-Caveat Lector- Some interesting articles (abbreviated format with links for the full versions) and feedback in this newsletter...
Progressive Response wrote: > ************************************************************************ > > Click http://www.fpif.org/progresp/volume6/v6n41.html to view an HTML-formatted >version of this issue of Progressive Response. > > ************************************************************************ > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------- > The Progressive Response 31 December 2002 Vol. 6, No. 41 > Editor: Tom Barry > ------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > The Progressive Response (PR) is produced weekly by the Interhemispheric Resource >Center (IRC, online at www.irc-online.org) as part of its Foreign Policy in Focus >(FPIF) project. FPIF, a "Think Tank Without Walls," is an international network of >analysts and activists dedicated to "making the U.S. a more responsible global leader >and partner by advancing citizen movements and agendas." FPIF is joint project of the >Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies. We encourage >responses to the opinions expressed in the PR and may print them in the "Letters and >Comments" section. For more information on FPIF and joining our network, please >consider visiting the FPIF website at http://www.fpif.org/, or email ><[EMAIL PROTECTED]> to share your thoughts with us. > > Tom Barry, editor of Progressive Response, is a senior analyst with the >Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC, online at www.irc-online.org) and codirector >of Foreign Policy In Focus. He can be contacted at <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>. > > **** We Count on Your Support **** > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > I. Updates and Out-Takes > > *** FRONTIER JUSTICE | TOWARD A REAL SECURITY AGENDA *** > By FPIF staff and Advisory Board > > *** DEBATING POST-SADDAM IRAQ: HARDLINERS V. REALPOLITIKERS *** > By Jim Lobe > > *** POST-SADDAM IRAQ: LINCHPIN OF A NEW OIL ORDER *** > By Michael Renner > > *** PROGRESSIVE RESPONSE SUBSCRIBERS *** > > II. OUTSIDE THE U.S. > > *** GLOBAL VIGILANCE IN A GLOBAL VILLAGE: U.S. EXPANDS ITS MILITARY BASES *** > By Madhavee Inamdar > > III. LETTERS AND COMMENTS > > *** THANKS *** > > *** ABRAMS APPOINTMENT NO SURPRISE *** > > *** I AM WITH YOU *** > > *** MISGIVINGS AND CRITIQUES OF "OUR FATEFUL CHOICE" *** > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > I. Updates and Out-Takes > > *** FRONTIER JUSTICE | TOWARD A REAL SECURITY AGENDA *** > > (Editor's Note: Frontier Justice is a weekly column written alternately by Tom Barry >and John Gershman, foreign policy analysts at the Interhemispheric Resource Center, >chronicling instances of U.S. unilateralism and its assault on the multilateralism >framework for managing global affairs. It is part of the new Project Against the >Present Danger. These columns are now indexed on the www.presentdanger.org site at: >http://www.presentdanger.org/frontier/2002/index.html. This week's column is an >excerpt from Our Fateful Choice: Voices for an Alternative U.S. Foreign and Military >Policy, an FPIF sign-on statement. We encourage our readers to sign the statement and >to send us your feedback by visiting: http://www.presentdanger.org/choice.html ) > > World peace depends on strong collective security mechanisms. The new threat of >international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the >existence of repressive, militaristic states like Iraq underscore the continuing need >for multilateral responses to security threats. The U.S. military must be prepared to >protect the nation against external threats. But U.S. military might is an >insufficient guarantor of national and international security. Well-funded >international institutions and international cooperation in intelligence gathering, >peacekeeping, and arms control are essential components to any real security. > > The United States should adopt a real security agenda--one that addresses the actual >dangers that Americans now face--by using its leadership to mobilize international >action against these global threats. Such an alternative approach would include: > > · Renewing efforts to mobilize a global consensus and global action against all >forms of terrorism at home and abroad. > > · Increasing our commitment to the UN security system and international law, while >urging UN action against threats to the peace. > > · Committing the United States to the fundamental principle of international >justice--that no country is above international law. > > · Strengthening multilateral, verifiable arms control regimes that aim to curb >weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, while at the same time >promoting nuclear disarmament and international demilitarization. > > · Exercising leadership for protection of the environment through the ratification >of the Kyoto Protocol and other international environmental agreements while >protecting existing multilateral environmental agreements from challenges by free >trade agreements. > > · Increasing support for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria