-Caveat Lector-
The Progressive Response
April 14th, 1999
Vol. 3, No. 13
The Progressive Response is a publication of Foreign Policy In Focus, a
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Tom Barry, editor
Table of Contents
I. Updates and Out-Takes
KOSOVO QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
U.S.-CHINA SECURITY RELATIONS
by James H. Nolt, World Policy Institute
II. Comments
FOREIGN POLICY AND VOICE OF ANCESTORS
by James H. Nolt, World Policy Institute
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I. Updates and Out-Takes
KOSOVO QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
(Ed. Note: Included below are portions of a document edited by Foreign
Policy In Focus codirector Martha Honey that includes the observations of
the following foreign policy experts: Phyllis Bennis, expert on the United
Nations and Fellow, Institute for Policy Studies; Robert Hayden, Director of
Russian and East European Studies, University of Pittsburgh; Carl LeVan,
Legislative Director, Office of Rep. John Conyers (D-MI); Jules Lobel,
Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh; Alistair Millar, Director of the
Washington Office, Fourth Freedom Forum; Michael Ratner, Lawyer, Center for
Constitutional Rights; Stephen Zunes, Professor of Politics, University of
San Francisco. The entire document is being posted on the project's website:
www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org)
Has the NATO bombing met the three goals originally announced by President
Clinton on March 24:
1) to "demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's opposition to aggression,"
2) to deter Milosevic "from continuing and escalating his attacks" in
Kosovo, and
3) to damage Serbia's capacity to wage war in the future?
The bombing has done just the opposite. It has increased the repression
against the Kosovar Albanians, threatened to widen the war, strengthened
Milosevic, and weakened NATO. The NATO air offensive has also failed in the
additional goals originally listed by President Clinton and others in the
administration:
1. To "prevent a humanitarian catastrophe"--to the contrary, the attack
provoked one.
2. "To prevent a wider war"--to the contrary, the war is threatening to
engulf other countries.
3. To build a "peaceful, secure, united, stable Europe" by meeting the
following challenges:
a. "strengthening our relationship with Russia"--the reverse has
happened.
b. "ending instability in the Balkans"--the reverse is happening.
4. "Demonstrating the seriousness of NATO's purpose"--but neither President
Clinton nor other top officials specified what would constitute a successful
NATO effort. (New York Times, March 25)
Now, according to the New York Times (April 11), the NATO allies face an
ever more "daunting task" to: 1) stop the Serb attacks against civilians; 2)
escort the half million-plus refugees back to Kosovo; and 3) guarantee a
lasting peace settlement through an indefinite peacekeeping operation. And
to get there will take not only greatly escalating the bombing but, military
experts argue, sending in somewhere between 100,000 and 200,000 NATO ground
troops--something President Clinton explicitly pledged would not happen.
What is the immediate and long-term impact of NATO bombing on Serbia and the
entire region?
The NATO destruction of Serbia's infrastructure, including felled bridges
that have blocked the Danube, will cause severe long-term damage to the
entire economic activity of the Balkans. The larger region, which was
heavily hit by the 1992-95 sanctions on Yugoslavia, is hit economically
again. While Milosevic is evil, his small country, under sanctions for seven
years now, simply does not have the ability to do much damage beyond its
borders. The fallout from the NATO assault will, however, extend throughout
the Balkans.
Macedonia, Montenegro, and Albania are in severe danger of destabilization.
Macedonia's delicate ethnic balance has been disrupted, and its
irresponsible actions toward the refugees have further isolated it.
Albania's weak economy and infrastructure are being further stressed by the
flood of refugees and, reportedly, KLA guerrillas. The democratic and
anti-Milosevic forces in Montenegro have been silenced and the country may
have to house refugees for a long time.
By intervening militarily in what is technically a civil war in Eastern
Europe, NATO has ignited ultra-nationalist, anti-Western sentiments in
Russia and elsewhere. It has validated many of Russia's fears stated during
the debate on NATO expansion that the Alliance is not a defensive
organization anymore. Russia has responded with the unprecedented step of
withdrawing its ambassador to NATO and its lower house of parliament voted
on April 7 to facilitate arms shipments to the Serbs.
Was a NATO military action of this type appropriate and legal under the
organization's mandate?
NATO was the wrong instrument to respond to the Kosovo crisis. Its use not
only violates the UN Charter, but is not encompassed by NATO's own charter
(signed in Washington in 1949), which, under Article 5, defines the Alliance
as collective defense against armed attack and limits NATO to acts of
self-defense.
Kosovo marks the first offensive action ever undertaken by NATO against a
sovereign nation and as such it constitutes what R.W. Apple (New York Times,
March 25) terms "a leap in the dark."
