-Caveat Lector-

January 25, 2003
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/25/opinion/25BASS.html?ex=1044560419
&ei=1&en=76d241c355228fe7
The Frustrations of Inspections

By WARREN BASS




fter years of Iraqi deceit, United Nations inspections now feel both
frustrating and familiar. "This looks like the rerun of a bad movie,"
President Bush said last week. In fact, that movie has been running for
longer than he realizes. Nuclear weapons inspections are almost always
difficult — even if the country being inspected is a friend of the United
States.

>From 1961 until 1969, United States nuclear inspectors were quietly sent
into Israel's secret reactor at Dimona in the Negev Desert. Of course,
there are obvious differences between Israel then and Iraq now; Israel was
hardly a regional menace like Iraq. It sought nuclear weapons as the
ultimate deterrent to Arab armies and as a guarantee against annihilation.
Still, the C.I.A. warned that a nuclear Israel could set off a Middle East
arms race and drive Arab states toward Moscow.

The Eisenhower administration sought to channel Israel's atomic efforts
toward peaceful research. It provided some technology for a small reactor
outside Tel Aviv under its Atoms for Peace program, which encouraged
nonmilitary nuclear science. But in 1958, a U-2 spy plane spotted a
suspicious construction site in the Negev. When news reports confirmed a
second reactor's existence, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion told the
Knesset that Dimona was "designed exclusively for peaceful purposes."

President John F. Kennedy, like his predecessor, was inclined to distrust
but verify. And Ben- Gurion, fearing Soviet interference, preferred United
States inspections to international ones. But Israel controlled the
inspections tightly. The first tour came, after much Israeli stalling, on May
18, 1961, when two scientists from the United States Atomic Energy
Commission spent the day being shown around Dimona, saw no plutonium-
separation plant, and gave the reactor something close to a clean bill of
health.

Kennedy, however, remained skeptical. At the Waldorf-Astoria in New York
on May 30, the new president told Ben-Gurion that he wanted more
inspections "on the theory that a woman should not only be virtuous but
also have the appearance of virtue." Sixteen months later, two other
commission scientists were abruptly taken on another tour around Dimona
— this time for just 40 minutes.

In 1963 Kennedy finally forced a showdown. Secretary of State Dean Rusk
told the Israelis that the president now wanted semiannual, unhindered
visits to Dimona by American experts. Kennedy insisted on two inspections
per year to see how fast Dimona was burning through fuel — a telltale sign
of a weapons program.

Ben-Gurion defiantly offered one supervised visit per year. That spring,
Kennedy sent Ben- Gurion two scorching letters warning that U.S.-Israel
relations would be "seriously jeopardized" without real inspections. When
Ben-Gurion resigned over an unrelated domestic political scandal, Kennedy
repeated the threat to the new prime minister, Levi Eshkol.

Eshkol's advisers were split. Deputy Defense Minister Shimon Peres, who
had helped start the Dimona program, wanted to defy the Americans;
Israel's ambassador to Washington, Avraham Harman, urged cooperation. On
Aug. 19, Eshkol sought to mollify Washington without abandoning Dimona.
He agreed to regular American visits, hinting that the six-month schedule
would not be a problem, and promised to return plutonium produced at
Dimona to France. Meanwhile, as the Federation of American Scientists
later reported, Israel installed false control-room panels and bricked over
passages leading to Dimona's innards.

Then Lyndon Johnson became president. He proved less resolute than
Kennedy, and Eshkol kept stalling. Johnson ended up settling for one
daylong visit per year, under watchful Israeli eyes. By 1969, the Nixon
administration had concluded that Israel had some nuclear weapons
capacity and gave up on inspections.

It's tempting to use the Dimona story to conclude that inspections can't
work, even under nigh-ideal conditions. But a better conclusion may be
that inspections are more easily used to paper over proliferation problems
than to solve them. Kennedy wanted to use inspections to stop Ben-
Gurion's drive for the bomb, but Johnson and Eshkol used them as a fig leaf
— averring that Israel's purpose was peaceful. They averted a regional crisis
not by halting Israel's nuclear program but by allowing it to continue and
muting American suspicions.

None of this means that war is the Bush administration's best or only
option on Iraq. But it does suggest that the success of inspections often
depends on who's more determined: the inspectors or the inspected. That
moral holds for friends and foes alike.

Warren Bass, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, is author
of the forthcoming "Support Any Friend: Kennedy's Middle East and the
Making of the U.S.-Israel Alliance."


Copyright 2003 The New York Times Company | Permissions | Privacy Policy
Forwarded for your information.  The text and intent of the article
have to stand on their own merits.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material
is distributed without charge or profit to those who have
expressed a prior interest in receiving this type of information
for non-profit research and educational purposes only.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"Do not believe in anything simply because you have heard it. Do
not believe simply because it has been handed down for many genera-
tions.  Do not believe in anything simply because it is spoken and
rumoured by many.  Do not believe in anything simply because it is
written in Holy Scriptures.  Do not believe in anything merely on
the authority of teachers, elders or wise men.  Believe only after
careful observation and analysis, when you find that it agrees with
reason and is conducive to the good and benefit of one and all.
Then accept it and live up to it." The Buddha on Belief,
from the Kalama Sut

<A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/";>www.ctrl.org</A>
DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER
==========
CTRL is a discussion & informational exchange list. Proselytizing propagandic
screeds are unwelcomed. Substance—not soap-boxing—please!  These are
sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory'—with its many half-truths, mis-
directions and outright frauds—is used politically by different groups with
major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought.
That being said, CTRLgives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and
always suggests to readers; be wary of what you read. CTRL gives no
credence to Holocaust denial and nazi's need not apply.

Let us please be civil and as always, Caveat Lector.
========================================================================
Archives Available at:
http://peach.ease.lsoft.com/archives/ctrl.html
 <A HREF="http://peach.ease.lsoft.com/archives/ctrl.html";>Archives of
[EMAIL PROTECTED]</A>

http:[EMAIL PROTECTED]/
 <A HREF="http:[EMAIL PROTECTED]/";>ctrl</A>
========================================================================
To subscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email:
SUBSCRIBE CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED]

To UNsubscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email:
SIGNOFF CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Om

Reply via email to