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--- Begin Message ----Caveat Lector- Stratfor: Terrorism Intelligence Report ~ March 1, 2006Attacks on Energy Infrastructure: Desire, Capability and Vulnerability By Fred Burton On Feb. 24, al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia attacked a key oil facility at Abqaiq with suicide bombers in explosive-laden pickup trucks. Two members of the Saudi national guard were killed, as were the attackers, who were reportedly on the Saudi Interior Ministry's most-wanted list. Although both bombs functioned, neither explosion caused serious damage to the critical portions of the facility. On March 1, Saudi security forces surrounded a neighborhood in Riyadh and, in a shootout, killed five al Qaeda operatives including Fahd Faraj Al-Joweir, who was also high on the wanted list. Ammunition magazines, tools, explosives components and other items linked to the Abqaiq attack were captured after the shootout. Although al Qaeda claimed the Abqaiq attack as a victory, the jihadist group paid a high price for it. Much has been made of the fact that the attack was foiled, and aside from a brief rise in the worldwide price of oil, attention to the strike and what it signifies has died down surprisingly quickly. This reaction might be premature. While al Qaeda and related groups have largely refrained from attacking energy infrastructure, that prohibition is clearly off with the Abqaiq attack. In assessing the threat to the region's energy infrastructure, three variables need to be considered: First, what are the ideology and intent of the regional al Qaeda presence? Second, what are al Qaeda's regional capabilities, both in itself and compared to the local security forces? Third, what are the critical nodes of the region's energy infrastructure? By understanding where the three elements of desire, capability and vulnerability meet, a clearer assessment can be made of the risks to the energy infrastructure in the Persian Gulf. Desire Until recently, al Qaeda has steered clear of attacking the oil infrastructure in Saudi Arabia or nearby nations. While al Qaeda knew that hitting oil-related targets would hurt the regimes the most, its hands were tied for several reasons. First, attacking the oil infrastructure threatened to undermine al Qaeda's ability to garner local support, as oil revenue not only keeps the governments in power, but also is the main source of cash throughout their economies. Al Qaeda did not want give the Saudi regime the chance to drum up more support against the jihadists by saying that the militants represented a threat to the nation's well-being. Nor did the jihadists want to seriously harm their financial supporters, some of whom benefit from the regional oil trade. In addition, al Qaeda sees oil as the future patrimony of the Islamist state it hopes to establish in the kingdom -- and seriously damaging the infrastructure would be problematic if the group attains its overall goal. At its core, Al Qaeda has two objectives in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the entire Arabian Peninsula. First, it seeks to rid the country of Western military and economic presence. With that accomplished, it can move to its second objective: toppling the Saudi and other local monarchies and replacing them with religious regimes. The initial attacks in Saudi Arabia, then, were most often against Western operations and personnel. Examples of this were the May 2003 attack on a Western housing complex in Riyadh, the May 2004 Yanbu attack and the June 2004 kidnapping and subsequent beheading of Lockheed Martin employee Paul Johnson. These attacks caused a temporary problem for Riyadh as Western oil workers sent their families home or took extended leaves themselves. But Riyadh's counterstrike significantly degraded the local al Qaeda branch's operational capabilities. The group lost half a dozen key commanders, and important operatives were removed in successive raids by Saudi security forces. Al Qaeda then shifted its focus to striking at the Saudi regime directly, rather than through proxy targets. In December 2004, al Qaeda militants attacked the Ministry of the Interior building, but this only led to another series of counterstrikes by Saudi forces. Having suffered several major consecutive losses, the jihadists have decided that they can no longer afford to avoid hitting oil-related targets; hence the attack on the Abqaiq facility. Given that the attack was against a processing facility, desperation likely forced al Qaeda to become creative and find a way to be able to claim it is attacking the Saudi regime and the West -- which are "looting" the oil -- without destroying the oil itself. Furthermore, this means that the jihadists probably have secured alternative, non-oil-related sources of funding, which further emboldened them to attack oil-related targets. This shift has been articulated at higher levels of the organization as well. The Dec. 7, 2005, videotape from Ayman al-Zawahiri called on militants to "concentrate their attacks on Muslims' stolen oil, from which most of the revenues go to the enemies of Islam, while most of what they leave is seized by the thieves who rule our countries." This was targeting guidance to militants, and confirmed the shift in target selection. While this first operation was not entirely successful, the shift has been made, and al Qaeda regionally is setting its sites on other pieces of the energy infrastructure. Capability Regionally, there are three key al Qaeda nodes, two of which -- the Saudi and Iraqi nodes -- can affect the regional energy infrastructure; the Egyptian node focuses primarily