as >well as other international efforts to respond to the AIDS pandemic. > > · Supporting efforts to promote corporate accountability at home and abroad while >working to insure that the global governance mechanisms of the international >economy--including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Trade >Organization (WTO)--are embedded within a framework that effectively addresses the >poverty, inequality, environmental degradation, and social disintegration that are >among the greatest threats to security in the world today. > > In the past several decades, the international community has made progress in >reaching effective agreements in the areas of human rights, environmental protection, >arms control, and collective security. We turn our backs on this progress at grave >risk to ourselves and humankind. This framework of international cooperation can help >us address current threats such as international terrorism, arms proliferation, and >deepening global poverty. Rather than spurning multilateralism, U.S. leaders should >dedicate themselves to reforming and reinvigorating the processes and structures of >international problem solving. As a world power with national interests around the >globe, the United States has the greatest stake in building international >institutions, fostering international cooperation, and instituting the international >rule of law. > > A good-faith effort in this regard would include: > > · Remitting all unpaid UN dues and making regular and timely payments of future >assessments to UN programs, including those for peacekeeping operations. > > · Committing to help reform UN decisionmaking to reflect the new realities of world >power and population distribution in the 21st century. > > · Strengthening international justice by ratifying the International Criminal Court. > > · Expanding the international human rights regime by ratifying such key >international human rights covenants as the International Covenant on Economic, >Social, and Cultural Rights; the International Labor Organization's core labor rights >conventions; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against >Women; and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. > > Now, more than ever before, U.S. foreign policy should draw inspiration from the >deep but often suppressed democratic and internationalist foundations of this nation. >Borrowing a phrase from the Declaration of Independence, this administration needs to >show "a decent respect for the opinions of mankind." > > We are compelled--both by our consciences and our hopes for future generations--to >call for a new foreign policy that successfully meets the new challenges that >threaten global security, peace, and development. Threats to our common security need >multilateral responses. Not in our name can the U.S. government ignore world opinion, >reject international treaties, adopt first-strike prerogatives, and put power before >reason. We stand behind a foreign and military policy that uses U.S. power >responsibly--one that wins respect at home and abroad through its commitment to >global partnerships and prudent international leadership. It is precisely such a >policy that will best ensure America's own well-being and protect our own security. > > (Initially signed by FPIF staff and members of the FPIF Advisory Committee, and now >being joined by hundreds of other individuals and organizations. We invite you to add >your own voice by signing the statement at www.presentdanger.org .) > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > *** DEBATING POST-SADDAM IRAQ: HARDLINERS V. REALPOLITIKERS *** > By Jim Lobe > > (Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new FPIF commentary available in its entirety at: >http://www.presentdanger.org/commentary/2002/0212post-saddam.html .) > > While U.S. military strategists are refining their plans for invading Iraq early >next year, the configuration of a post-invasion Iraq remains a matter of hot debate >within the administration of President George W. Bush. The debate breaks along lines >that have become very familiar to those who have followed the administration's >foreign policy since Bush first took office. > > On one side are the neoconservative and unilateralist hawks in and around the >offices of Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, but who >also have key allies strategically placed in the National Security Council and the >State Department. On the other side are the more internationalist realpolitikers led >by Secretary of State Colin Powell and senior career officers in the foreign service, >the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the military itself. They are aided by >former top officials in the George H.W. Bush administration (1989-1993). > > The two groups have tangled repeatedly--from the Kyoto Protocol and North Korea to >the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and, of course, Iraq--over the past two years. They >fought hard over whether to go the UN Security Council before launching an invasion, >and even over how to invade Iraq. > > The hawks, who opposed going to the UN, initially favored an