-Caveat Lector-
an excerpt from:
Revelations of an International Spy
I. T. T. Lincoln
Robert M. McBride & Company�1916
New York
--[8]--
CHAPTER VIII
SPYING AND COUNTER-SPYING�THE SINISTER FOUNDATION OF SECRET DIPLOMACY
I HAVE just spent some weeks in England going over the ground which in
case of invasion is assigned to me." Thus spoke to me an officer of the
German army, in 1911, on the Dover-Ostend boat, both of us reclining on the
deck chairs, on a superb July day. We were basking in the sun. I was reading
a German book, and he, noticing it, soon drew me into conversation. Our
conversation soon drifted on to the Morocco crisis, particularly the Agadir
incident.
"Sir Edward Grey is pursuing a wrong policy," I urged. "Instead of paying
such a tremendous price for Russia's adherence to his anti-German policy, as
he did by the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907, he ought to have satisfied
Germany's legitimate aspirations by agreeing to the sale of the Portuguese
colonies to her-we would have had peace in Europe instead of this continual
tension."
This my opinion, frankly stated, greatly interested him, and soon he knew
that I had been an M.P., disclosing, in his turn, that he was an officer of
the Great General Staff of Germany. He was greatly surprised at my detailed
knowledge of Germany's war readiness in 1905 and 1906 and again in July of
that year (1911), and looked at me with a mingled look of amazement and
interrogation when I remarked that all along the Rhine locomotives were
collected at strategical centers with steam up day and night, and that a vast
aggregation of rolling stock was ready for the troops concentrated there
should England and France force Germany into war over the Morocco affair.
England was also ready. The expeditionary force was ready on the east coast
and in Aldershot, ready to embark at a moment's notice. "I know," he said,
and did not ask me any more questions. He had gone over his section in
England in a touring car to see whether any new buildings had been erected,
and whether bridges had been strengthened, and so forth, but chiefly to keep
his local knowledge of his section up-to-date and fresh. This is but an
illustration of the thoroughness of the German spy system.
ORGANIZATION OF SPY SYSTEMS
Much has been written of late of the organization and activity of Continental
spy systems, but all these descriptions are fragmentary, many even confused
and confusing. The arrest and execution of Kuepferle, Lody, Rosenthal�German
spies in England�the unexplained blowing-up of the battleship Bulwark, the
oft-repeated stories of signalings from the east coast of England, and many
other incidents have not only contributed little to the exact knowledge that
the man in the street has of espionage, but have, on the contrary, enshrouded
its workings with greater and deeper mystery.
People with an inventive turn of mind, or with an alert imagination, seized
this favorable opportunity and regaled the public with fictitious
descriptions of spy systems, which were eagerly read and readily believed. In
the mind of the average person, spying has become a kind of mythical
organization, working furtively and with great dramatic effect. Nothing could
be further from the truth. On the contrary, it is a most matter-of-fact
organization, sober, methodical, working with great deliberation and unusual
thoroughness. The Japanese, for instance, have a wonderful espionage system,
which in some respects is even superior to the German.
In the Russo-Japanese War they had a paid agent in the Russian headquarters�a
staff officer�who by relays of messengers kept them informed of all decisions
taken or moves contemplated. It was only after the battle of Mukden that this
was found out. The officer in question was, of course, shot.
But in regard to organization, none can be compared with the German. The
German espionage system is the only one which has a peace establishment which
in times of war expands into a war establishment. This is the great
distinguishing feature of the German Secret Service. When the army is
mobilized, the espionage is also mobilized in the strictest sense of the
word. This mobilization takes place according to a well-prepared plan in
which each agent has his or her preappointed place and duty. Schemes long ago
prepared are put into execution. An agent who, for instance, for years was
doing porter's work at the railway station at Ostend (Belgium) is recalled,
meets certain troops, and leads them in their advance, having a thorough
knowledge not only of Ostend but of the whole neighborhood which he minutely
studied on his bicycle rides into the country on his "off days."
Military or naval attaches must be very circumspect, for if their espionage
is revealed the Government must take official cognizance. This recall, if
found out, cannot be evaded. For years there was no German military attache
in Paris because Col. S___ was deeply involved in high espionage. Indeed, I
call the military and naval attaches "privileged spies," for they cannot be
called to book, no matter how much they are compromised. A few years ago
Colonel Zubovits, the Russian Military attache in Vienna, had to leave Vienna
on six hours' intimation that the climate of Vienna did not suit his health.
He had carried on from the Embassy a vast scheme of military espionage. But
as a rule, attaches take care not to be identified with any espionage.
In times of peace there are itinerary spies employed by the Germans and
Japanese more systematically than by any other government. The Russian and
English, too, send spies into a foreign country to spy upon some definite
object, say the defenses of Wilhelmshaven, or the distribution of troops in
South Hungary and Bosnia at a given time. But only the Japanese and the
Germans carry on spying in times of peace as an art and science.
Each spy unit works unknown to the other. The duty of some spies is to
acquire topographic knowledge of certain well-defined localities, of roads,
schools, other public buildings, hospitals, factories, dockyards; others to
obtain drawings of forts, guns, battleships; others to obtain exact data as
to quantity of food provisions obtainable in a given neighborhood during
different seasons; draught animals, cattle, sheep, other live stock, etc.,
etc. Others, as teachers of music or languages or governesses or butlers or
gardeners, reside for months or years in a foreign country and acquire an
inner knowledge of its internal administration, party politics, and obtain
the contents of important documents.
MOBILIZATION
Now, when war breaks out all these thousands of agents are mobilized. They
get a code telegram; they know what it means. It is all rearranged.
