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>From www.foreignpolicy.com/bookspage.htm
Via www.cybereditions.com/aldaily/

Les faux complots d’Houphouët-Boigny

The Fake Plots of
Houphouët-Boigny
by Samba Diarra
248 pages, Paris: Karthala, 1997 (in French)

Reviewed by Howard W. French

Almost from the moment in the early 1950s when they emerged as the
preeminent indigenous political leaders of Côte d’Ivoire and the Gold
Coast (now Ghana), Felix Houphouët-Boigny and Kwame Nkrumah have
often been linked in the minds of historians and of the people of
their region. Their determined rivalry was captured in one of the
most famous episodes of their era: the public wager they made in 1957
over whose approach to leadership — Nkrumah’s socialist-oriented Pan-
African nationalism or Houphouët-Boigny’s eager alignment with the
capitalist West — would create the more prosperous and influential
nation.

Their bet was to have been decided in only 10 years time, but Nkrumah
could not stay the course. In 1966, he was overthrown. Nkrumah died
in exile in Bucharest in 1972. Houphouët-Boigny, for his part,
continued ruling his country until his death in 1993. Even so,
Nkrumah today remains an icon of an enduring grassroots attachment to
ideals of African unity and self-reliance, while outside of
Francophone Africa, mention of Houphouët-Boigny, who built his
region’s most prosperous and stable state, stirs few memories.

Nkrumah famously enjoined Africans to “Seek ye first the political kingdom,” promising 
that they wo
uld receive all manner of dividends from sovereign control of the continent’s vast 
wealth. But it w
as Houphouët-Boigny who
 actually devised the model that generations of African autocrats have copied to 
secure power.

It is precisely this latter story that most impresses the reader of Samba Diarra’s 
book, The Fake P
lots of Houphouët-Boigny, a political prisoner’s–eye view of the dark side of a leader 
who is celeb
rated in national myth—
and was much lauded in the West—as a benign nation builder, model of moderation, and 
man of peace.
With a minimum of emotion, Diarra recounts how, from the earliest days of his rule, 
Houphouët-Boign
y warded off potential
challenges to his authority through a cunning strategy of intimidation. As the 
president saw it, kn
own foes were easy to deal with, whether by arrest, execution, or banishment. The 
trickier task was
 conjuring a steady str
eam of traitors, whose punishment—and usually, eventual pardon—would keep his new 
nation in awe of
him and preemptively terrify anyone from questioning his power.

Setting a pattern followed by Nigeria’s late General Sani Abacha, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo’
s Laurent Kabila, and a legion of other African dictators, the president focused his 
paranoid energ
ies on many of his clos
est collaborators. One of Houphouët-Boigny’s earliest and most surprising victims was 
Jean-Baptiste
 Mockey, his loyal number-two figure during the last years of French rule and, 
significantly, one o
f the few colleagues wh
ose courageous role in the independence movement might have cast shadows over 
Houphouët-Boigny’s pr
oject to make himself his nation’s quasi-mythic father. Mockey, who eventually died in 
a suspicious
 car accident, was put
away for several years because of the so-called Black Cat Plot, in which he was 
accused of planting
 the head of a cat whose mouth had been stuffed with the tip of a bull’s horn in the 
luggage of Hou
phouët-Boigny’s wife. T
he curse, it was publicly alleged, was intended to render Houphouët-Boigny impotent 
and eventually
kill him.

Houphouët-Boigny distinguished himself from many of his African presidential peers by 
investing hea
vily in overseas higher education right from the start of his rule. But there was a 
high price to b
e paid by that first ge
neration of graduates, who were frequently jailed on wholly invented charges when they 
returned hom
e—the better to disabuse them of any ideas they might have had of enjoying power. 
Diarra himself wa
s imprisoned for four y
ears in 1963 for his supposed participation in one of a series of plots involving the 
first great w
ave of students returning from university training in France to become the new 
administrative and p
olitical élite of an in
fant nation.

Many survivors, once rehabilitated, went on to become trusted lieutenants—indeed, 
ardent champions—
of Houphouët-Boigny’s rule, capable of giving speeches to the effect that from the 
time of his infa
ncy, as one put it, the
 nonpareil president had been “first in everything.”