invasion plan that >called for U.S. Special Forces, working with local militias in Kurdistan and other >"liberated" parts of Iraq, to direct U.S. air power against strategic targets, >bringing about the collapse of the Hussein government in much the same way that the >Taliban was defeated in Afghanistan. As insurance, the plan called for some 70,000 >U.S. troops to stand by--ready to intervene if the going got tough. > > This strategy was scorned by the realists, and especially by the military brass, who >found it not only hopelessly optimistic, but potentially disastrous. Ret. Gen. >Anthony Zinni, Powell's Mideast adviser, who served in the late 1990s as the >commander of the U.S. Central Command, which includes the Gulf region, even refers to >it as the "Bay of Goats." Consistent with the so-called Powell Doctrine, the >dissenters called for mustering hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops and major >weapons systems for a full-scale invasion that would completely overwhelm defending >forces. By the end of last summer, a compromise was struck in which the realists got >the better of the bargain, just as they did in September when Bush went to the United >Nations. > > But this agreement on the battle plan does not mean there is any consensus about the >configuration of a post-invasion Iraq--over which both factions are still at odds. > > The neoconservatives in Rumsfeld's and Cheney's office see the invasion of Iraq as >the first step in a profound transformation of the Arab world. It is this faction >that has argued for establishing a U.S. military occupation similar to that which >followed World War II in Germany and Japan. The hawks see as their main partner in >this enterprise one particular opposition leader, the head of the exiled Iraqi >National Congress (INC), Ahmed Chalabi, a long-standing friend of both Deputy Defense >Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and the chairman of the Defense Policy Board (DPB), Richard >Perle, who is based at AEI. They have also favored establishing a provisional >government headed by Chalabi once the invasion gets underway. In addition, they >reject any major role for the United Nations in administering Iraq. > > The realpolitikers, on the other hand, think these plans are as dangerous as the >hawks' initial ideas about a military campaign. Their rebuttal was laid out in a new >study by a 25-member task force released by the influential Council on Foreign >Relations and the James Baker III Institute for Public Policy, named for Bush >Senior's secretary of state. Headed by Edward Djerejian and Frank Wisner, two retired >foreign service officers who held top diplomatic positions under Bush Senior, the >task force rejected virtually every key position pushed by the hawks. > > (Jim Lobe <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> is a political analyst with Foreign Policy In Focus >(online at www.fpif.org). This analysis originally appeared in the Asia Times.) > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > *** POST-SADDAM IRAQ: LINCHPIN OF A NEW OIL ORDER *** > By Michael Renner > > (Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new FPIF policy report available in its entirety at >http://www.fpif.org/papers/oil.html .) > > Only in the most direct sense is the Bush administration's Iraq policy directed >against Saddam Hussein. In contrast to all the loud talk about terrorism, weapons of >mass destruction, and human rights violations, very little is being said about oil. >The administration has been tight-lipped about its plans for a post-Saddam Iraq and >has repeatedly disavowed any interest in the country's oil resources. But press >reports indicate that U.S. officials are considering a prolonged occupation of Iraq >after their war to topple Saddam Hussein. It is likely that a U.S.-controlled Iraq >will be the linchpin of a new order in the world oil industry. > > The Bush administration's ties to the oil and gas industry are beyond extensive; >they are pervasive. They flow, so to speak, from the top, with a chief executive who >grew up steeped in the culture of Texas oil exploration and tried his hand at it >himself; and a second-in-command who came to office with a multi-million dollar >retirement package in hand from his post of CEO of Halliburton Oil. Once in office, >the vice president developed an energy policy under the primary guidance of a cast of >oil company executives whose identities he has gone to great lengths to withhold from >public view. > > The Bush administration's energy policy is predicated on ever-growing consumption of >oil, preferably cheap oil. U.S. oil consumption is projected to increase by one-third >over the next two decades. The White House is pushing hard for greater domestic >drilling and wants to open the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to the oil industry. >Even so, the administration's National Energy Policy Development Group, led by Vice >President Cheney, acknowledged in a May 2001 report that U.S. oil production will >fall 12% over the next 20 years. As a result, U.S. dependence on imported oil--which >has risen from one-third in 1985 to more than half today--is