The NATO summit to be held in Washington (April 23 and 25) is intended to
chart the Alliance's new "strategic concept" defining its role into the 21st
century. But the Kosovo action and earlier Bosnian operation (punitive air
strikes and peacekeeping troops) constitute an end run around this process,
producing through action a new raison d'etre for NATO: what NATO officials
term "non-Article 5" missions against ethnic instability. This may turn NATO
into a replacement for the United Nation's role of defining and responding
to international peace and security crises.
What authorization, if any, has the UN given for NATO's military action?
None. The U.S. bypassed the UN Security Council in anticipation of a likely
Russian and Chinese veto. The UN has given no authorization for NATO's
military actions, although UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (April 9) called
for a ceasefire and issued a 5-point demand to Belgrade for ending the
conflict: 1) end intimidation and expulsion of civilians from Kosovo; 2)
withdraw its forces; 3) allow the return of refugees; 4) permit deployment
of an international military force; and 5) agree to international monitoring
for compliance.
Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, only the UN Security Council can
authorize the use of force (except in cases of self-defense). While the
Council has passed resolutions regarding repression in Yugoslavia, none of
these authorizes the use of force. In fact, UNSCR 1199 specifically stated
that the Security Council "remained seized of the matter," meaning future
decisions belong to the Council. This has not been done.
Article 51's right of inherent self-defense does not give any authority for
individual countries or regional organizations to use force for political,
military, or humanitarian intervention within a state. Likewise, the Charter
prohibits the use of force by individual nations unless authorized by the
Security Council, except in self-defense to respond to an armed attack. That
exception is a narrow one, which recognized that a nation being attacked
could not wait for Security Council authorization to respond.
The UN Charter identifies the importance of regional organizations and their
role in maintaining international peace and security. Those organizations,
like the UN itself, are urged by the Charter to exhaust all peaceful means
of resolving disputes "before referring them to the Security Council"
(Article 52) where presumably non-peaceful means might be considered. The
Security Council might have looked to NATO to carry out an "enforcement
action under its authority" (Article 53) in Kosovo, but no such
authorization was requested or granted. And the Charter is explicit that "no
enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional
agencies without the authorization of the Security Council."
What would a negotiated, diplomatic settlement to this conflict look like?
Any settlement would almost certainly begin with a ceasefire, as the UN
Secretary General noted. The process should be done under joint UN and OSCE
auspices and include:
1. Reasserting the primacy of the UNHCR as the highest authority to
coordinate international response to the refugee crisis and, eventually,
their safe return to Kosovo.
2. The safe return of the ethnic Albanian Kosovars to their original
communities, with adequate financial support for rebuilding them, and
permanent settlement in the United States and other NATO countries for those
Kosovar refugees who choose that option.
3. The stationing of international peacekeepers in Kosovo, perhaps a joint
UN-OSCE armed protection force, to create and hold corridors and safe havens
throughout Kosovo to enable the safe return of refugees.
4. Autonomy, independence or partitioning for Kosovo? The precise
formulation remains to be determined: what is key is that negotiations are
broad-based and inclusive.
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U.S.-CHINA SECURITY RELATIONS
by James H. Nolt, World Policy Institute
(Ed. Note: The U.S. visit of the Chinese premier, the ongoing discussions of
China's request to join the World Trading Organization, unabated human
rights violations in China, and revelations about probable security leaks at
Los Alamos have raised the level of public and congressional concern about
the Clinton administration possible of engagement with China. James Nolt, an
expert in U.S.-China security relations, examines the persistent alarms
about China's military threat to the United States. The following is
excerpted from an updated (April 1999) FPIF policy brief, which is available
online at: http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol3/v3n19chi.html)
Although economically China has experienced rapid growth, militarily, China
has been in relative decline since the 1970s. China does not and will not
pose in the foreseeable future the kind of military threat to the U.S. that
the Soviet Bloc did (exaggerated though that threat often was). China is not
even an irritating "rogue state" as some consider Iraq, Iran, or North
Korea. China has achieved normal commercial and diplomatic relations with
the U.S. and most of China's neighbors. Even where there is tension, as in
China's relations with Taiwan, India, and Vietnam, relations have improved
considerably since the armed clashes of decades ago. Both the relative
decline in China's military capabilities and the improvement of China's
foreign relations should lead to U.S. optimism and confidence about the
prospects for continued peaceful progress in Asia.
When Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978, he began a drastic shift in policy
away from centralized socialist planning toward a market-influenced economy.
Many commentators assume that rapid economic growth also ensures China's
ascendancy as a military superpower. There are two reasons why we should be
skeptical of such claims: 1) China's high growth rate is slowing, and 2)
China's pattern of growth has actually undermined its ability to become an
autonomous military power.