Those individuals deemed less cooperative were harshly condemned in show trials or 
tirelessly humil
iated, whether through beatings in front of visiting African heads of state or 
warnings to their wi
ves that they should ta
ke other husbands because their current ones were unlikely to be of much use after 
release from the
 political prison of Assabou. The most famous victim of this type of treatment was 
Ernest Boka, the
 first president of Côt
e d’Ivoire’s Supreme Court. In 1964, the jurist had refused to condemn political 
detainees against
whom there was no evidence and so was arrested himself and, according to Diarra, 
savagely beaten in
 front of Houphouët-Boi
gny. Untreated, he died a short time later of his wounds.

Stories such as these have made the book a big seller in Côte d’Ivoire and throughout 
the region, w
here, even if such events have been discussed with ever greater openness since the 
advent of multi-
party elections in 1990
 and especially since Houphouët-Boigny’s death, they had never before been chronicled 
in such an ex
haustive way.

What emerges, though, in Diarra’s recounting of how so many “political opponents” were 
created, pun
ished, and then, quite often, coopted is less interesting for its revelations of the 
president’s mi
sdeeds than for the rou
gh schematic it provides for the consolidation of power in postcolonial Africa.

In less capable hands, Houphouët-Boigny’s model often turned to grand tragedy or 
tragic farce. Yet,
 as evidenced by the steady stream of visits from African peers—including both more 
famous leaders
such as the late “Emper
or” Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Republic or Mobutu Sese Seko, the 
deceased dictator o
f the former Zaire, and relatively obscure microdespots such as Presidents Gnassingbe 
Eyadema of To
go and Omar Bongo of Ga
bon—the Ivorian leader’s approach to building unchallenged one-man rule was broadly 
influential.

As a member of the Baoule, a large but hardly majority ethnic group, Houphouët-Boigny 
quickly sough
t to put Côte d’Ivoire’s other ethnic groups on notice that power was not up for 
grabs. What better
 way to do that than by
 inventing coup plots to jail their most ambitious members. And lest the Baoule 
themselves feed res
entment, or begin to think of power as an entitlement, Houphouët-Boigny used his last 
major wave of
 arrests (in 1963 and 1
964) to prosecute another group of supposed plotters that included kinsmen as close as 
nephews and
cousins who were sentenced to death or long terms of imprisonment.

By 1966, the Ivorian leader’s project of establishing an uncontested autocracy replete 
with a perso
nality cult run by effusive sycophants was complete. From then on, a progressive 
relaxation began.
By the early 1970s, Hou
phouët-Boigny felt secure enough to acknowledge publicly what no other African tyrant 
has—namely, t
hat the charges pressed against his enemies were almost all cooked up. Not by himself, 
of course, b
ut supposedly by overly
 ambitious underlings. In a private meeting with one of Houphouët-Boigny’s many 
victims, Jean Konan
 Banny, a fellow Baoule clansman and former defense minister who served four years at 
Assabou, the
author quotes a contrit
e Houphouët-Boigny explaining away the minister’s imprisonment in these terms: 
“Between disorder an
d injustice, I chose injustice. Injustice can always be repaired, whereas disorder can 
have unpredi
ctable consequences. In
 any case, these [jailings] had a positive side to them: They allowed me to 
exterminate in egg any
thoughts of a coup plot in Côte d’Ivoire.”

For the remainder of his life, Houphouët-Boigny worked tirelessly at promoting an 
image of himself
as an apostle of peace and of his country as a kinder, gentler corner of a mean 
continent. His effo
rts included building t
he world’s largest basilica near where the Assabou prison once stood and giving asylum 
to political
 refugees from all over the continent.

Diarra rejects Houphouët-Boigny’s pretensions to a George
Washington–like stature in his country’s history. Indeed, The Fake
Plots of Houphouët-Boigny is destined to contribute to an Africa-
driven reconsideration of independence-era leaders that in some cases
will highlight how far their respective countries have come and, in
others, stress what a vast, uncharted stretch of road ahead they
still have to travel. Yet, Côte d’Ivoire undoubtedly remains a haven
of relative peace and prosperity in a region of much poverty and
turmoil. And at home at least, the country’s first leader remains
widely revered.

Howard W. French recently completed a four-year assignment as West
African bureau chief for the New York Times. He is currently a
visiting scholar in Japanese and Korean Studies at the University of
Hawaii and will be assigned by the Times to Tokyo in August.

A<>E<>R
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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