-Caveat Lector-
Begin forwarded message:
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: September 13, 2007 3:15:25 PM PDT
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Petraeus' Boss Called Him (to His Face) "An Ass-Kissing
Little Chickenshit"
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=39235
U.S.-IRAQ: Fallon Derided Petraeus, Opposed the Surge
By Gareth Porter*
WASHINGTON, Sep 12 (IPS) - In sharp contrast to the lionisation of
Gen. David Petraeus by members of the U.S. Congress during his
testimony this week, Petraeus's superior, Admiral William Fallon,
chief of the Central Command (CENTCOM), derided Petraeus as a
sycophant during their first meeting in Baghdad last March,
according to Pentagon sources familiar with reports of the meeting.
Fallon told Petraeus that he considered him to be "an ass-kissing
little chickenshit" and added, "I hate people like that", the
sources say. That remark reportedly came after Petraeus began the
meeting by making remarks that Fallon interpreted as trying to
ingratiate himself with a superior.
That extraordinarily contentious start of Fallon's mission to
Baghdad led to more meetings marked by acute tension between the
two commanders. Fallon went on develop his own alternative to
Petraeus's recommendation for continued high levels of U.S. troops
in Iraq during the summer.
The enmity between the two commanders became public knowledge when
the Washington Post reported Sep. 9 on intense conflict within the
administration over Iraq. The story quoted a senior official as
saying that referring to "bad relations" between them is "the
understatement of the century".
Fallon's derision toward Petraeus reflected both the CENTCOM
commander's personal distaste for Petraeus's style of operating and
their fundamental policy differences over Iraq, according to the
sources.
The policy context of Fallon's extraordinarily abrasive treatment
of his subordinate was Petraeus's agreement in February to serve as
front man for the George W. Bush administration's effort to sell
its policy of increasing U.S. troop strength in Iraq to Congress.
In a highly unusual political role for an officer who had not yet
taken command of a war, Petraeus was installed in the office of
Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, a Republican from Kentucky, in
early February just before the Senate debated Bush's troop
increase. According to a report in The Washington Post Feb. 7,
senators were then approached on the floor and invited to go
McConnell's office to hear Petraeus make the case for the surge
policy.
Fallon was strongly opposed to Petraeus's role as pitch man for the
surge policy in Iraq adopted by Bush in December as putting his own
interests ahead of a sound military posture in the Middle East and
Southwest Asia -- the area for which Fallon's CENTCOM is responsible.
The CENTCOM commander believed the United States should be
withdrawing troops from Iraq urgently, largely because he saw
greater dangers elsewhere in the region. "He is very focused on
Pakistan," said a source familiar with Fallon's thinking, "and
trying to maintain a difficult status quo with Iran."
By the time Fallon took command of CENTCOM in March, Pakistan had
become the main safe haven for Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda to plan
and carry out its worldwide operations, as well as being an
extremely unstable state with both nuclear weapons and the world's
largest population of Islamic extremists.
Plans for continued high troop levels in Iraq would leave no troops
available for other contingencies in the region.
Fallon was reported by the New York Times to have been determined
to achieve results "as soon as possible". The notion of a long war,
in contrast, seemed to connote an extended conflict in which Iraq
was but a chapter.
Fallon also expressed great scepticism about the basic assumption
underlying the surge strategy, which was that it could pave the way
for political reconciliation in Iraq. In the lead story Sep. 9, The
Washington Post quoted a "senior administration official" as saying
that Fallon had been "saying from Day One, 'This isn't working.' "
One of Fallon's first moves upon taking command of CENTCOM was to
order his subordinates to avoid the term "long war" -- a phrase
Bush and Secretary of Defence Robert M. Gates had used to describe
the fight against terrorism.
Fallon was signaling his unhappiness with the policy of U.S.
occupation of Iraq for an indeterminate period. Military sources
explained that Fallon was concerned that the concept of a long war
would alienate Middle East publics by suggesting that U.S. troops
would remain in the region indefinitely.
During the summer, according to the Post Sep. 9 report, Fallon
began to develop his own plans for redefine the U.S. mission in
Iraq, including a plan for withdrawal of three-quarters of the U.S.
troop strength by the end of 2009.
The conflict between Fallon and Petraeus over Iraq came to a head
in early September. According to the Post story, Fallon expressed
views on Iraq that were sharply at odds with those of Petraeus in a
three-way conversation with Bush on Iraq the previous weekend.
Petraeus argued for keeping as many troops in Iraq for as long as
possible to cement any security progress, but Fallon argued that a
strategic withdrawal from Iraq was necessary to have sufficient
forces to deal with other potential threats in the region.
Fallon's presentation to Bush of the case against Petraeus's
recommendation for keeping troop levels in Iraq at the highest
possible level just before Petraeus was to go public with his
recommendations was another sign that Petraeus's role as chief
spokesperson for the surge policy has created a deep rift between
him and the nation's highest military leaders. Bush presumably
would not have chosen to invite an opponent of the surge policy to
make such a presentation without lobbying by the top brass.
Fallon had a "visceral distaste" for what he regarded as Petraeus's
sycophantic behaviour in general, which had deeper institutional
roots, according to a military source familiar with his thinking.
Fallon is a veteran of 35 years in the Navy, operating in an
institutional culture in which an officer is expected to make
enemies in the process of advancement. "If you are Navy captain and
don't have two or three enemies, you're not doing your job," says
the source.
Fallon acquired a reputation for a willingness to stand up to
powerful figures during his tenure as commander in chief of the
Pacific Command from February 2005 to March 2007. He pushed hard
for a conciliatory line toward and China, which put him in conflict
with senior military and civilian officials with a vested interest
in pointing to China as a future rival and threat.
He demonstrated his independence from the White House when he
refused in February to go along with a proposal to send a third
naval carrier task force to the Persian Gulf, as reported by IPS in
May. Fallon questioned the military necessity for the move, which
would have signaled to Iran a readiness to go to war. Fallon also
privately vowed that there would be no war against Iran on his
watch, implying that he would quit rather than accept such a policy.
A crucial element of Petraeus's path of advancement in the Army, on
the other hand, was through serving as an aide to senior generals.
He was assistant executive officer to the Army Chief of Staff, Gen.
Carl Vuono, and later executive assistant to the chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, Gen. Henry Shelton. His experience taught him that
cultivating senior officers is the key to success.
The contrasting styles of the two men converged with their conflict
over Iraq to produce one of the most intense clashes between U.S.
military leaders in recent history.
*Gareth Porter is an historian and national security policy
analyst. His latest book, "Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power
and the Road to War in Vietnam", was published in June 2005.
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