Kuepferle, for instance, goes to London. Another goes to Chile, to keep track
of British war and merchant ships. Others go to Canada to watch the training
or sending of troops. Indeed, they travel with them as sailors on the boat,
or as Red Cross men or as Red Cross nurses. Others hurry to the United States
to watch and report shipments of ammunitions and other merchandise to enemy
countries. The whole is a wonderful piece of organization, thoroughly
prepared in advance. Those who have resided for years in Belgium or France or
England or Russia hurry home, join certain army troops, or Zeppelins, as
guides. This knowledge, carefully tabulated and filed away at Berlin, extends
to the most minute matters.
I know, for instance, that the Great German General Staff as well as the
Japanese General Staff is informed exactly from what hill or elevation New
York, Galveston, Baltimore, or Boston, etc., can be effectually bombarded.
The ranges, distances, are all measured and prepared. This knowledge embraces
every important city of strategical or tactical importance in any country of
the world. As a high German officer once remarked to me:
"We may never land in San Francisco, indeed the probabilities are we never
will, but yet we have got the range of all important government buildings
there. As soon as the caliber, velocity, and range of our field or siege guns
is increased, the information is brought up to date.
"Moreover, any railway that is built in any part of the world is carefully
noted and studied from various points of view-weight of rail and nature of
permanent way-in order to know what amount and weight of traffic it will
handle during a given time; also quantity and quality of rolling stock
required for the transportation of troops and war material devised for that
particular section. Bridges are very carefully studied. You know in England
there are a great number of old stone bridges. We know every one of them and
know what amount of traffic they will stand. Now, when we invade England, we
shall take with us not only pontoons to cross rivers but bridge material
which is all ready in sections, numbered, booked away, so to speak, for a
specific object in a known locality."
"Don't you think, Colonel" I said, "that much of this information is, or
rather will ever remain, useless? What is the use of collecting, studying,
filing away of things into elaborate war plans, minute information which you
never may use?"
"Why not?�it may be useful to potential allies," was his significant reply.
In the War Office in London, I found a verification of this. In many of the
secret offices in the War Office, I saw high filing cabinets, more like
chests of drawers, of quite enormous length. The legend on them runs as
follows: "Hankau Peking Railway," or "Tashkent-Tiflis Railway," or
"Kabul-Herat Road," or "Liao-Tang, Peninsular Railway," etc., etc. There were
a goodly number of these huge drawers. My curiosity was aroused and I asked
Captain Kenny of the M. O. 5 J. (Military Counter-Espionage) what they were.
He told me as far as Manchuria, China or Mongolia were concerned they got
their information from the Japanese Secret Service, "who know everything," as
he said. Yet even he admitted that no Secret Service in the world had so
complete a knowledge of all countries as the Germans.
GERMANY'S MISTAKES
This brings me to the consideration of a point which will, I am sure, come as
a great surprise to many a reader. The Germans know all mechanical,
topographical, military, or naval secrets, but their system entirely fails in
the personal element, the personal factor. Their own system, I mean their
Secret Service, is over-organized. Very little scope is left to individual
enterprise or initiative; everything goes, as it were, by pressing a button.
It is a thoroughly organized machine, but it is a machine. I will give two
illustrations from my own personal knowledge.
"You have made a great blunder by invading Belgium, from a diplomatic point
of view, "[1]said I to Legationsrath Consul Gneist at Rotterdam, and to
Lieut.-CoIonel von Ostertag, German Military Attache at The Hague (formerly
in London), and to a member of the German Embassy in Washington, whom I met
in New York, soon after my arrival in New York. [ 1. See also pp. 200 and
201.]
The faint, half-heartened contradiction to my drastic statement clearly
showed me that in their hearts they did agree with me.
"You would have prevented England joining the war�at any rate for several
months," I remarked.
"No, Mr. Linclon[sic], we know that Grey meant to war upon us. Indeed, this
was one of the reasons why we invaded Belgium," they all replied.
"I was in the House of Commons on the 3rd and 4th of August, 1914, where
as a former Mem-ber of Parliament I had the privilege of going into the inner
lobby and the majority of the mem-bers I spoke to, and indeed the general
opinion of the House and of the country, was that if Belgium is not
invaded�Great Britain should not go to war.
"Now you knew that the Foreign Office had an- other policy, that at
all costs to join France and Russia as they were committed by previous
under-standings. The people of England, the Parlia-ment of England, yes, even
the Cabinet of England, knew nothing of Grey's policy. Conse-quently when
Grey asked you that fatal question,
'Will you respect the neutrality of Belgium?' you should have replied,
'Certainly, how can you ask such a thing? Have we not guaranteed it? Our word
is our bond.' I can assure you the Parlia-ment of England would not have
supported Grey. As it is, Lord Morley, John Burns, and Mr. Trevelyan resigned
from the Government. Grey could not have gone on with his policy."[1][ 1.
Prince Lichnovsky offered to Grey to respect Belgium's neutrality and not to
attack France, but Grey refused. However, I still maintain if Germany had
from the first made this clear Grey could not have plunged Great Britain into
the war.]
Why this lack of diplomatic finesse? Because the mill works with great
precision, but does not see the human element. The future will re-veal the
correctness of my statement, for it will be proved that Bethmann-Hollweg, the
Imperial Chancellor, was emphatically against the invasion of Belgium, but
was overruled by the military� the supreme power in Germany.
There is nothing worth knowing about the naval and military establishments of
England which the Germans did not know until the outbreak of war. But since
then they have been singularly lacking in information about the number of
recruits, the training camps, the transportation of troops to the Continent,
their number there, their training camp there, and many other important
details connected with Kitchener's army. This lapse is to be referred to the
same blunder as the invasion of Belgium, ignoring the human equation. The war
plan of the Great General Staff-prepared years ahead-provided for the
invasion of Belgium for two reasons:
1. Because Great Britain, to their knowledge, intended doing the same thing.
2. It was easier and quicker to reach Paris via Liege than via Verdun�so they
thought. As a matter of fact they could have reached Paris quicker via
Verdun, as the French were hopelessly disorganized and behind with their
mobilization the first three weeks. Also they did not expect such a
resistance from the Belgian army, a knowledge of which their secret service
might have forecasted. However, it was previously worked out, so it had to be
executed. This is the military mind of precision and method.