set to climb to >two-thirds by 2020. > > Saudi Arabia is a pivotal player. With 262 billion barrels, it has a quarter of the >world's total proven reserves and is the single largest producer.6 More importantly, >the Saudis have demonstrated repeatedly--after the Iranian revolution, and following >Iraq's invasion of Kuwait--that they are prepared to compensate for losses from other >suppliers, calming markets in times of turmoil. > > The pariah state of Iraq, however, is a key prize, with abundant, high-quality oil >that can be produced at very low cost (and thus at great profit). At 112 billion >barrels, its proven reserves are currently second only to Saudi Arabia's. At present, >of course, this is mere potential--the Iraqi oil industry has seriously deteriorated >as a result of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, the 1991 Gulf War, and inadequate postwar >investment and maintenance. Since 1990, the sanctions regime has effectively frozen >plans for putting additional fields into production. But once the facilities are >rehabilitated (a lucrative job for the oil service industry, including Vice President >Cheney's former employer, Halliburton) and new fields are brought into operation, the >spigots could be opened wide. To pay for the massive task of rebuilding, a >post-sanctions Iraq would naturally seek to maximize its oil production. > > Washington would gain enormous leverage over the world oil market. Opening the Iraqi >spigot would flood world markets and drive prices down substantially. OPEC, already >struggling with overcapacity and a tendency among its members to produce above >allotted quotas (an estimated 3 million barrels per day above the agreed total of >24.7 million b/d), might unravel as individual exporters engage in destructive price >wars against each other. A massive flow of Iraqi oil would also limit any influence >that other suppliers, such as Russia, Mexico, and Venezuela, have over the oil market. > > In the Persian Gulf and adjacent regions, access to oil is usually secured by a >pervasive U.S. military presence. From Pakistan to Central Asia to the Caucasus and >from the eastern Mediterranean to the Horn of Africa, a dense network of U.S. >military facilities has emerged--with many bases established in the name of the "war >on terror." > > Although the U.S. military presence is not solely about oil, oil is a key reason. In >1999, General Anthony C. Zinni, then the head of the U.S. Central Command, testified >to the Senate Armed Services Committee that the Persian Gulf region is of "vital >interest" to the U.S. and that the country "must have free access to the region's >resources." > > Bush administration officials have, however, categorically denied oil is one of the >reasons why they are pushing for regime change in Iraq. "Nonsense," Defense Secretary >Donald Rumsfeld told 60 Minutes' Steve Kroft in mid-December 2002. "It has nothing to >do with oil, literally nothing to do with oil." > > In fact, oil company executives have been quietly meeting with U.S.-backed Iraqi >opposition leaders. According to Ahmed Chalabi, head of the Iraqi National Congress, >"The future democratic government in Iraq will be grateful to the United States for >helping the Iraqi people liberate themselves and getting rid of Saddam." And he added >that "American companies, we expect, will play an important and leading role in the >future oil situation in Iraq." > > (Michael Renner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> is a Senior Researcher at Worldwatch Institute >and a policy analyst for Foreign Policy In Focus (online at www.fpif.org).) > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > *** PROGRESSIVE RESPONSE SUBSCRIBERS *** > > The number of Progressive Response subscribers jumped dramatically this year. We now >number more than ten thousand, and we thank you for your support and interest. This >is the first year that we have asked subscribers to contribute to the support of this >weekly progressive response to U.S. foreign policy, and the response has been >encouraging. Although we still have a way to go to meet our goal of $23,500, we have >been heartened by the number of initial contributions to cover the cost of your >subscription. Aside from meeting our budget with your support, we also aim to >increase the number of subscribers by 5,000 in the coming year. To help us meet that >goal, please forward issues of the Progressive Response to your friends, students, >and relatives, encouraging them to subscribe too. > > Wishing you all the best in 2003. > > Tom Barry > Editor, Progressive Response > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > II. Outside the U.S. > > (Editor's Note: FPIF's "Outside the U.S." component aims to bring non-U.S. voices >into the U.S. policy debate and to foster dialog between Northern and Southern actors >in global affairs issues. Please visit our Outside the U.S. page for other non-U.S. >perspectives on global affairs and for information about submissions at: >http://www.fpif.org/outside/index.html. If you're interested in submitting >commentaries for our use, please send your solicitation to John Gershman at ><[EMAIL