on Egypt, Israel and the Palestinian territories. Al Qaeda's capabilities in Saudi Arabia have deteriorated since the May 2003 housing attack in Riyadh. Saudi crackdowns have been effective but have not eliminated the network in the kingdom. There are signs that funding has deteriorated, training is lacking, shorter operation cycles are needed -- which would bring in more room for error -- and military-grade explosives have been replaced with home-made mixtures. The attack on the oil facility represents the first attack inside Saudi Arabia in more than a year, as there have only been "encounters" between the jihadists and security forces since the Dec. 29, 2004, strike at the Ministry of the Interior. The Saudi node also handles operations in Kuwait, Qatar and Yemen, but these are still fledgling operations. Al Qaeda can still launch attacks in the Kingdom, but they must plan and move quickly and use smaller teams to avoid detection, thus increasing the chances for error or failure. At the same time, the Saudi security forces have been better able to infiltrate the local al Qaeda cell, undercut its popular and financial support and counter attacks. The local al Qaeda is down, but not out. Given the almost homogenous character of Saudi society regarding religion, the jihadists' and their supporters' presence in various strata of the Saudi state is nothing new. Most people have underestimated the House of Saud's ability to maintain control; the Saudis have successfully used the concept of fitnah (chaos) against the jihadists and stemmed the flow of people aligning with al Qaeda. Furthermore, most who were enamored of al Qaeda agreed with the jihadist diagnosis of the current political situation but did not believe the jihadists had the right approach to effecting political change. Saudi religious scholars played a major role in countering the deviants -- the Saudi regime's term for the jihadists. As for al Qaeda's tribal links, they are not as strong in the kingdom as they have been in Iraq, where the tribes have been granting safe haven to the jihadists. In contrast, the Saudi tribes have kept their distance from the jihadists while providing them with material support. The jihadists have also kept a low profile because of the fear that the regime could use the same Wahhabi conduits against them that the militants used against the regime. In addition, the majority of the population in Saudi Arabia is not part of the insurgency -- another factor which has kept the Saudi jihadists beneath the radar. Al Qaeda in Iraq has concentrated on attacking U.S. forces and elements of the emerging government structure, and on fomenting a civil war between the Shiite and Sunni factions. In Iraq, al Qaeda remains an active force, though one constrained by local political issues and the ongoing evolution of the local Shiite-Sunni relationship. In particular, the Iraqi-based al Qaeda has shown minimal ability to operate in the predominately Shiite area where the main oil-exporting facility is located. There have been reports of fighting between foreign jihadists and Iraqi insurgents. Suicide bombings, which almost always are carried out by jihadists, have been declining since the beginning of the year. This could mean that al Qaeda in Iraq is having trouble getting martyrs into the country . Vulnerability The energy industry is extremely easy to hit, particularly in the Middle East. There are pipelines and wells and tankers and berths and refineries everywhere . But it is extremely difficult to strike the industry in a way that actually impedes supply on the international level. Blowing up a tanker just does not do it -- and blowing up a tanker is a lot harder than it sounds. Further, while there are critical nodes, routes and facilities, many have redundancies built into the system. There are really only seven targets of international significance that, if seriously damaged, could substantially affect international energy flows: the Rotterdam oil port, the collective might of Texas' Galveston Bay oil facilities, the Houston ship channel, Russia's Samara pipeline nexus, Saudi Arabia's Ras Tanura oil port, Saudi Arabia's Yanbu oil port and Saudi Arabia's Abqaiq facility. Although damage to these facilities would be quite harmful to the global economy, hurting these facilities in any really significant way would be extremely difficult. The Abqaiq facility, for example, has by far the smallest footprint of the seven, and even it covers a square mile of territory. That is not something that a suicide bomber -- even in a van -- can substantially affect. Partial damage can be inflicted on a facility, slowing down operations, requiring repairs and higher security, and sending psychological shockwaves through the international system. But as militants from Pakistan to Nigeria have shown, attacks on the energy infrastructure can have a local effect without necessarily striking at the most critical of international nodes. Regionally, there are several second-tier facilities that, if attacked -- though the effects on the overall international energy picture might not be significant -- could cause serious problems at the national level. But many of these second-tier targets are insulated due to either size or backup infrastructure. Saudi Arabia's Petroline shuttles up to 5 million barrels per day (bpd) back and forth across the peninsula to keep the country's various oil ports supplied. But striking the world's largest pipeline raises two problems. First, oil pipelines are easily repaired; and second, the line is in reality one massive work-around. Saudi Arabia has excess oil port facilities; the Ras al-Juaymah oil port, for