So with their failure to know things about Kitchener's army, they never
expected, nor thought it possible, that Kitchener or anybody would raise such
a large army in a trice�consequently they made no preparations to watch its
coming into being, its organization, training, and transportation. Once war
breaks out it is difficult to organize a comprehensive, unified spy system in
an enemy's country. The fate of Lody, Kuepferle, Hahn, Muller, Rosenthal, and
my own experience amply testifies to this.
Lieut.-Colonel von Ostertag, the Intelligence Office at Wesel, were very
badly informed of Kitchener's army. Colonel von Ostertag has put forward
every effort to gain information on this point. They were and are fairly well
informed of the movements of the British fleet in ports, but much less when
at sea. At the outbreak of the war certain previously selected and appointed
agents were sent or assigned to Dublin, Belfast, Glasgow, Edinburgh,
Sheffield, Southampton, Dover, Harwich, and Tyne, and all along the east
coast towns, and of course to London. These agents are Irishmen, Belgians,
Dutchmen, Americans, Poles, Danes, etc. They are frequently changed. They are
not all sent from the same sectional headquarters and consequently they do
not send their information to the same countries. Some came to England from
the United States. Others came from Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium,
France, South America, etc., and of course they send their information to
different offices. These various offices have each other's code systems.
When I arrived in New York, and desired to communicate to Berlin via
Rotterdam that my scheme had miscarried, I went to a certain office in New
York City. I asked to see a certain party. When I was shown into his room, he
naturally first of all wanted to know my identity, or rather, have proofs of
any bona fides. When I told him I communicated to addresses through
Rotterdam, he asked me:
"What codes did you use, to what addresses did you send your mail and cables?"
I, gave him my three codes and the corresponding three addresses. He went up
to his safe, opened a portfolio, took out some sheets of paper, looked them
over, and said, "Yes, that is quite all right."
My bona fides was thus proved to him beyond doubt. He then called in a higher
official and they then immediately put me in touch with some one to whom I
gave my report.
Another great fault of the German Secret Service is that they pay by results,
placing great temptation or rather compulsion in the way of their agent to
invent stories when they are unsuccessful. The English Secret Service, on the
other hand, engage their agents on a fixed salary basis, which is paid to him
whether he be successful or not. In addition to their regular army of agents,
the Germans employ sometimes (but rarely) occasional spies for certain
specific objects. Alike with the Russians and Japanese, every German consul
all over the world is at the same time a secret service agent as well.[1][
1. In times of war, such as at present, every Consulate, Embassy or Legation
of all the belligerents are centers of Secret Service activity. The English
have at present more spies in this country than the Germans.]
England is, however, not only thoroughly "worked" at home; she is being spied
upon from Holland, Norway, United States. This is the Counter-Espionage. To
find out what the English spies in those countries do, what shipments are
made, and many other matters, the respective consulates in those countries
look after this branch in close cooperation with the military and naval
attaches. At the outbreak of war many spies were sent to England to blow up
certain important bridges, factories, shipyards, waterworks, etc., and it is
only due to the prompt measures taken before the declaration of war that
every attempt failed. But there were many attempts. The English have done or
attempted to do all the same things in Germany. Indeed I know that plans were
being elaborated for the blowing up of all the Rhine bridges through spies,
but I foiled this.
COUNTER-ESPIONAGE
The aim of the Counter-Espionage is to thwart the schemes and plots of Secret
Service agents. It is a most elaborate system and absorbs quite as much money
as the espionage itself. How effective the whole system is may be judged by
an interview I had with Mr. McKenna, then First Lord of the Admiralty, in
January, 1910:
After my election to the House of Commons in January, 1910, I paid a visit to
my native country and was quite royally received in Budapest. While there I
came into possession of a very valuable secret process which I thought would
greatly aid the British navy. The man in possession of the secret only gave
me sufficient details to be able to form a judgment on its merits. I
immediately wrote to McKenna and told him that the man was willing to
accompany me to London and place all the facts before him. The price he asked
was $5,000,000 (�1,000,000). Mr. McKenna wired me to bring the man along.
In the afternoon at 3 P. m. of our arrival in London, I saw Mr. McKenna by
appointment. The man I brought with me from Budapest had to wait in the
waiting-room, which had three bare walls, the window being on the fourth wall
opposite the door and looking down on St. James Park. It is important to bear
this in mind to appreciate the full significance of what will follow later.
Being shown to Mr. McKenna Is private room, I, in reply to a query of his,
explained to him the nature of the secret and added:
"The man wants �1,000,000, but for this amount the British Admiralty shall be
the sole possessor of the secret."
Mr. McKenna smilingly replied:
"We never give any large amount of money for secrets, for I know within a
fortnight of any secret, invention, or process of any navy in the world, and
I must necessarily assume this to be the case with your secret."
This statement reveals the astonishing character of Secret Service plotting
and counter plotting.
Towards the close of our conversation a gentleman came in, drew Mr. McKenna
into a far corner of his very spacious room, and whispered something into his
ears�and then left.
When bidding good-by to Mr. McKenna, he thus addressed me:
"Will you please ask the man in the waitingroom to return all the Admiralty
note-paper he filled his pockets with?"
I rushed into the waiting-room and remonstrated with the man for having thus
abused my chaperonage of him. He turned as white as snow and stammered out a
few incoherent remarks.
"I can't understand . . . I . . . there was nobody in the room . . . 1
thought there was no harm . . . seeing it is placed here in the waitingroom .
. . eh."
Those of the readers who have ever had occasion to call at any of the
government offices in London were certainly astonished at the long waiting in
a waiting-room and at the presence of an abundant supply of note-paper with
the royal arms impressed on it.
Now they understand!
As a general rule actual espionage is much more elaborate during times of
peace, whilst in times of war, like at present, the Counter-Espionage is even
more important than actual espionage.