PROTECTED]>.) > > *** GLOBAL VIGILANCE IN A GLOBAL VILLAGE: U.S. EXPANDS ITS MILITARY BASES *** > By Madhavee Inamdar > > (Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new FPIF "Outside the U.S." commentary, available >in its entirety at: http://www.fpif.org/outside/commentary/2002/0212milbase.html .) > > The consequences of September 11th remain visible on several fronts. Politically, >the United States decided to use the tragedy and reorganize the world. Its military >bases now cover every continent. The largest of these is situated in one of the >tiniest states: Qatar in the Persian Gulf. There are 189 member states of the United >Nations. The globe's only superpower maintains a military presence in 140 countries, >including significant deployments in 25 countries. It has security arrangements with >at least 36 countries. > > Empires throughout history have relied on foreign military bases to enforce their >rule. U.S. forces are active in the biggest range of countries since the Second World >War. The aim is to provide platforms from which to launch attacks on any group >perceived by President George W. Bush to be a danger to America. According to defense >analysts, the intention is to have a host of such forward bases--staffed by a few >thousand troops and technicians all year round--that can provide support for huge >reinforcements as required. These bases are being built in or near any country that >President Bush decides constitutes "a clear and present danger." > > As of the latest count, there are more than 200,000 troops (half of these in >Asia-Pacific) on foreign soil and more than 50,000 personnel afloat in foreign >waters. In recent years, an average of 35,000 of these personnel have been involved >in contingency operations, mostly around Iraq and in the Balkans. Aside from these, >the United States maintains more than 800 foreign military installations including 60 >major ones. Many current U.S. bases were acquired after previous wars--from the >Second World War through the war in Afghanistan. Bases obtained in one war are seen >as forward deployment positions for some future war, often involving an entirely new >enemy. The Bush administration says publicly that it will leave the Central Asian >bases after the "war on terrorism" is over, but privately officials admit they are >there to stay. As well as bases, the U.S. is sending in military advisers to a host >of countries. > > Are there alternatives to a global network of U.S. military bases? There are >military answers and there are broader political answers. There is a broader >political alternative to a globe-girdling network of bases: dropping the notion that >the United States is the world's policeman. The UN Security Council was supposed to >have at its disposal contingents from the member nations' armed forces under the >strategic direction of a Military Staff Committee. The committee, made up of the >chiefs of staff of the five permanent members of the Security Council, was to advise >on the military requirements for maintaining international peace. The cold war >prevented that blueprint from becoming reality. Now the UN Charter could show the way >to a less expensive, less one-sided approach to maintaining the peace. > > Indeed, the establishment of new bases may in the long run be more critical to U.S. >war planners than the wars themselves. The U.S. military interventions cannot all be >tied to the insatiable U.S. thirst for oil even though many of the recent wars do >have their roots in oil politics. They can nearly all be tied to the U.S. desire to >build or rebuild military bases. The new U.S. military bases, and increasing control >over oil supplies, can in turn be tied to the historical shift taking place since the >1980s: with the rise of the "euro bloc" and "yen bloc," U.S. economic power is >perhaps on the wane. But in military affairs, the U.S. is still the unquestioned >superpower. It has been projecting that military dominance into new strategic regions >as a future counterweight to its economic competitors, to create a military-backed >"dollar bloc" as a wedge geographically situated between its major competitors. The >Bush administration's first National Security Strategy, released recently, > takes an unprecedented step away from cold war views to confront a world beset by >the likes of Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda terrorists. Critics are already describing >the new strategy as arrogant and dangerous--a far cry from the tone of humility in >foreign affairs promised in President Bush's inaugural address. To supporters, it >represents an overdue codification of America's mission of global leadership. On one >thing analysts on both sides agree: In many ways it merely makes explicit what has >been U.S. practice for years. > > (Madhavee Inamdar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> is based in Vancouver, where she is a >researcher in Peace and Conflict Studies. She is a columnist and editorial writer for >Khaleej Times, a UAE-based newspaper. She has degrees in international politics and >strategic studies from Jawaharlal Nehru University and University of