example, is the smallest of the country's big three but can still handle 3 million bpd in case something goes offline. The Petroline exists in order to keep the country's options option. Similarly, the primary Kuwaiti terminal at Mina al-Ahmadi is a potential target. But Kuwait also maintains capacity at Mina Abdullah, Shuaiba and Mina Saud, with yet another facility under construction on Bubiyan Island. No matter what is hit, exports would likely continue flowing. In reality, there are only three locations on the west shore of the Persian Gulf where a single attack could cause catastrophic damage. The first is in Iraq's sector of the Persian Gulf, where its Basra oil terminal handles 90 percent of the country's oil exports. There are no backups. In fact, Iraq's only oil export option -- a pipeline north to Turkey -- is so often attacked by guerillas that it is largely inoperable. The second is Qatar's liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility at Ras Laffan. While there are actually two separate facilities there -- three, if one considers the two phases of the Rasgas project to be separate -- neither has the capacity to cover for the other. The third is Oman's LNG facility at Minal al Fahal, which has no backup whatsoever. Also, Oman's oil network is unique in the region, in that it has no realistic workarounds; it consists of a line of pipelines and oil fields stretching from the south of the country all the way up to the only oil port, also at Minal al Fahal. Conclusion When the three variables are assessed together, it becomes clear that al Qaeda has altered its target selection to include at least certain types of oil and gas infrastructure, but desire alone does not make for a successful attack. The group's regional infrastructure has been constrained, and the attack on Abqaiq showed signs of only minimal initial surveillance -- hence the failure to inflict significant damage even with the use of high-profile group members. Regionally, the desires and the targets may match, but the reach and capabilities seem more limited. Though Riyadh was troubled by attacks against Western contractors a few years ago, it has even less tolerance for attacks on the energy infrastructure. Saudi security forces have thus far demonstrated both a defensive capability and an offensive one, going after al Qaeda militants and supplies throughout the kingdom. Elsewhere in the region, al Qaeda has a more limited reach. Though the group has jumped borders in the past, the surveillance and preparation necessary for a significant operation is more difficult outside of the traditional operating ground. That said, there are two areas that appear most vulnerable in the near term: Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In Iraq there remains a wider operating range, and while al Qaeda has had difficulty operating in the mostly Shiite areas around the export facilities, there is a potential opening in the area as tensions grow between local and Iranian-inspired forces and the foreign troops in the area. Al Qaeda might not be able to sustain long-term operations in that part of Iraq, but the instability could open a window for a strategic strike. Despite the relative effectiveness of the Saudi security forces, Saudi Arabia remains the central focus of al Qaeda. Al Qaeda will continue to push resources, funding and training to its Saudi operations, even if these prove difficult. The Abqaiq attack was a failure, but offered the jihadists hope and operational intelligence for planning future attacks. Send questions or comments on this article to [EMAIL PROTECTED] ................................................................ Get unrestricted access to Stratfor Premium with a FREE 7-day Trial today. Have intelligence delivered straight to your inbox every day and get 24/7 access to the "Shadow CIA" with Stratfor Premium – yours FREE for an entire week! 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Send them to www.stratfor.com/subscriptions/free-weekly-intelligence-reports.php to sign up and begin receiving the Stratfor Weekly every Tuesday for FREE! For more information on STRATFOR's services, please visit www.stratfor.com or e-mail [EMAIL PROTECTED] today! (c) 2006 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. All rights reserved. -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.375 / Virus Database: 268.1.1/271 - Release Date: 2/28/06 www.ctrl.org DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion & informational exchange list. Proselytizing propagandic screeds are unwelcomed. Substance—not soap-boxing—please! These are sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory'—with its many half-truths, mis- directions and outright frauds—is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. That being said, CTRLgives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and always suggests to readers; be wary of what you read. CTRL gives no credence to Holocaust denial and nazi's need not apply. Let us please be civil and as always, Caveat Lector. ======================================================================== Archives Available at: http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/ <A HREF="http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/";>ctrl</A> ======================================================================== To subscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: SUBSCRIBE CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED] To UNsubscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: SIGNOFF CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED] Om
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