There is a Counter-Espionage Division (M. 0. 5 J.), both at the War Office
and at the Admiralty. It must, however, not be presumed that the two work
independently of one another. On the contrary; indeed the military division
is quasi under the supervision of the naval one. The funds for both are
supplied by the Foreign Office, which gets a vote annually from Parliament
for Secret Service, amounting to �65,000. This is a very small amount
compared with the huge amounts spent by Japan, Russia, or Germany.
But then it must be pointed out that Great Britain has many voluntary
workers, which is not the case with the other powers. Some of the most
valuable information, such as the defenses of Borkum and other Frisian
Islands, sectional drawings of the new naval gun of Germany, and many other
pieces of secret data were obtained for Great Britain through the efforts of
voluntary workers.
I need only refer to General Baden-Powell's book "My Adventures as a Spy,"
and to Captain Trench and Brandon, who, however, were caught by the Germans
and imprisoned. But before they were caught they obtained and sent very
valuable information to England. Capt. P. W. Kenny, at present the active
chief of the M. O. 5 J., as well as his brother, have been on secret service
in Ger-many. Of the �65,000, only �20,000 were allotted to the War Office
during the years prior to the war, which, as Captain Kenny remarked to me,
"greatly handicapped our work. Though since the war we have all the money we
want."
When the War Office wants money they apply to Captain "C" of the Admiralty,
who on every first Tuesday of the month obtains funds from the Foreign Office.
Prior to the war the Counter-Espionage in Lon-don restricted its
activity to the opening of the correspondence of suspected persons and their
shadowing. A classical example in this connec-tion was furnished by the
arrest in London of Mr.
Ernest, a German barber, and three others on the day of the declaration of
war and whose correspondence were read during two full years. Mr. Ernest, for
a bagatelle of 20 marks ($5.00) a month, which later was increased to 30
marks ($7.50) a month, received and forwarded mail be-tween the chief of the
German Secret Service in
Charlottenburg and his agents in England, un-suspecting that all the letters
he sent or received through Mr. Ernest were being read during two full years
by the Counter-Espionage in London.
Through the reading of these letters four German spies were arrested and
imprisoned in London on the day of the declaration of war; and three during
1912, the one a teacher of languages in Rochester, adjoining Chatham where
the royal dockyards are, and a man and woman at Charing Cross station, just
departing for Ostend with important plans and drawings.
When war broke out the Counter-Espionage was totally unprepared and
unorganized for the enormous task it had to face. The Germans not only had
quite a few spies in England permanently, others temporarily on "special
duty" in the years prior to the war, but when Austria delivered her ultimatum
to Servia, Germany's Secret Service was mobilized. I am using this word in
its truest application. Many of Germany's agents in France, Belgium, Great
Britain, Russia, and Poland, who have resided in those respective countries
for years, were recalled to act as guides, etc., to the invading army; but
others from Germany, Holland, Norway, and the United States were sent out on
their duties, some to Russia (Slavs, Poles), to France, others (mostly
Alsatians), to Great Britain (mostly Belgians), and United States naturalized
citizens, such as Kuepferle. In exceptional cases Germans having had special
qualifications, were sent to England on special missions, with fraudulent
passports, of course.[1][ 1. The English, too, have a section doing nothing
but forging passports, post marks, letters, documents, etc.]
The Counter-Espionage in England was totally unprepared to deal with the
situation and the greatest blunders were committed. When the Belgians fled
before the invader and sought refuge in England, scores, yea, hundreds of
German spies (Belgians) were shipped across the Straits of Dover by the
methodical Germans as "Belgian refugees."
For several weeks they went about their work unsuspected, sending plain
language code messages to Belgium and Holland about the troops in their
respective localities, the presence of war ships, etc.
The coast of England was, of course, guarded by patrols, and how
ineffectually is proved by the following event. One of the "Belgian refugees"
was installed comfortably in Margate, from whence he took walks and drives
along the coast both during the day and in the evening accompanied by an
English girl whose acquaintance he cultivated in order to serve as a shield.
One Sunday evening he proposed to the English girl with whom he had become
acquainted that they should motor to Dover (only a few miles away), which the
girl gladly accepted, not finding it strange that a refugee should have money
enough to spare for motoring excursions. From Dover they drove on to
Folkestone. There they were stopped by a sentry. The sentry was satisfied
with the spy's explanation, confirmed by the girl, that he was a "Belgian
refugee" who had escaped from the barbarous Germans. He also produced a
meaningless card with a lot of stamps, seals, and his photograph on it, dated
at Brussels and printed in French.
The spy apparently was a fellow with a pretty sense of humor for he actually
reprimanded the sentry for taking the examination so lightly, as there were
many German spies among the Belgian refugees. The sentry jabbered a few words
in his defense, that "he would easily detect them" and so on.
As a result of this ruse several weeks later, an order in council was
promulgated prohibiting any foreigners or even Belgian refugees to live or
stay in any coastal towns or other prohibited areas.
I recite this merely as an instance to show how hopelessly inadequate were
the means adapted by the English Counter-Espionage. But with each month the
system improved and a few months after the war the British Counter-Espionage
had a fairly efficient staff in Holland, Norway, and thousands in the United
States.
In London itself the War Office organized a Counter-Espionage department
under the very able leadership of Capt. P. W. Kenny and a Postal Censorship
department under the control of Major Churchill. The Postal Censorship had
nothing to do with the Post-Office. It was and is under the M. 0. 5 at the
War Office, Major Churchill having under his personal control the
correspondence of the prisoners of war, whilst Lieut.-Col. Bellamy has charge
of all general cor-respondence. When the diplomatic situation to-ward the end
of July became threatening, the British Government withheld all
correspondence mailed in England to Germany or Austria-Hungary or arriving
from those countries.
Although Great Britain declared war on Germany on the 4th of August, 1914, I
can affirm as a positive fact based on personal knowledge that, beginning
with the 28th of July, much, whilst from the 30th of July all, correspondence
as above described was kept back in London. Mail from Germany and
Austria-Hungary to the United States and South America passing through
England from the 24th of July was held up�we shall see presently why.
