ASHINGTON, Aug. 7 - In what amounted to an unexpected
test run of the nation's overhauled security system, the unfolding
terrorist threats of recent days revealed both marked improvements and
lingering vulnerabilities in the federal government's ability to identify
and mobilize against a possible attack.
A tense week of global arrests, closed-off roadways and public jitters
demonstrated the government's capacity to move much more quickly and mass
far more resources in response to a perceived threat than it did three
years ago before the Sept. 11 attacks, government officials and outside
experts agreed.
But the week underscored the United
States' increased reliance on terrorist information from Pakistan and
other allies, its continued difficulties in using covert sources to
infiltrate Al Qaeda and, perhaps most critically, the
credibility problems the government faces in deciding what to tell a
somewhat jaded public.
In general, the administration's handling of the most recent threats
against financial centers "was really a great example of how the system
can work, and what I really liked was the heightened sense of urgency we
saw," said Thomas H. Kean, the chairman of the Sept. 11 commission.
Indeed, after American intelligence officials began receiving word
about 10 days ago of alarming terrorist intelligence out of Pakistan,
Central Intelligence Agency workers and analysts were called back from
vacation to scrub new information about possible plots against financial
centers in New York, Newark and Washington. The White House maintained a
virtual open phone line to senior officials across the federal government,
as well as mayors and police leaders in the targeted areas. And the
Department of Homeland Security issued the most explicit public warning in
its short history.
That led city leaders in New York, Newark and Washington to undertake
extraordinary security measures around possible targets.
The climate contrasted sharply with that seen in the weeks before the
Sept. 11 attacks.
In the summer of 2001, as warnings of a possible terrorist attack grew
louder, critical information about Al Qaeda was bottled up within the
American government because of miscommunication and turf wars. The White
House held few high-level strategy meetings on the threat. Tantalizing
leads went unconnected, and agents on the ground knew little about the
rising threat.
But if the week's drama showed a much more agile federal response to
fast-breaking events, it also pointed up the government's continuing
limitations in infiltrating Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, some
terrorism experts said. The United States is getting more on-the-ground
support and intelligence from allies like Pakistan since the Sept. 11
attacks, but it is making much less progress in infiltrating Al Qaeda with
its own spies and informers.
A result last weekend was that it took intelligence that originated in
Pakistan to point officials to detailed Qaeda reconnaissance missions on
the streets of New York, Newark and Washington about where security guards
were posted, when elevators ran and what coffee shops could be used for
cover.
The Sept. 11 commission's investigation showed that "we knew much more
about activity abroad than we did about activity in the United States,"
said Jamie S. Gorelick, a commission member. "And we got much more
information abroad from our liaison relationships than we did from our own
sources."
Mr. Kean said the new information from Pakistan about the Qaeda
reconnaissance missions highlighted the need to find better ways of
placing more spies and informers inside Al Qaeda and develop quicker
information about terrorist plots.
"It was disturbing that we didn't have any information during the time
when they were actually casing these places out," he said. "But until we
rebuild the C.I.A.'s covert program - and that could take five years - we
just don't have a lot of human intelligence operatives. And until that
happens, we have to rely on countries like Pakistan for a lot of our
intelligence."
Terrorism experts said the Bush administration may have also hurt its
own cause and inspired public skepticism this week in how it alerted the
public to the possible attacks. Administration officials did not
acknowledge until Monday, a day after declaring a "high risk" of attacks
against financial sectors, that much of the new intelligence was based on
reconnaissance missions by Qaeda operatives three or four years ago.
"It is hard to understand why they felt something was going to happen
in an imminent way," said Tony Bullock, spokesman for Mayor Anthony
Williams in Washington, where officials set up roadblocks and inspected
vehicles around targeted buildings.
The conflicting views of what took place this week - a vigorous
response to a looming danger, or a knee-jerk overreaction driven by
political calculations as much as practical ones - may be impossible to
reconcile, given that much of the intelligence that has been disclosed is
murky, and that presumably there is more that remains hidden from public
view. At a minimum, this week's events reflected the difficult balance
between giving the public enough notice about a threat but not so much
information that intelligence sources may be compromised, officials said.
"These public warnings are all very new stuff, and it's going to take a
little while to get it right," said John Gannon, an ex-C.I.A. official who
is now staff director for the House homeland security committee.
Mr. Kean said the administration's failure to acknowledge from the
outset that it was dealing with largely dated material "was a mistake, and
it's tough to undo the damage in public confidence. What looked bad is the
public thinking we just found this out yesterday, then you find out it was
four years old and people say, 'Well, it couldn't be that important.' ''
(The detailed plan for the 911 attack
"Project Bonjinka" was six years old when finally executed and the FBI,
CIA and State Department had been given explicit information in
1995.- JR)
Administration officials defended their response, saying they were
still analyzing the new information from Pakistan through last weekend and
they did not fully realize until after the threat level was raised that
most of the surveillance of the financial buildings happened before the
Sept. 11, 2001, attacks .
The officials added that no matter the information's vintage, it was
specific and alarming.
Still, the changing public message also raised questions about how
quickly intelligence officials were able to analyze information and decide
what and whether to tell local law enforcement officials, private
businesses and the general public.
Counterterrorism officials say they have already taken strong steps to
bolster their intelligence and analysis abilities, including the hiring
and training of more agents, analysts and linguists, as well as the
opening of a joint terrorism center run out of the C.I.A.
The new center, known as the Terrorist Threat Integration Center,
brings together some 100 analysts from the C.I.A., the F.B.I., the
Department of Homeland Security, the Secret Service and other agencies,
and it was at the center of last weekend's effort to assess the
significance of the intelligence from Pakistan.
"The government worked more as a team than I have ever seen it before,"
said John O. Brennan, the C.I.A. official who runs the center.
Several Sept. 11 commission members said that for all the improvements
made, the week's events reinforced the commission's belief that wholesale
restructuring was still needed, including the creation of a national
intelligence director.
Another recommendation of the Sept. 11 commission - backed by President Bush - would expand the terrorism
center to allow even faster analysis of threat information.
The most encouraging sign to emerge from this week's threat response,
officials at the federal, state and local levels agreed, was the quick
coordination and sharing of information up and down the Washington-New
York corridor.
Before the weekend was over, Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly of
New York was hooked into a conference call that included Condoleezza Rice,
among others.
"If you are included in a conference call with people of that nature,
there is not much to complain about," said Ed Skyler, Mayor Michael R.
Bloomberg's press secretary. "It really shows a recognition on the federal
government's part that the localities are the ones that ultimately are
going to have the troops on the ground domestically."
For cities where officials had once complained about being left out of
the loop, this was a much appreciated departure - a sure sign, top
officials in these cities said, that the response to threats has improved
since Sept. 11.