Hull.) > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > III. Letters and Comments > > *** THANKS *** > > Re: Iraq Focus (http://www.fpif.org/iraq/index.html) > > Many useful and important petitions have been shown/explained on the Internet. I'm >impressed with them. Your site helps me, & perhaps others, to see a situation from >yet another vantage point. We understand action(s) which we'd like to see take place >in preventing any war. But I strongly believe that the manner in which such action is >worded means as much as the number of people who sign a petition. When we read a >well-thought-out and -worded document such as the one you've written, we can see and >understand the immensity of the situation. Potential war and prevention is a delicate >title. Anytime readers are educated in the process of understanding how to sign their >name to something, they see an even larger picture than they expected. Thank you for >writing a text that is informative and succinct. A paper which also give a scholarly >interpretation of how people will be effected in the future. Thank you. Peace, > > - Camille Pierce <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > *** ABRAMS APPOINTMENT NO SURPRISE *** > > Re: Neoconservatives Consolidate Control over U.S. Mideast Policy >(http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2002/0212abrams.html) > > The appointment of Elliot Abrams to the top U.S. Mideast policy spot in the National >Security Council should surprise no one. In fact, any observer of the hostile policy >of the radical Republican right-wingers in the Republican-controlled Congress during >Clinton administration toward the Oslo process and the policy of the Israeli >government under the leadership of Yitzhak Rabin supported by president Bill Clinton >could discern this trend underpinned by ideological affinity and identification with >the reactionary Israeli militant right represented by the Likud party and the >extremist settlers' organizations. > > - eliezer haffner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > *** I AM WITH YOU *** > > Re: Our Fateful Choice (http://www.presentdanger.org/pdf/PrD-OurFatefulChoice.pdf) > > I have signed the statement because I feel that it may be useful, and it reflects >many of my sentiments. However, I think that it is too mild a statement, a bit too >academic in flavor, for it seems to ignore the nature of the beast in Washington. I >don't believe that you can convince the beast not to be beastly on the basis of >intellectual arguments while it seeks to further its policies of narrow self >interest, knowing that seemingly no one can challenge it. You have to demand that it >stop being beastly or it will be fiercely resisted. > > Of course, you may not be addressing the Bush administration, but rather hope to >enlist the support of all those who are in any way appalled by its policies, both for >humane and practical reasons. With that I am with you. > > Good luck--to all of us. > > - Morton K. Brussel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > *** MISGIVINGS AND CRITIQUES OF "OUR FATEFUL CHOICE" *** > > Re: Our Fateful Choice (http://www.presentdanger.org/pdf/PrD-OurFatefulChoice.pdf) > > Having received my latest "Progressive Response," I learned about your "Our Fateful >Choice" document. It is a good piece, expressing many important arguments and >positive ideas. Also, it is signed by a number of people for whom I have a great deal >of respect--a respect I also have for you and your work. I am pleased that you are >issuing the statement, and I hope it has some impact. > > Nonetheless, I do not want to add my name to the "Our Fateful Choice" statement. >Although I share the statement's abhorrence of the Bush administration's policies, I >think it differs from my own views in important ways. > > My primary dispute with the statement is that I believe it accepts the Bush >administration's framework of defining "terrorists with global reach" as a--perhaps >"the"--principal threat to U.S. and global security. In my view, what we call >"terrorism" has root causes in the structures of inequality, the poverty and the >exploitation that dominate the world economy and in the corresponding harsh >inequalities of power--and the arrogant exercise of that power--in international >political affairs. The U.S. government and U.S.-based firms, while by no means the >sole forces effecting these global problems, have been and are major forces >establishing and maintaining the situation that I see at the base of "terrorism." In >order to deal with U.S. foreign policy, I believe we need to start from a recognition >of this U.S. role in world affairs. I recognize that your statement does list other >threats, and you do raise issues of human rights and suggest that economic issues are >of some importance. > Yet I believe that your focus on the political realm binds you to an approach that >downplays, and may in effect ignore, what I see as the root causes of the issues of >concern. > > Before going further, I should explain why I use the term "terrorism" in quotations, >as I do so to underscore my objection to what I see as the failure of your statement >to fully confront the role of the U.S. in