During many years preceding the war the Home Office had a department at
Scotland Yard opening correspondence of persons suspected of espionage. But
no systematic provision seems to have been in existence for the contingency
of a war. Hence when war broke out the Counter-Espionage of the War Office
hurriedly organized the Postal Censorship and installed the censors at the
Mount Pleasant Sorting Post-Office, Major Ducrot being in actual charge.
There were millions of letters, positively millions, accumulated by the time
the censorship was organized, and hundreds of thousands pouring in daily. All
the corridors of the floors where the censors were housed were blocked by
thousands of mail bags. If the provisions devised to deal with all this mail
was inadequate, the personnel was absolutely ridiculous.
First, as to their number. There were sufficient censors for French and
German correspondence, but totally inadequate for the Slavic languages. There
was only one censor for the Scandinavian languages, one for Yiddish, though a
sufficient number of naturalized British subjects were available for any and
all languages. As to their fitness, the blunders committed were really
indescribable.
There were, to my own knowledge, three German spies doing censor's work for
the British War Office when I left London and during many months previous, as
I learned. When one re-members the importance of the postal censors for the
purposes of Counter-Espionage, of immediate, reading of letters, of quick
action being taken, no words can be too strong for the deplorable conditions
existing in the Postal Censor's department during the early stages of the war.
The card reproduced on the next page was given to me August, 1914, at the War
Office, London. It secured for me admittance on the next day to the sacro
sanctum of the Censor- ship Bureau. When you arrive at the War Of-fice,
unless you have an appointment, you will not go further than the
waiting-hall, whose every door is guarded by two stalwart policemen. So
having an appointment, you sign a slip, giving the name of the officer you
want to see, say, "Capt. P. W. Kenny, M. O. 5, by appointment," and then you
have to sign it and give your full address. You are then taken up by a Boy
Scout to the floor clerk, who takes charge of you and your slip. He takes in
the slip to the officer concerned; meanwhile you have to wait under the
vigilance of an usher. At last you are conducted into the inner recesses of
the English Secret Service. Great Scott! What a difference between the
workshops of the German and English Secret Services! The German office, the
model of order, exactitude, cleanliness.
The disorganization and muddle at M. 0. 5 was such that many clerks and
officers had to do their work�secret and confidential�in the War Office
corridors, shielded only by a folding stand. How different a German office!
No overcrowding, everybody has his place, every officer his appointed room,
every matter, department, or section is located somewhere, according to a
methodical plan conducive to efficiency.
Whether you entered the room of Captain Kenny, Captain Hall, Legationsrath
Consul Gneist, or Colonel von Ostertag, you see nothing! No maps, codes,
invisible inks, and other paraphernalia of espionage.
Every time they leave their office, all slips and fragments of paper,
blotting paper, are carefully collected and destroyed.[1] [ 1.This is
important. M. Delcasse when Foreign Minister of France, used to work at his
desk till exhaustion, leaving the destruction of such papers to his usher,
who sold them to secret agents.]
THE ROUTINE OF CENSORSHIP
I started my work as Hungarian and Rumanian censor on the 18th of August. On
arrival at the office, Major Ducrot introduced me to one of the
superintendents, who handed me a large secret dossier, which I had to read
and sign each page as read. Some of the contents I had to return immediately
after it was read, while another part became my personal dossier, lying
always in front of me.
The dossier contained full instructions about codes, both cypher and plain
language codes, used by spies, samples of spies' letters, and other general
instructions on how to detect suspicious letters. In it were also various
names, pseudonyms, aliases of German spies in England, the addresses they
corresponded with, etc. This list was called the "Black List." It contained
the names, etc., of fifteen German spies who had been busy in England in the
years preceding the war and whose correspondence, unknown to them, was opened
by the British authorities, photographed, sealed, and then delivered. There
was another longer one-in the sole possession of Major Ducrot.
All letters handed to us were already opened. All matter dealt with had to be
divided into four categories: First, correspondence which was addressed, or
came from, one of the persons on the Black List; or correspondence manifestly
being written by a spy. A slip had to be attached to all such, marked urgent,
and immediately handed to Major Ducrot, who sent them on to the War Office by
special messengers. When the reader recalls that the mail in many cases was
days, in some cases weeks, old, the "urgency" was rather amusing. In the
second category were placed those letters which were suspicious looking, but
in which there was no definite or open mention of military or naval matters.
These, too, had to be handled at once. In the third category were placed
doubtful letters. In the fourth category were the manifestly innocuous ones,
which were passed by us to be sealed again.
I have mentioned above that all mail matter passing through England from
Germany or Austria-Hungary to the United States and South America or on
British vessels was held up a week or ten days before the actual declaration
of war by England. Why? Hundreds of thousands of mobilization orders to
German and Austro-Hungarian reservists in England and on the whole continent
of North and South America came into the hands of the Counter-Espionage by
this simple process.
Needless to say, these mobilization orders never reached their destination.
Each of us was provided with a sheet of paper, giving every regiment of line,
first and second reserve, Ersatzreserve, also of infantry, cavalry, field
artillery, garrison artillery, engineers, wireless section, telephone troops,
etc., and all we had to do was to fill in the rubric "place of mobilization,
date of presentation."
Every evening the result of the day's work was cabled to the French and
Russian General Staff, who thereby knew exactly which troops and how many of
them were mobilized against them. How much more valuable this information
might have been had there been no avoidable delay! Take my own case. I
started on the 18th of August and was positively overwhelmed with work. None
of the mobilization orders coming from Hungary were then as yet dealt with!
Yet war had been going on for close upon three weeks. And although I worked
all day it took me a fortnight to dispose of the tremendous accumulation of
mail. For be it remembered, I had to take the letters as they came to my hand
and the detection of the spies through their correspondence was as important
as the classification of the mobilization orders.
