-Caveat Lector-
Begin forwarded message:
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: July 5, 2007 5:36:42 PM PDT
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: (2) Backstory: Why Pakistan Is A US "Ally" in "War Against
Terror"
Profile: Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/entity.jsp?
entity=gulbuddin_hekmatyar
1973-1979: The US Starts to Provide Support to Islamists Opposing
the Soviets in Afghanistan
In 1973 Afghan Prince Muhammad Daoud ousts the king with help from
the Soviet Union, and establishes an Afghan republic. The CIA in
turn begins funding Islamist extremists, including Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar, as a resistance movement opposing the Soviets. US
allies, the Shah of Iran’s intelligence agency, SAVAK, and
Pakistan’s Interservices Intelligence Directorate (ISI) play an
important role in funneling weapons and other forms of assistance
to the Afghan Islamist militants. After the pro-Soviet coup in
April 1978, the Islamic militants with the support of the ISI carry
out a massive campaign of terrorism, assassinating hundreds of
teachers and civil servants. [Dreyfuss, 2005, pp. 260 - 263]
1982-1991: Afghan Opium Production Skyrockets
Afghan opium production rises from 250 tons in 1982 to 2,000 tons
in 1991, coinciding with CIA support and funding of the mujaheddin.
Alfred McCoy, a professor of Southeast Asian history at the
University of Wisconsin, says US and Pakistani intelligence
officials sanctioned the rebels’ drug trafficking because of their
fierce opposition to the Soviets: “If their local allies were
involved in narcotics trafficking, it didn’t trouble [the] CIA.
They were willing to keep working with people who were heavily
involved in narcotics.” For instance, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a rebel
leader who received about half of all the CIA’s covert weapons, was
known to be a major heroin trafficker. Charles Cogan, who directs
the CIA’s operation in Afghanistan, later claims he was unaware of
the drug trade: “We found out about it later on.” [Atlantic
Monthly, 5/1996; Star-Tribune (Minneapolis), 9/30/2001]
1983: Gulbuddin Hekmatyar Emerges as Most Powerful ISI Client
A young Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. [Source: Public domain]
[NOTE SIMILARITY IN APPEARANCE TO INDIVIDUAL CALLED "OSAMA BIN
LADEN" IN PHOTO TAKEN WITH BRZEZINSKI)
Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar emerges as the most powerful of
ISI’s mujaheddin clients, just as Rep. Charlie Wilson (D) and CIA
Director William Casey, along with Saudi Intelligence Minister
Prince Turki al-Faisal, are pouring “hundreds of millions of
dollars’ worth of new and more lethal supplies into ISI
warehouses.” Hekmatyar is among the most ruthless and extreme of
the Afghan Islamic warlords. [Coll, 2004, pp. 119] He receives
about half of all the CIA’s covert weapons directed at Afghanistan
despite being a known major drug trafficker (see 1982-1991). He
develops close ties with bin Laden by 1984 while continuing to
recieve large amounts of assistance from the CIA and ISI (see 1984).
1984: Bin Laden Develops Ties with Pakistani ISI and Afghan Warlord
Bin Laden moves to Peshawar, a Pakistani town bordering
Afghanistan, and helps run a front organization for the mujaheddin
known as Maktab al-Khidamar (MAK), which funnels money, arms, and
fighters from the outside world into the Afghan war. [New Yorker,
1/24/2000] “MAK [is] nurtured by Pakistan’s state security
services, the Inter-Services Intelligence agency, or ISI, the CIA’s
primary conduit for conducting the covert war against Moscow’s
occupation.” [MSNBC, 8/24/1998] Bin Laden becomes closely tied to
the warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and greatly strengthens
Hekmatyar’s opium smuggling operations. [Le Monde (Paris),
9/14/2001] Hekmatyar, who also has ties with bin Laden, the CIA,
and drug running, has been called “an ISI stooge and
creation.” [Asia Times, 11/15/2001]
February 1992: Soviet Puppet Government Ousted in Afghanistan
Afghan President Mohammad Najibullah, a Soviet puppet in power
since 1988, is finally ousted by Ahmed Shah Massoud in February
1992. US aid to the mujaheddin continues during this period, but at
a lower level. There are disagreements about which leaders should
be receiving support. The CIA favors Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, an
extreme Islamist closely associated with bin Laden (see 1983),
while the State Department favors the much more Westernized and
well educated Massoud. [Coll, 2004, pp. 205-207, 225]
January 24, 1994: CIA Concludes It Is
‘Partly Culpable’ for WTC Bombing
The Boston Herald reports that an internal CIA report has concluded
that the agency is “partially culpable” for the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing (see February 26, 1993) because it helped train and
support some of the bombers. One source with knowledge of the
report says, “It was determined that a significant amount of
blowback appeared to have occurred.” A US intelligence source
claims the CIA gave at least $1 billion to forces in Afghanistan
connected to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. More than a half-dozen of the WTC
bombers belonged to this faction, and some of the CIA money paid
for their training. The source says, “By giving these people the
funding that we did, a situation was created in which it could be
safely argued that we bombed the World Trade Center.” Those
connected to the bombing who went to Afghanistan include Sheikh
Omar Abdul-Rahman, Clement Rodney Hampton-el, Siddig Siddig Ali,
Ahmed Ajaj, and Mahmud Abouhalima. [Boston Herald, 1/24/1994]
Additionally, Ramzi Yousef trained in Afghanistan near the end of
the Afghan war, and there are claims he was recruited by the CIA
(see Late 1980s). “Intelligence sources say the CIA used the al-
Kifah Refugee Center in Brooklyn—founded to support the Afghani
rebels fighting Soviet occupation—to funnel aid to Hekmatyar,
setting the stage for terrorists here to acquire the money, guns
