"Why
We Didn't Remove Saddam"
George
Bush [Sr.] and Brent Scowcroft Time (2 March 1998)
The end of effective Iraqi resistance came with a rapidity which
surprised us all, and we were perhaps psychologically unprepared for the
sudden transition from fighting to peacemaking. True to the guidelines we
had established, when we had achieved our strategic objectives (ejecting
Iraqi forces from Kuwait and eroding Saddam's threat to the region) we
stopped the fighting. But the necessary limitations placed on our
objectives, the fog of war, and the lack of "battleship Missouri"
surrender unfortunately left unresolved problems, and new ones arose.
We were disappointed that Saddam's defeat did not break his hold on
power, as many of our Arab allies had predicted and we had come to expect.
President Bush repeatedly declared that the fate of Saddam Hussein was up
to the Iraqi people. Occasionally, he indicated that removal of Saddam
would be welcome, but for very practical reasons there was never a promise
to aid an uprising. While we hoped that popular revolt or coup would
topple Saddam, neither the U.S. nor the countries of the region wished to
see the breakup of the Iraqi state. We were concerned about the long-term
balance of power at the head of the Gulf. Trying to eliminate Saddam,
extending the ground war into an occupation of Iraq, would have violated
our guideline about not changing objectives in midstream, engaging in
"mission creep," and would have incurred incalculable human and political
costs. Apprehending him was probably impossible. We had been unable to
find Noriega in Panama, which we knew intimately. We would have been
forced to occupy Baghdad and, in effect, rule Iraq. The coalition would
instantly have collapsed, the Arabs deserting it in anger and other allies
pulling out as well. Under those circumstances, furthermore, we had been
self-consciously trying to set a pattern for handling aggression in the
post-cold war world. Going in and occupying Iraq, thus unilaterally
exceeding the U.N.'s mandate, would have destroyed the precedent of
international response to aggression we hoped to establish. Had we gone
the invasion route, the U.S. could conceivably still be an occupying power
in a bitterly hostile land. It would have been a dramatically
different--and perhaps barren--outcome.
We discussed at length forcing Saddam himself to accept the terms of
Iraqi defeat at Safwan--just north of the Kuwait-Iraq border--and thus the
responsibility and political consequences for the humiliation of such a
devastating defeat. In the end, we asked ourselves what we would do if he
refused. We concluded that we would be left with two options: continue the
conflict until he backed down, or retreat from our demands. The latter
would have sent a disastrous signal. The former would have split our Arab
colleagues from the coalition and, de facto, forced us to change our
objectives. Given those unpalatable choices, we allowed Saddam to avoid
personal surrender and permitted him to send one of his generals. Perhaps
we could have devised a system of selected punishment, such as air strikes
on different military units, which would have proved a viable third
option, but we had fulfilled our well-defined mission; Safwan was waiting.
As the conflict wound down, we felt a sense of urgency on the part of
the coalition Arabs to get it over with and return to normal. This meant
quickly withdrawing U.S. forces to an absolute minimum. Earlier there had
been some concern in Arab ranks that once they allowed U.S. forces into
the Middle East, we would be there to stay. Saddam's propaganda machine
fanned these worries. Our prompt withdrawal helped cement our position
with our Arab allies, who now trusted us far more than they ever had. We
had come to their assistance in their time of need, asked nothing for
ourselves, and left again when the job was done. Despite some criticism of
our conduct of the war, the Israelis too had their faith in us solidified.
We had shown our ability--and willingness--to intervene in the Middle East
in a decisive way when our interests were challenged. We had also crippled
the military capability of one of their most bitter enemies in the region.
Our new credibility (coupled with Yasser Arafat's need to redeem his image
after backing the wrong side in the war) had a quick and substantial
payoff in the form of a Middle East peace conference in Madrid.
The Gulf War had far greater significance to the emerging post-cold war
world than simply reversing Iraqi aggression and restoring Kuwait. Its
magnitude and significance impelled us from the outset to extend our
strategic vision beyond the crisis to the kind of precedent we should lay
down for the future. From an American foreign-policymaking perspective, we
sought to respond in a manner which would win broad domestic support and
which could be applied universally to other crises. In international
terms, we tried to establish a model for the use of force. First and
foremost was the principle that aggression cannot pay. If we dealt
properly with Iraq, that should go a long way toward dissuading future
would-be aggressors. We also believed that the U.S. should not go it
alone, that a multilateral approach was better. This was, in part, a
practical matter. Mounting an effective military counter to Iraq's
invasion required the backing and bases of Saudi Arabia and other Arab
states. |