As Major Ducrot remarked to me:
"We are doing here more useful work than a battalion of soldiers on the
battlefield."
There was another kind of work done in our section of the Counter-Espionage
which throws a lurid light on the hidden motives for this war. The
correspondence held up during the eight or ten days preceding the war and
that illegally captured from neutral vessels after the outbreak of the war
(this was stopped by President Wilson's first note addressed to Great Britain
although continued clandestinely), was for the most part genuine, bona-fide
correspondence.
There were letters from German and Austro-Hungarian manufacturers, exporters,
bankers, etc., both to Americans and to English, but also from American firms
to German and Austro-Hungarian houses. Indeed, until President Wilson's note
stopped it, all neutral mail such as United States, Dutch, Italian, Danish,
passed through our hands.
Now all the information gleaned from this mass of valuable sources with exact
data was carefully collected and minutely tabulated, according to country,
articles, prices, with cross references, and handed over to the Intelligence
Department of the Board of Trade, who confidentially circularized the trades
concerned or interested in any particular trade or pursuit, with a view, as I
was often told, to capture German and neutral trade.
THE METHODS OF ESPIONAGE,
The methods employed are manifold. Each accredited representative of a
foreign nation may be termed a spy, with certain qualifications. No
ambassador, minister, or military attache ever engages directly or openly in
spy's work, and yet they all employ backstair methods to gain precise
information on vital methods, such as secret negotiations between two or more
governments or what is passing at the time, of meeting of sovereigns, etc.,
which may become inimical to the country they represent. The only exception
to the above rule is furnished by the Russian representatives, who do
directly take a hand in all the plotting.
Ambassadors, ministers or military attaches or naval attaches, as a rule,
work "underground."
It can be stated as a positive fact that all embassies or even important
legations have their confidential informants in every capital.[1] These
informants in many cases are in the immediate entourage of the ruler. They do
not do it for money, as a rule, except in Russia. Indeed, very often, they do
not know that they give information to another country. Ladies play a very
important role in this sphere. The embassy keeps in close relation with a
noted society beauty, who is amply provided with funds to keep a salon. They
have liaisons with officials, indeed, with members of the Cabinet themselves,
and obtain by finely spun intrigues, by the alluring and liberal display of
their charms, many important state, i.e., diplomatic, secrets. But they never
have direct relations with the embassy for whom they are active.[ 1. I could
tell some interesting and sensational things of M. de Leval, the legal
adviser of Mr. Brand Whitlock in Brussels. I know him and he knows me. He had
very close connections with the British Legation in Brussels during many
years.]
Some years ago in Rome the young and beautiful widow of the multi-millionaire
Von Smoved to Rome to reside there, keeping up a huge and luxurious
establishment, which became the rendezvous of statesmen and diplomatists. She
then married the accredited representative of another country, Prince M. K.
Every move, policy, or negotiation conducted or embarked upon was known to
her and to the government she was working for, until through jealousy�the
usual tale�the whole plot was discovered and suppressed, as many of the
highest of the country would have been ruined by the sordid revelations. The
consequences of this mistake were very drastic. Her husband's government
received a friendly hint from the Quirinal that his recall would be more than
welcome.
Another source of the embassies is the abundant gossip of high society. It is
astonishing how much "bad blood" has been created between nations by
information which is propagated by mere gossip. It is not generally known
that the very strained relations that existed between Edward VII and the
Kaiser�for years they were not on speaking terms-and which resulted in
strained diplomatic relations and in the intensification of distrust and
jealousy already existing, were in degree due to some remarks the Kaiser made
to a small circle of intimate friends.
The Kaiser was regarding his left hand, crippled by the English physician who
attended his mother in confinement.
"Sie haben meinen linken Arm verstummelt, aber sie sollen meinen rechten zu
fuhlen bekommen!"
("They [the English] have crippled my left hand, but they shall feel my
right!")
At another occasion when his nose was bleeding, he remarked:
"Gott sei Dank! Das war das letzte Tropfen englischen Blutes in mir!"
("Thank God, this was the last drop of English blood in me.")
Within a day or two Edward VII knew of these remarks, and they added but
another welcome opportunity to the English conspirators to drive Edward one
step further in his anti-German policy already pursued.
The most thorough and well informed of all military or naval secret services
is the Japanese, next comes the German, then the Russian, then the English,
then the Austro-Hungarian, then the French. If I were asked pithily to
characterize each, I would say, The Japanese get their information through
the devotion of their agents; the Russians by lavish distribution of money;
the Germans through minute organization; the English through the
sportsman-like instinct of their agents (mostly officers); the
Austro-Hungarians by a judicious but only half-successful mixture of the
German and Russian systems; the French by daring and spirit of adventure.
The biggest success the Russians have had during recent years was their
employment of Colonel Redl of the Austrian army and head of the Austrian
Counter-Espionage. Colonel Redl was during four years in the pay and service
of Russians and betrayed to them not only plans of forts-�so notably
PrzemysI, Cracow, etc., and plans of mobilization, but actually denounced to
the Russians his, own agents whom he sent to Russia. He was at last cornered
in a Viennese hotel, where four staff officers of the Austrian army handed
him a loaded revolver and gave him fifteen minutes to shoot himself, they
meanwhile standing outside his door.
The discovery of this plot necessitated the expenditure of millions of crowns
for the hasty transformation of the Cracow and PrzemysI forts and the working
out of new mobilization plans. However, ambassadors and attaches devote their
attention to specific objects and never do they (except Russia) directly take
any part in this work. Indeed, they have no "official cognizance" of it.
Consequently the finding out of Secret Service secrets, i.e., the names of
the spies, the organization of the service, the methods adapted, the
discovery of information sought, is performed by special agents.
One of the most strictly guarded secrets of all espionage is the names and
personalities of the heads of the service, and conversely one of the most
sought for informations of the Counter-Espionage is precisely to obtain the
names and photographs of the heads of the other countries' spy system.
