-Caveat Lector- from: http://jya.com/pfiab-doe.htm <A HREF="http://jya.com/pfiab-doe.htm">PFIAB Report: Science At Its Best, Security At </A> ----- 15 June 1999. Thanks to the White House Office of the PFIAB (202) 456-2352. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Tue, 15 Jun 1999 15:34:33 -0400 Subject: PFIAB RPT See attached file: Report of Presidents Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, "Science At Its Best, Security At Its Worst: A Report on Security Problems at the U.S. Department of Energy," June, 1999: http://jya.com/pfiab-doe.pdf (72 pages; 420K) See attached file: Unclassified Appendix to PFIAB Report: http://jya.com/pfiab-appx.pdf (34 pages; 191K) Or, both the Report and Annex in a Zipped file: http://jya.com/pfiab-doe.zip (432K) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ [Conversion in progress of PDF to HTML] SCIENCE AT ITS BEST __________________________ SECURITY AT ITS WORST A Report on Security Problems at the U.S. Department of Energy [Presidential Seal] ____________________________ A Special Investigative Panel President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board JUNE 1999 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ABSTRACT On March 18, 1999, President William J. Clinton requested that the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) undertake an inquiry and issue a report on “the security threat at the Department of Energy’s weapons labs and the adequacy of the measures that have been taken to address it.” Specifically, the President asked the PFIAB to “address the nature of the present counterintelligence security threat, the way in which it has evolved over the last two decades and the steps we have taken to counter it, as well as to recommend any additional steps that may be needed.” He also asked the PFIAB “to deliver its completed report to the Congress, and to the fullest extent possible consistent with our national security, release an unclassified version to the public.” In response, the Honorable Warren B. Rudman, Chairman of PFIAB, appointed board members Ms. Ann Z. Caracristi, Dr. Sidney Drell, and Mr. Stephen Friedman to form the Special Investigative Panel and obtained detailees from several federal agencies (CIA, DOD, FBI) to augment the work of the PFIAB staff. Over the past three months, the panel and staff interviewed more than 100 witnesses, reviewed more than 700 documents encompassing thousands of pages, and conducted onsite research and interviews at five of the Department of Energy’s national laboratories and plants: Livermore, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, Pantex, and Sandia. The panel has produced a report and an appendix of supporting documents, both of which are unclassified to the fullest extent possible. A large volume of classified material, which was also reviewed and distilled for this report, has been relegated to a second appendix that is available only to authorized recipients. This report examines: The 20–year history of security and counterintelligence issues at the DOE national laboratories, with an emphasis on the five labs that focus on weapons–related research; The inherent tension between security concerns and scientific freedom at the labs and its effect on the institutional culture and efficacy of the Department; The growth and evolution of the foreign intelligence threat to the national labs, particularly in connection with the Foreign Visitor’s Program of the labs; The implementation and effectiveness of Presidential Decision Directive No. 61, the reforms instituted by Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson, and other related initiatives; and, Additional measures that should be taken to improve security and counterintelligence at the labs. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ PANEL MEMBERS The Honorable Warren B. Rudman, Chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Senator Rudman is a partner in the law firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton, and Garrison. From 1980 to 1992, he served in the U.S. Senate, where he was a member of the Select Committee on Intelligence. Previously, he was Attorney General of New Hampshire. Ms. Ann Z. Caracristi, board member. Ms. Caracristi, of Washington, DC, is a former Deputy Director of the National Security Agency, where she served in a variety of senior management positions over a 40–year career. She is currently a member of the DCI/Secretary of Defense Joint Security Commission and recently chaired a DCI Task Force on intelligence training. She was a member of the Aspin/Brown Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the Intelligence Community. Dr. Sidney D. Drell, board member. Dr. Drell, of Stanford, California is an Emeritus Professor of Theoretical Physics