China's economy until 1978 was oriented around suppressing both consumerism
and individual employment freedom in order to direct much of society's
energy toward military production. This massive effort succeeded in making
China a major producer of tanks, artillery, submarines, warplanes, and other
weaponry, though all of 1950s Soviet design. This massive, obsolete arsenal
still constitutes the overwhelming bulk of China's military hardware. Since
the start of Deng's reforms, production of weaponry has fallen drastically.
Except for limited production of obsolete warships, China's production of
major weapons systems, including tanks and combat aircraft, has virtually
ceased in the 1990s.
Many policymakers have voiced concern that the influx of U.S. dual-use
technology into China will facilitate military modernization. However, in
industries such as aerospace the trend has been for foreign involvement to
relegate Chinese manufacturers to subcontracting low-tech components rather
than manufacturing entire systems, let alone weapons systems. China's
incapacity to design and manufacture most modern weapons has forced it to
rely, like most developing countries, on arms imports. China's limited
acquisition of modern foreign weapons (mostly Russian) has been a tiny
fraction of what would be needed to replace China's aging arsenal.
China's armed forces are the world's largest, but smaller per capita than
those of many countries, including the United States. The present size of
its forces is actually a hindrance to military modernization because China
cannot afford adequate pay, training, or modern weapons for most of its
forces. China will not be able to develop modern military forces unless it
either greatly increases military spending (which seems unlikely) or
drastically cuts the size of its forces. China can defend its territory, but
its capacity for external aggression is minimal given the low quality of its
forces, the logistical difficulties of mobilizing these forces across
China's vast expanse, and its declining strength relative to potential
enemies.
Although China does have border disputes with most of its neighbors, it has
not resorted to force to resolve them since its defeat in the 1979 war with
Vietnam (except for a brief clash with Vietnam in the disputed Paracel
Islands in 1988). China and Russia have made great progress in
demilitarizing their common border, and China has shown more restraint than
Taiwan in their mutual dispute with Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.
China has extensive trading relations with all of its neighbors, including
Taiwan and both North and South Korea. Unlike the U.S., China does not use
economic boycott as a political weapon.
Since Chinese external relations have generally improved, its arms exports
declined, and its own military forces deteriorated during the past decade,
there should be both less fear and less criticism of China in the U.S.,
while in fact there is more of both. There are two reasons for this. The
most obvious is the shock of the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989, which
shattered for many Americans their progressive image of China. Less widely
recognized is the second reason: the end of the Cold War has made China less
useful to the U.S. as a military ally and more useful as a potential threat
to justify U.S. military spending to the public.
There have been three major concerns in U.S.-China security relations in
recent years: Taiwan, transfer of military-related technologies (including
nuclear secrets), and Chinese arms export policies. In all three areas the
emerging frictions have more to do with the post-Cold War changes in U.S.
policy than they do with memories of Tiananmen or any changes in Chinese
policies.
The U.S.-China rapprochement was founded in a fundamental realignment of
U.S. foreign policy embodied in the Shanghai Communiqu of 1972. The U.S.
began to transfer official recognition from the Kuomintang government in
Taiwan to the Communist government in Beijing, culminating in the
restoration of full diplomatic relations in 1979, just as Deng was beginning
his momentous reforms. The U.S. withdrew its military forces and bases from
Taiwan and terminated its defense treaty with the island. Yet the Taiwan
Relations Act of 1979 mandates continued U.S. relations with Taiwan
virtually as if it were an independent country, while officially the U.S.
does not dispute Beijing's claim that Taiwan is merely province of China. In
1982, the Reagan administration agreed to limit arms sales to Taiwan. China,
in return, promised to resolve differences with Taiwan peacefully.
During the 1990s, however, the U.S. resumed sales of high-tech weapons to
Taiwan, including 150 F-16 fighter aircraft. The ostensible reason for this
sale was to counter China's purchase of 50 modern Russian Su-27 fighters,
but the response was disproportionate, especially since Taiwan also acquired
60 modern Mirage fighters from France and manufacturers its own fighter
(mostly from imported U.S. components) superior to anything made in mainland
China. Now the U.S. is considering sharing with Taiwan and Japan a proposed
theater missile defense (TMD) system. Similar systems were outlawed by the
U.S.-Soviet ABM Treaty of 1972. Now that China has apparently developed MIRV
technology (perhaps in part through spying), any TMD system could be
inexpensively overwhelmed by multiple-warhead missiles. MIRV technology is
what led the U.S. and USSR to ban ABMs as uneconomic. Excessive weapons
sales to Taiwan--driven largely by the U.S. export drive and its pandering
to arms manufacturers--remain an obstacle to consolidating peace in the
Asia-Pacific region.