Indeed, it is one of the strict rules of all Secret Services that the heads
very rarely, if ever, have any direct intercourse even with their own agents.
This rule is devised and enforced in order to prevent a foreign country
snapshoting him. Once his name is known it is easy to shadow him until a
favorable moment will enable him to be snapshoted�and from this minute his
usefulness is greatly diminished and in many directions made impossible.
In Rotterdam, the English Consul General as well as the Vice-Consul
complained to me that they were shadowed constantly by the German
Counter-Espionage, while the German Consul in Rotterdam and Lieut.-Col. von
Ostertag, the German Military Attache at The Hague, made the same complaint
about the English Counter-Espionage. When Captain Kenny, the active head of
the English Counter-Espionage and "C," met me, we had our meeting in a
taxicab, driving about the streets of London, with drawn blinds, to prevent
being snapshoted. It is, namely, sometimes found necessary that one of the
heads himself go to a foreign country; indeed, this s part of their training
before arriving at being chief.
Captain Kenny, the present head at the M. 0. 5 J., at the War Office, London,
spent many years in Holland and particularly in Germany as a music teacher.
But as he remarked to me:
"I shall never be able to return to Germany, as I was careless enough to
allow myself to be seen by German agents."
Often, indeed, the Counter-Espionage of one country sends its emissaries to
another country that they should offer themselves as spies to that country.
Whether they be accepted or not, is immaterial. The main thing is that they
shall find out who the chiefs are and from very little data under their
notice, they, shall be able to "infer" the "system" adapted as well.
A case in point. A Major von der Goltz came to London from the United States
in October last, pretending that he was a naturalized American living in
Mexico. He succeeded in establishing a connection with Captain Kenny,
offering his services as a spy. But diligent search revealed his identity-and
was put under lock and key and will remain there for some time to come.
In addition to emissaries, each Espionage seeks to enlist natives of the
country as agents. The Germans have many Irishmen working for them in Great
Britain. Subjects of neutral countries are very much used. When I was in the
Censor's Department in London, we discovered, as will be shown later, two
Hungarians who have been German spies in England, the one was arrested, the
other escaped through the blunders of the English.
Another rule of the Secret Service is that their .agents operating in foreign
countries should not know each other, if possible have no complete
information about each other. Every one is provided with a code and other
means which enable him to communicate with his chief. In times of peace very
few telegrams are sent,. only occasionally, to notify the chief of change of
address, or want of money, or for some urgent, reason. In times of war,
however, telegrams and cables for the transmission of messages are
extensively used. Needless to say, to pass the censor they must be
plain-language codes.
Poor Lody gave his life for a message of the most trivial nature. Just at the
time when he was in Scotland, the passing through Scotland and England of
those "phantom" Russian armies was talked of and believed by every one. He
sent a message to a neutral country, telling of this expedition with
pretended satisfaction, predicting in consequence with evident glee the
routing of the Germans. This message directed attention to him. He was being
watched and shadowed and a clever trap set for him, in which he was caught.
He paid with his life for his daring devotion to his country's call.
Another means of finding out important naval and military secrets is by the
use of "dummy" prisoners of war. After the naval battle in the Bight of
Heligoland many naval prisoners wore brought to England by the British fleet.
A day or two afterwards a batch of other German prisoners, taken at some
other time and place, were moved amongst the Heligoland prisoners, but with
them several Counter-Espionage agents, who spoke German or Hungarian like
natives were smuggled in amongst them. They pretended to be reservists and to
have been taken prisoners on an ocean liner on their way to Rotterdam to join
their regiments. They were treated and lived exactly like the other prisoners
of war. But they found out very important things, such as the location of the
mine fields, how many battleships are in actual commission., how many are in
repair, fortifications of Cuxhaven, etc.
After a lapse of time a batch of the prisoners was moved to some other town
in order to provide a convenient mode of smuggling these CounterEspionage
agents away, to be sent to a newly arrived crowd of prisoners elsewhere.
Agents on special missions, are cautioned not to cross the frontiers. The
disregarding of this instruction landed Mr. Stewart, the London solicitor, in
a German fortress prison, from which he was liberated by the Kaiser on the
occasion of King George and Queen Mary's visit to Berlin.
At the time of his arrest both Stewart and the British Government disclaimed
that he was a spy, but he was none the less. He was sent to Holland to obtain
plans of fortifications and other data about Germany's North Sea coast and
was especially cautioned in writing under no circumstances to cross into
Germany.
The German Counter-Espionage knew of Stewart's plot, a German counter spy got
into touch with him in Holland, gave him or obtained for him "bait"
information, cleverly lured him to Bremen, where at eleven o'clock at night
he was to be given the promised plans against the agreed payment. But in the
afternoon Stewart was arrested and the Germans found on him written
instructions from the British Admiralty. Six years in a fortress prison was
his sentence.
"Stewart was a fool," said to me Captain Kenny, when once discussing with him
past reminiseences, to which I replied:
"The fools were they who employed a man like Stewart as a spy."
I knew Stewart very well, having had occasion in 1910 to come up against him
in a matter relating to Austria, and I must confess I absolutely played with
him to my heart's content and successfully shattered all his machinations. He
is dead, having died in France, but a certain Mr. R___, who was allied with
him against me, will know, if reading this, to what I refer.
I must now give some examples of the wonderful organization, forethought and
ramification of the German Secret Service. I (and all of us) in the Censor's
Department had a "Black List," containing the names of German spies and
addresses in Germany and neutral countries to which they mailed their
information, as I have before related.
One day towards the end of August, 1914, when reading and examining the
letters on my desk, I picked up an envelope which bore the following address:
X. B. 21�Tr.
Berlin
Poste-Restante
or some similar letters. It was posted in Edinburgh on the 28th of July, six
days before the declaration of war, and contained a four-page letter without
address. It was addressed to "Dear Camilla" and signed "Vilmos" and was
written in Hungarian.
