on the political agenda. The controversy over this point remained as unresolved in this technology assessment as it is in the rest of the society. The limits of participatory technology assessment The exchange of arguments did not achieve a final consensus in our technology assessment. However, the dissent at the end of the discussions was not the same as at the beginning. The issues of debate had been transformed. They had shifted from arguments about risk prevention to arguments about the reform of political institutions and the future development of society. This shift seems to indicate that no conclusive reasons against the use of transgenic herbicide-resistant plants could be formulated within the framework of established risk regulation, and that the real issue behind the conflict over genetic engineering is the quest for democratic control of the process of technological innovation. It would have been a real accomplishment if we had been able to publicize this transformation of issues, and hence a refiguration of the landscape of political controversy in Germany, as a finding of our participatory technology assessment. The critics of genetic engineering were not, however, prepared to take this step. They withdrew their participation in the technology assessment at the beginning of the final conference, at which they were expected either to accept the proposed conclusions or to reject them, giving additional reasons why they considered them incorrect. Apparently, it would have been difficult for them to declare explicitly that the conflict was not about risks, but about social goals and political reform, after they had committed themselves categorically to the rhetoric of risk, and used it successfully in the mobilization of the general public. As long as one claims risks it is easy to argue that the dominant policy is irresponsible and offends against generally accepted values. When risk arguments no longer play a role, it seems more legitimate to apply majority decisions in the choice of conflicting goals. Participatory technology assessments are not a procedural fix to resolve political conflicts over technological innovation. They provide a forum for rational discourse in which controversial arguments will not only be exchanged but also examined. Such discourse implies learning. However, while the learning may easily be accepted by the observing public (including parliaments, administrations, and the courts) the participants who represent the parties of the political conflict may refuse to adapt to what has been learned. Participatory technology assessment constitutes a limited context of cooperation and it operates at a distance from the real political arena. It remains a small island of argumentation in a large sea of strategic battle. Thus, in terms of "realpolitik" it must be expected that arguments which have been refuted within the technology assessment will continue to be used outside the technology assessment, as long as they can still impress the public. Even then, participatory technology assessments may be a valuable contribution to the political culture. They will not lead to consensus, political decisions will still have to be taken in dissent. However, procedures that give the critics a fair chance and submit controversial issues to the discipline of rational argumentation will contribute to the legitimacy of decision-making in dissent. References For a full acount of the technology assessment see: van den Daele, W.; Pühler, A.; Sukopp, H. (1996): Grüne Gentechnik im Widerstreit. Weinheim: Verlag Chemie. An English summary report is available as WZB-discussion paper FS II 97-302: van den Daele, W.; Pühler, A.; Sukopp, H. (1997): Transgenic herbicide-resistant crops. A participatory technology assessment. Requests for papers should be addressed to the author: Wolfgang van den Daele, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Reichpietschufer 50, D-10785, Berlin. [Fax: (49) 30 25491-219, e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]] Library: Risk prevention and the political control of genetic engineering: lessons from a participatory technology assessment on transgenic herbicide-resistant crops http://binas.unido.org/binas/Library/cabi/daele.html DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion and informational exchange list. Proselyzting propagandic screeds are not allowed. Substance—not soapboxing! These are sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory', with its many half-truths, misdirections and outright frauds is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. That being said, CTRL gives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and always suggests to readers; be wary of what you read. CTRL gives no credeence to Holocaust denial and nazi's need not apply. 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