-Caveat Lector-

from:
http://www.aci.net/kalliste/
<A HREF="http://www.aci.net/kalliste/">The Home Page of J. Orlin Grabbe</A>
-----
Japanese Banking

Long-Term Credit Bank Faces Heat Over Loan Mess

How to hide bad loans

Tokyo prosecutors and police are preparing to press criminal charges
against former board members of the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan
(LTCB) on suspicion they violated the Securities and Exchange Law and
the Commercial Code by underreporting the extent of the bank's bad loans
when they closed the books on fiscal 1997, sources said over the
weekend.
Investigators say they suspect the former directors manipulated some of
the figures on the bank's balance sheet to keep paying dividends to
shareholders, the sources said.

Investigations by the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors' Office and
police are focusing on the treatment of the bank's loans to some of its
affiliated non-bank financing companies, the sources said.

The bank was put under government-supervised management last year after
collapsing under the weight of non-performing loans.

The sources said the bank's accounts reported in May 1998 showed it
still had 46 billion yen at the end of fiscal 1997 after writing off 610
billion yen in bad loans.

On the strength of that report, the bank issued a total of 7.18 billion
yen in shareholder dividends.

But other sources familiar with the bank's accounting procedures and
internal reporting said the bank had manipulated some of the figures in
terms of the way loans were evaluated to make the amount of loans to
affiliated non-banks and other affiliated businesses regarded as
uncollectible would look smaller than the real total.

The Financial Supervisory Agency concluded, based on its July 1998
examination of the bank's records, that the LTCB had underreported its
uncollectible loans by about 130 billion yen.

Investigators believe that a proper evaluation of all the bank's
uncollectible loans would have resulted in a balance sheet with no
surplus left to be distributed to shareholders as dividends, according
to the sources.

Prosecutors and police have been investigating the LTCB case in
cooperation with the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission.

They have examined documents on the bank prepared by the Financial
Supervisory Agency and the bank's loans on a case-by-case basis.

At the same time, the investigators have questioned former executives of
the bank's divisions responsible for its accounting policy and
practices, the sources said.

As a result, they have discovered that the bank had used its affiliated
companies to hide some non-performing loans. The most manipulative
element of the bank's alleged window dressing was the removal of as much
as 100 billion yen from its own books by using three of its related
companies including Nippon Lease, according to the sources.

Police and prosecutors say they believe that the former board members of
the bank had been involved in manipulating the account records and that
they thus should be held criminally accountable for their acts, the
sources said.

Asahi Shimbun, May 17, 1999


Der Fuhrer Invades Yugoslavia

The Current Status of the War Against the Serbs

"Clinton cannot appear to have fought this war for nothing."

As the new week begins, it is time to take stock of the war. This is not
particularly difficult as we have clearly entered a period of stalemate
in which neither side is able to bring the conflict to a close and
indeed, for the moment, neither side is motivated to bring it to a
close. From the NATO perspective, the air war is not particularly costly
or risky. Given the fragility of the NATO coalition, the policy of air
war intensification without either a diplomatic breakthrough or a ground
war is the lowest risk option. The advantage of this strategy is
threefold. First, it keeps open the possibility, however distant, that
the Serbs will crack under the bombing attack and capitulate to NATO’s
demands. Second, absent that, it allows NATO to keep further war fig
hting options open while also keeping open diplomatic options. Third, as
we have said, it also avoids decision-making in NATO’s councils. The
less decision-making goes on, the less likely the coalition is to come
apart.
>From Belgrade’s side, the stalemate is also acceptable. First, while
daily tragedies occur, from a strictly military viewpoint, the bombing
is not affecting Sebia’s long-term war fighting capability. The light
infantry forces that would be used in an extended resistance to a NATO
invasion are not being sufficiently hurt by the bombing to force a
strategic reconsideration. Second, Milosevic’s political standing has
been strengthened by the bombing. While NATO’s psychological warfare
staff is trying to generate a sense of impending disintegration in
Milosevic’s support, both among civilians and military, and some war
weariness is certainly setting in, it is our view that the sense of
victimization at the hands of NATO is sufficient to hold his support
together. Appearing to be too eager to seek a settlement may actually
hurt him rather than help him. Finally, the Russian internal political
situation has become so unsettled that the basic premise that allowed
Milosevic to resist NATO has become problematic. It is in Milosevic’s
interests to wait until the situation in Moscow clarifies itself and
hopefully the pro-Serb factions reassert themselves, before entering
negotiations.