It was a most remarkable letter. Although it was written in colloquial
Hungarian, occupying four pages it did not contain any consecutive thought or
subject, except that furniture and furnishing and house and rooms appeared in
it too often without any reference to the contents.
I looked up my black list, but it did not contain the a[d]dress to which the
letter was sent. I then went to Major Ducrot's desk and asked him to look up
his black list, and indeed there was the very same Berlin address. So the
letter was from a German spy. Many of the words of entire sentences in the
letter were bracketed or underlined, once, twice, or three times. Sometimes,
too, there were figures like 5, 9, 12, prefixed or affixed to certain words.
It dealt with many subjects. That the weather in Edinburgh was stormy,
threatening; that Daisy was getting nervous on account of not having received
the money as promised; that Albert cannot understand why he has got no reply
to a wire he sent three days ago; that there are many open spaces in
Edinburgh surrounded by houses (underlined) in which there are rooms to let
(underlined), but the furniture is "scanty 9." The rate of exchange is going
up on account of war rumors, consequently he thinks it best to exchange his
money at once and the furniture in the room and so forth.
I made a literal translation of the letter and had then to go to the War
Office and from there with a staff officer to the Code Department of the
Admiralty, where we compared it with many German codes in the possession of
the Admiralty. But none of them would fit it. Some days afterwards three more
letters to the same address, written in the same handwriting, came into my
hands, posted on the 1st and 3d of August. These four letters then combined
helped us to decipher the most of the four letters, and we found that they
contained information about Rosyth and the Forth Bridge. The information,
however, was too old to enable the Counter-Espionage to hunt down "Vilmos."
His movements in Edinburgh were traced, but he had already escaped.
Another letter that came under my notice was from a well-known Manchester
firm, addressed to Germany in Hungarian. On the face of it it looked a
bona-fide address in Berlin. Yet my suspicions were aroused by the fact that
a Manchester firm should write a business letter to Berlin in Hungarian, and
by the fact that too many words were underlined, such as, "we would like to
send you samples of our goods, but we are afraid they might not reach you on
account of war breaking out, which seems probable. The samples are very fine
and we are sure would please you, etc., etc."
Major Ducrot would not agree with me that it was a spy's letter, but I was
certain it was. I then suggested that inquiries should 'be made in
Manchester whether there was such a firm, and, if so, whether they had
written this letter. This was done and it turned out that the paper headings;
of the note-paper were very clever imitations of' their business paper. This
spy, too, escaped arrest on account of lapse of time. The letter was, dated
the 2d of August, but it was the 23d of August when it came into my hands,
which shows lack. of organization.
Here another experience. During the first few weeks of the war the
wires between London and important centers were often "tapped" dur-ing the
night. This was particularly the case with the wires between London and
Edinburgh, London-Harwich, London-Portsmouth, London--Southampton,
London-Dover and Folkestone. Toward the end of August motor cars and motor-
cycle patrols were organized, who "guarded" the highroads along which these
wires were drawn. On the 1st of September, Tuesday night, a suspicious
looking "tramp" was arrested by one of these patrols and lodged in Canterbury
jail. The old man, he was about fifty-six, refused to speak
English; he pretended not to understand any-thing that was said to him or
asked of him. On him were found the sketch drawings of a Zeppelin and a small
pocket notebook with unintelligible notes and figures. Nobody could read them
There were also about �160 in gold and Bank of England notes found on him. No
information could be gained from him, who he was, whence he came, or what his
nationality was.
The War Office asked me, knowing that I speak or know most of the European
languages, to go down to Dartford in Kent (it was, near this place that he
was arrested) and see what I could make out of the case. I went through his
notes and soon saw that most of them were in Hungarian, though others were
evidently in code. There was also the following table in the book:
S2 1 8 15 22 29
P 2 9 16 23 30
C 3 10 17 24 31
S 4 11 18 25
K 5 12 19 26
H 6 13 20 27
V 7 14 21 28
To all intents it looked like a calendar, but it was a code in skeleton. It
was agreed that I should go down to Dartford on the 3d, Thursday, and the man
should be brought from the Canterbury county jail the same day by two
detectives to whom I was introduced, and coming with their prisoner from the
station in Dartford on their way to the police station, I should pass them
and when nearest to the man�as if speaking to myself�make a remark in
Hungarian. This was done and, as expected, the man turned to me: "Maga magyar
ember?" ("You are a Hungarian?") He then complained to me about his arrest,
but closely studied me all the while. He was indeed a shrewd man. I asked him
who he was, why he was arrested, what he was doing in England, and so forth,.
but could get no satisfactory replies. Here is his incredible story. He came
to England twenty-four years ago from America, he was robbed of his money and
could not continue his journey home. He was ashamed to ask his relatives to
send him money, so he decided to remain in England.
"All right," I said, "but what did you do all these twenty-four years here?"
"Nothing; I tramped," he said.
"Surely," I replied, "you must have lived somewhere, done some work some
time."
No, he had tramped all over the British Isles twenty-four years and had done
no work. He had no home, he could give us no address where he had been all
these twenty-four years, nor could he explain why he could not speak English
after twenty-four years of tramping in England.
As to the codes, the money and the sketch he was equally obstinate. The same
day he was taken before the magistrate�I acting as interpreter�and on the
technical charge of vagrancy he was condemned to six months' prison to enable
the Counter-Espionage to make inquiries.
It is likely that the man had wandered about in England for a great many
years�he looked it, but that he was no "tramp" was equally certain. His
intelligent, shrewd face and his correct, select Hungarian, belied all his
statements. He was without doubt only another impenetrable link in the
marvelous organization of the German Secret Service.
pps. 278-323
--[fini]--
Aloha, He'Ping,
Om, Shalom, Salaam.
Em Hotep, Peace Be,
Omnia Bona Bonis,
All My Relations.
Adieu, Adios, Aloha.
Amen.
Roads End
Kris
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