and training needed to later attack the Trade Center. CIA support
also made it easier for alleged terrorist leaders to enter the
country.” [Boston Herald, 1/24/1994]
1996: Bin Laden Arrives in Afghanistan
Bin Laden arrives in Afghanistan from Sudan. The Taliban, closely
allied with bin Laden and with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, assume power in
Kabul, calling for a jihad against Ahmed Shah Massoud. [Coll, 2004,
pp. 326-328]
After May 18, 1996-September 1996: Bin Laden Quickly Alligns With
the Taliban After Arrival in Afghanistan
Bin Laden arrives in Afghanistan on May 18, 1996 after being
expelled from Sudan (see May 18, 1996). Initially, bin Laden stays
in an area not controlled by the Taliban, who are fighting for
control of the country. But by the end of September 1996, the
Taliban conquer the capital of Kabul and gain control over most of
the the country (see September 27, 1996). Bin Laden then becomes
the guest of the Taliban. The Taliban, bin Laden, and their mutual
ally Gulbuddin Hekmatyar then call for a jihad against Ahmed Shah
Massoud, who retains control over a small area along Afghanistan’s
northern border. As bin Laden establishes a new safe base and
political ties, he issues a public fatwa, or religious decree,
authorizing attacks on Western military targets in the Arabian
Peninsula (see August 1996). [Coll, 2004, pp. 326-328]
October 2, 2001: US Intelligence Cables Review ‘Hidden Agenda’ of
ISI Support for Taliban
An agent of the Defense Intelligence Agency sends two classified
cables to various US government agencies detailing how Pakistan’s
Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) created the Taliban and helped al-
Qaeda. The agent writes that during the Soviet-Afghan War, the
“Pakistan government also had a hidden agenda… Pakistan decided to
deliberately influence the outcome. Rather than allow the most
gifted Afghan commanders and parties to flourish, who would be hard
to control later, Pakistan preferred to groom the incompetent ones
[because] they would be wholly reliant on Pakistan for support…
Pakistan also encouraged, facilitated, and often escorted Arabs
from the Middle East into Afghanistan. Eventually a special
facility was constructed… with [ISI] funding.” When Ahmed Shah
Mossoud captured Kabul in the early 1990s, “Pakistan could not
accept this result and the fragile Afghan coalition began another
civil war, with the Pakistan stooge (Gulbuddin Hekmatyar) being
backed to seize total power. In the end Pakistan was proved right
about only one thing, Hekmatyar was incompetent. He was never able
to wrest Kabul from Massoud, despite massive logistical and
material (including manpower) support from Pakistan.” When
Hekmatyar failed, “[Pakistan] created another force they hoped to
have better control over than Hekmatyar’s rabble. It was called
Taliban… To lead the Taliban Pakistan chose Mullah Mohammad (Omar),
who was willing to do as he was told… Omar’s emergence is credited
to Pakistan ISI actions… The fully supported (by Pakistan) Taliban
prevailed over the unsupported legitimate government of
Afghanistan…” [Defense Intelligence Agency, 10/2/2001 ; Defense
Intelligence Agency, 10/2/2001 ]
February 2002: US Criticism Results in Iran Expelling Al-Qaeda-
Linked Warlord to Afghanistan
Flynt Leverett. [Source: Publicity photo]In the wake of the 9/11
attacks, Iran is supportive of US efforts to defeat the Taliban,
since the Taliban and Iran have opposed each other. In 2006, Flynt
Leverett, the senior director for Middle East affairs on the
National Security Council in 2002 and 2003, will recall this
cooperation between Iran and the US in a heavily censored New York
Times editorial. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a notorious Afghan warlord
with close ties to bin Laden (see 1984), had been living in Iran
since the Taliban came to power in the 1990s. Leverett claims that
in December 2001 Iran agrees to prevent Hekmatyar from returning to
Afghanistan to help lead resistance to US-allied forces there, as
long as the Bush administration does not criticize Iran for
harboring terrorists. “But, in his January 2002 State of the Union
address, President Bush did just that in labeling Iran part of the
‘axis of evil’ (see January 29, 2002). Unsurprisingly, Mr.
Hekmatyar managed to leave Iran in short order after the
speech.” [New York Times, 12/22/2006] Hekmatyar apparently returns
to Afghanistan around February 2002. He will go on to become one of
the main leaders of the armed resistance to the US-supported Afghan
government. Iranian cooperation with the US over Afghanistan will
continue in a more limited manner, with Iran deporting hundreds of
suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives who had fled Afghanistan,
while apparently keeping others. But the US will end this
cooperation in 2003. [BBC, 2/14/2002; USA Today, 5/21/2003; New
York Times, 12/22/2006]
2004: CIA Concludes Illegal Drug Profits Going to Islamic Militant
Groups and Afghan Warlords
Assistant Secretary of State Bobby Charles asks the CIA to analyze
where the drug profits in Afghanistan are going. The CIA concludes
that it is probable some of the drugs are going to the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), an al-Qaeda-related group just north
of Afghanistan; the Taliban; the anti-US warlord Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar; and possibly al-Qaeda. Charles says, “The linkages were
there.” Author James Risen later comments, “The connections between
drug trafficking and terrorism that the Pentagon didn’t want to
acknowledge were real and growing, and were clearly helping to fuel
a revival of guerrilla activity in Afghanistan.” [Risen, 2006, pp.
152-162] An article in the Independent this year will come to
similar conclusions (see August 14, 2004). Based on this report and
other evidence, Charles will push for a tough counter-narcotics
policy but will end up losing his job instead (see November 2004).
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