The convoy which was attacked while driving through Samara was
not a supply convoy as reported, but was carrying large amounts of
new Iraqi currency to stock local Iraqi banks and US greenbacks used
to pay for goods and services the US forces need to accomplish their
missions in Iraq. This convoy was heavily guarded by Abrams Tanks
and Bradley Fighting Vehicles. It was akin to a huge Brinks Truck
delivery.
The reports of 54 enemy killed will sound great on the home
front, but the greater story is much more disturbing and needs to be
told to the American Public.
When we received the first incoming rounds, all I could think of
was how the hell did the Iraqis (most of these attackers being
criminals, not insurgents) find out about this shipment? This was
not broadcast on the local news, but Iraqi police knew about it.
Bing, Bing Bing, You do the math.
Of greater importance in the scale of the attack and the
coordination of the two operations. Iraqi Rebel Guerilla Units
elements still retain the ability to conduct synchronized operations
despite the massive overwhelming firepower "Iron Hammer" offensive
this month.
Hack, most of the casualties were civilians, not insurgents or
criminals as being reported. During the ambushes the tanks, brads
and armored HUMVEES hosed down houses, buildings, and cars while
using reflexive fire against the attackers. One of the precepts of
"Iron Hammer" is to use an Iron Fist when dealing with the
insurgents. As the division spokesman is telling the press, we are
responding with overwhelming firepower and are taking the fight to
the enemy. The response to these well coordinated ambushes was as a
one would expect. The convoy continued to move, shooting at ANY
target that appeared to be a threat. RPG fire from a house, the tank
destroys the house with main gun fire and hoses the area down with
7.62 and 50cal MG fire. Rifle fire from an alley, the brads fire up
the alley and fire up the surrounding buildings with 7.62mm and 25mm
HE rounds. This was actually a rolling firefight through the entire
town.
The ROE under "Iron Fist" is such that the US soldiers are to
consider buildings, homes, cars to be hostile if enemy fire is
received from them (regardless of who else is inside. It seems too
many of us this is more an act of desperation, rather than a well
thought out tactic. We really don't know if we kill anyone, because
we don't stick around to find out. Since we armored troops and we
are not trained to use counter-insurgency tactics; the logic is to
respond to attacks using our superior firepower to kill the rebel
insurgents. This is done in many cases knowing that there are people
inside these buildings or cars who may not be connected to the
insurgents.
The belief in superior firepower as a counter-insurgency tactic
is then extended down to the average Iraqi, with the hope that the
Iraqis will not support the guerillas and turn them in to coalition
forces, knowing we will blow the hell out of their homes or towns if
they don't. Of course in too many cases, if the insurgents bait us
and goad us into leveling buildings and homes, the people inside
will then hate us (even if they did not before) and we have created
more recruits for the guerillas.
The Commander of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, Colonel Frederick
Rudesheim, said after this battle that "We are going to continue to
take the fight to this enemy. This is the most significant contact
we have had to date in the city of Samarra. We are going to have to
respond accordingly."
This is a great attitude for a combat commander to have when
fighting an armored force on force, but Colonel Rudesheim is not
trained in Counter-Insurgency and my soldiers are taking the heat.
We drive around in convoys, blast the hell out of the area, break
down doors and search buildings; but the guerillas continue to
attacks us. It does not take a George Patton to see we are using the
wrong tactics against these people. We cannot realistically expect
that Stability and Support Operations will defeat this
insurgency.
As one would expect from using our overwhelming firepower, much
of Samarra is fairly well shot up. The tanks and brads rolled over
parked cars and fired up buildings where we believed the enemy was.
This must be expected considering the field of vision is limited in
an armored vehicle and while the crews are protected, they also will
use recon by fire to suppress the enemy. Not all the people in this
town were hostile, but we did see many people firing from rooftops
or alleys that looked like average civilians, not the Feddayeen
reported in the press. I even saw Iraqi people throwing stones at
us, I told my soldiers to hold their fire unless they could indentfy
a real weapon, but I still can't understand why somebody would throw
a stone at a tank, in the middle of a firefight.
Since we did not stick around to find out, I am very concerned in
the coming days we will find we killed many civilians as well as
Iraqi irregular fighters. I would feel great if all the people we
killed were all enemy guerrillas, but I can't say that. We are
probably turning many Iraqi against us and I am afraid instead of
climbing out of the hole, we are digging ourselves in deeper.
A COMBAT LEADER