world affairs. Any reasonable definition of >"terrorism" would include the terror that the U.S. government has brought to bear >upon peoples around the globe, recently and over the longer term. To speak of >"terrorism" without acknowledging the actions of the U.S. government will, I think, >lead us to a poor policy response. > > In addition, I have some serious misgivings about the way in which your statement >portrays U.S. history. The statement implies that the current policy is a major >departure from past U.S. policies. While I do not deny that the actions of the Bush >administration are especially aggressive and dangerous, I think they depart much less >from past policy than you indicate. Certainly the U.S. government has undertaken >unilateral, preemptive interventions at many times in the past. In the Middle East, >one might point to the U.S. government's role in the overthrow of the Mossadegh >government in 1953. No, this did not involve full-scale war, but it was certainly a >unilateral and preemptive action. In the realm of full-scale war, there is of course >Vietnam. The U.S. government's actions there were certainly unilateral, and they were >preemptive in the sense that they were undertaken without any threat posed to the >United States itself. These examples, of course, are simply part of a long list. > > Moreover, in your description of U.S. efforts to establish a new world order in the >wake of World War II, I think your focus on the United Nations leads to a distortion >of history, a distortion that portrays a much more benign role for the U.S. in world >affairs than is justified. My reading of the history of that period suggests that >U.S. business and the U.S. government were engaged in a clear and conscious effort to >establish their international dominance. The IMF and World Bank were structured in a >manner to assure U.S. control and have been used consistently to pursue the >international interests of the United States--which has meant the interests of >U.S.-based internationally operating firms and corresponding strategic-military >interests. I do not think it will do us much good to fail to recognize the reality of >U.S. history and paint a misleading picture of our past. > > As a consequence of the analysis that I believe is implicit in your statement, you >end up in a dispute with the Bush administration that is largely a dispute over >strategy, not a dispute over ends and interests. You argue that the Bush people are >doing the job of maintaining our security in the wrong way. They should, you >maintain, protect us from "terrorism" and do so through "collective security." I do >not think a U.S. government, the Bush administration or any other, can do a very good >job of protecting us from "terrorism" until its ends and interests are altered. Yes, >the government can stop individuals or groups from perpetrating some of the >particular horrors that have filled our TV screens in recent years, but, while U.S. >political and economic ends and interests remain as they are, I expect that we will >continue to get terrible responses and "blowbacks." > > So, yes, those people responsible for the September 11 attacks should be brought to >justice, but it should not be a selective justice. It should be a justice that also >deals with actions taken by U.S. actors and allies. Otherwise it will be simply a >"justice" of the powerful. In the realm of the practical, I do not disagree with the >particular proposals that you put forth. This is part of what I meant when I said >your statement is a good one. But I would be much more comfortable with something >more. Even if we recognize that it may not be practical to demand changes in U.S. >ends and interests at this time and thus put forth lesser demands, we should at least >recognize the roots of the problems. > > Again, let me reiterate my view that "Our Fateful Choice" is a good piece, >expressing many important arguments and positive ideas. I hope you will take my >disagreements in the context of this view. > > - Arthur MacEwan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Please consider supporting Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF). FPIF is a new kind of >think tank--one serving citizen movements and advancing a fresh, internationalist >understanding of global affairs. Although we make our FPIF products freely available >on the Internet, we need financial support to cover our staff time and expenses. >Increasingly, FPIF depends on you and other individual donors to sustain our >bare-bones budget. Click on https://secure.webburner.net/fpif/donate/index.html to >support FPIF online, or for information about making contributions over the phone or >through the mail. > > ***** We Count on Your Support. Thank you. ***** > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------- > We're working to make the Progressive Response informative and useful, so let us >know how we're doing, via email to <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>. Please put "Progressive >Response" in the subject line. Please feel free to cross-post the Progressive >Response elsewhere. 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