Thus, the major tendency is toward gridlock. There are, however, forces
on the horizon that can generate movement. On NATO’s side, the Italian
political situation is deteriorating daily. The government could move
into crisis by mid-week over the bombing issue. That political crisis
could end the war unilaterally. Should Italy deny NATO the use of its
air bases for the bombing campaign, it would signal the end of the war.
Italy is absolutely necessary for the war. This means that NATO, in
anticipation of the outcome of the Italian crisis, might be forced to
seek some diplomatic initiatives. Indeed, the Italian situation is one
reason that Milosevic not only might, but must, hold out. It is his
major hope for a breakthrough.

Yugoslavia has its own pressures leading it to make concessions. While
the current situation in Moscow is an argument for waiting, there is
tremendous long-term danger there for Yugoslavia. If victory in Moscow’s
political wars goes to western-oriented leaders, which might happen if
only for a short time, and Milosevic loses his support from that
quarter, his strategic position will deteriorate dramatically. China is
simply too far away to matter. A shift in Moscow could trigger a shift
in Greece and Macedonia, opening the way to a ground war. In addition,
while the air campaign is not decisive, it does hurt. All of these
factors cause movement toward diplomacy.

The key question continues to be the makeup of the peacekeeping force
and the quantity and type of force Serbia will be permitted to keep in
Kosovo. It is interesting to us that the discussions on this seem to be
going on in slow motion. Discussions that should take hours are taking
days. Discussions that should take days are taking weeks. One reason for
this is the situation in Moscow and Rome. But the underlying problem is
that each side believes that the other’s problems are more serious than
its own. Milosevic hopes that Clinton’s problems with Rome will cripple
him. Clinton hopes that Milosevic’s problems with Moscow will cripple
him.

>From our perspective, there is an ongoing tragedy here. There is a clear
structure for a peace agreement in place. It has been there from the
beginning. The discussions have now degenerated to what weapons
peacekeepers will carry. The real problem is not one of substantial
issues, but of appearance. Clinton cannot appear to have fought this war
for nothing. Milosevic cannot appear to have put his country through
this pounding for nothing. Each must find a way to claim victory while
allowing the other to do the same.

In an odd way, Clinton and Milosevic are similar men. They are willing
to fight wars for domestic political reasons even when the strategic
issues could be settled fairly readily. Each knows that the victory he
wants is impossible. Clinton cannot invade Serbia and impose a new
government. Milosevic will not be able to avoid foreign troops in
Kosovo. Each is more concerned about how the final, obvious agreement
will be arrived at than what that agreement will contain, because each
knows pretty much what will be in the agreement. It is not a question
just of stubbornness, although both are extraordinarily willful men.
Rather, it is the reasoning behind fighting wars.

Wars fought for geopolitical reasons are ultimately manageable. Wars
fought for domestic political reasons are the hardest to solve. That
means that the nations whose geopolitical interests are most affected by
this--Italy, Germany and Russia--will ultimately have to take
responsibility for imposing an agreement. The problem is that everyone’s
attention is on other things, and there is no pressing urgency in the
war. That is the most extraordinary fact: Kosovo refugees and the
bombing of Serbia aside, no one at all seems to feel a sense of urgency.


This has surprised us during the past few weeks and it continues to
surprise us. However, if we had looked closely at the careers of these
two men, perhaps we would have been less surprised. For men to whom
appearance is everything, how war is settled can be more important than
what is achieved.

Stratfor Special Report, May 16, 1999
-----
Aloha, He'Ping,
Om, Shalom, Salaam.
Em Hotep, Peace Be,
Omnia Bona Bonis,
All My Relations.
Adieu, Adios, Aloha.
Amen.
Roads End
Kris

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