The second area of tension has been over U.S. restrictions on the transfer
of military-related technologies to China since 1989. At that time, several
major U.S. arms manufacturers had contracts with Chinese firms to upgrade
Chinese weaponry, including fighter aircraft, tanks, and missiles. President
Bush forced the cancellation of all these contracts as part of the sanctions
imposed after Tiananmen. Despite the uproar over the supposed transfer of
missile technology to China in the months prior to Clinton's June 1998
visit, projects to upgrade Chinese weaponry such as those of the 1980s have
not resumed. Recently it has been alleged that China's spies have acquired
U.S. nuclear weapons technology. Since Chinese production of missiles and
nuclear weapons remains a tiny fraction of that of the U.S. and the former
USSR, this should not portend a new nuclear arms race.
The third area of tension revolves around U.S. efforts to restrict Chinese
arms exports. Ironically, Chinese exports were much greater in the 1980s, at
a time when the U.S. did not complain. In fact, several of China's biggest
arms customers then, including Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Thailand,
were also U.S. allies and arms customers. China sold weapons to both sides
during the Iran-Iraq war, but then the U.S. and its allies helped both sides
too and the U.S. covertly sold arms to Iran.
During the 1990s, the low quality of Chinese weapons and end of the
Iran-Iraq war led to a precipitous drop in Chinese arms sales. By the
mid-1990s Chinese arms sales were one-sixth the peak level of 1987-88 and
only 4% of U.S. arms sales. While the U.S. has its increased its market
share of global weapons sales, China's sales and market share have
decreased.
At the same time, the U.S. and its allies decided to restrict international
sales of ballistic missiles with the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR). Although the MTCR was negotiated without Chinese input, China was
asked to adhere to it and agreed to do so in 1992. The powerful Chinese
military-industrial companies resent these restrictions because the MTCR
limits the possibility of selling one of the few weapons that China can make
that is in demand abroad. China regards U.S. arms control efforts as being
one-sided. The U.S. makes demands on China, but does not offer reciprocal
concessions, such as limiting arms sales to Taiwan. Foreign arms sales to
Taiwan (mostly from the U.S.) have been more than twice as great as sales to
China during the past decade.
(James H. Nolt ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) is Senior Fellow at World Policy
Institute specializing in East Asia relations.)
Sources for More Information
American Friends Service Committee
Peace and Economic Security Program
Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Asia-Pacific Center for Justice and Peace
Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Center for Defense Information
Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Website: http://www.cdi.org
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Website: http://www.sipri.se
Pacific Campaign for Disarmament and Security
Email:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
World Policy Institute
Website: http://worldpolicy.org/americas/index.html
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II. Comments
FOREIGN POLICY AND VOICE OF ANCESTORS
by James H. Nolt, World Policy Institute
The United States, by its role as the super power of the world affects even
the smallest village in an obscure country. It has the power to affect the
way humans treat one another and the world around them. This power in the
past and present has been used for material gains and personal power. This
type of structure can no longer continue in the global nature of foreign
policy today. The intertwining of economies necessitates a new way of
looking at Earth as a whole, where an action in one part deeply affects
those who may be far removed from those actions.
We, as indigenous people, look at humanity as caretakers, not owners, of our
environments. The original instructions of our environment and its processes
have been tempered and altered, to its detriment.
The global economic structure omits personal responsibility for the effects
of corporate or national actions on people and the environment. In the
multinational corporate structure, CEOs blame stockholders, or managers or
anyone they can for their actions that cause wholesale destruction of
indigenous cultures and communities and the environment. This is also true
on a political level. It is sad to say that our political structure is more
influenced by a few multinational firms based on greed and power, than a
true resolution of the problems facing our planet. We look for the short
term gain rather than the long term vision.
What is the answer? In regard to U.S. foreign policy anywhere in the world,
we must first consider and focus with honor and respect on the sacred
process of the environment and its relation with the indigenous peoples who
have learned how to survive and adept in that environment and its sacred
processes.
We must bear in mind the results of our actions -- common sense, not focus
groups, studies or impact states that waste time, money and resources. If
you remove an element from an environment, such as the removal of vast
amounts of water from the Great Lakes to sell overseas, is this a wise use
of resources? It may be that this removal affects lives in Mexico and the
Gulf States. As native American tradition states, we must see our actions in
terms of their effects on the seventh generation in the future. We the few
and Indigenous in nature believe in offering our energies for the healing of
our sacred and living planet and humanity. The future is now, we must think
in hundreds of thousands of years and put aside that, what's in it for me
attitude and turn it around and say how may we help, and participate in the
healing process; Bring back the focus on original instruction of our
environment and its people.
The voice of our Ancestors.
Coki Treespirit [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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