and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He has served as a scientific consultant and advisor to several congressional committees, The White House, DOE, DOD, and the CIA. He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences and a past President of the American Physical Society. Mr. Stephen Friedman, board member. Mr. Friedman is Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Columbia University and a former Chairman of Goldman, Sachs, & Co. He was a member of the Aspin/Brown Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the Intelligence Community and the Jeremia h Panel on the National Reconnaissance Office. PFIAB STAFF Randy W. Deitering, Executive Director Mark F. Moynihan, Assistant Director Roosevelt A. Roy, Administrative Officer Frank W. Fountain, Assistant Director and Counsel Brendan G. Melley, Assistant Director Jane E. Baker, Research/Administrative Officer PFIAB ADJUNCT STAFF Roy B., Defense Intelligence Agency Karen DeSpiegelaere, Federal Bureau of Investigation Jerry L., Central Intelligence Agency Christine V., Central Intelligence Agency David W. Swindle, Department of Defense, Naval Criminal Investigative Service Joseph S. O’Keefe, Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense ------------------------------------------------------------------------ TABEL OF CONTENTS FOREWORD I-IV FINDINGS 1 ROOT CAUSES 7 An International Enterprise 7 Big, Byzantine, and Bewildering Bureaucracy 8 Lack of Accountability 10 Culture and Attitudes 11 Changing Times, Changing Missions 12 [Balance being converted to HTML] RECURRING VULNERABILITIES 13 Management and Planning 13 Physical Security 18 Screening and Monitoring Personnel 20 Protection of Classified and Sensitive Information 21 Tracking Nuclear Materials 22 Foreign Visitors’ Program 23 ASSESSMENTS 29 Responsibility 29 Record of the Clinton Team 30 The 1995 “Walk-In” Document 30 W-88 Investigation 31 Damage Assessment 35 PDD-61: Birth and Intent 36 Timeliness of PDD-61 37 Secretary Richardson’s Initiatives 38 Prospects for Reforms 39 Trouble Ahead 40 Back to the Future 41 REORGANIZATION 43 Leadership 43 Restructuring 46 RECOMMENDATIONS 53 ENDNOTES APPENDIX Map of DOE Installations Chronology of Events Chronology of Reports on DOE Damage Assessment of China’s Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Information Presidential Decision Directive 61 Bibliography ------------------------------------------------------------------------ FOREWORD FROM THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE PANEL For the past two decades, the Department of Energy has embodied science at its best and security of secrets at its worst. Within DOE are a number of the crown jewels of the world’s government–sponsored scientific research and development organizations. With its record as the incubator for the work of many talented scientists and engineers—including many Nobel prize winners—DOE has provided the nation with far–reaching advantages. Its discoveries not only helped the United States to prevail in the Cold War, they undoubtedly will continue to provide both technological benefits and inspiration for the progress of generations to come. The vitality of its national laboratories is derived to a great extent from their ability to attract talent from the widest possible pool, and they should continue to capitalize on the expertise of immigrant scientists and engineers. However, we believe that the dysfunctional structure at the heart of the Department has too often resulted in the mismanagement of security in weapons–related activities and a lack of emphasis on counterintelligence. DOE was created in 1977 and heralded as the centerpiece of the federal solution to the energy crisis that had stunned the American economy. A vital part of this new initiative was the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), the legacy agency of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and inheritor of the national programs to develop safe and reliable nuclear weapons. The concept, at least, was straightforward: take the diverse and dispersed energy research centers of the nation, bring them under an umbrella organization with other energy–related enterprises, and spark their scientific progress through closer contacts and centralized management. __________________________________ At the birth of DOE, the brilliant scientific breakthroughs of the nuclear weapons laboratories came with a troubling record of security administration. Twenty years later, virtually every one of its original problems persists. However, the brilliant scientific breakthroughs at the nuclear weapons laboratories came with a very troubling record of security administration. For example, classified documents detailing the designs of the most advanced nuclear weapons were found on library shelves accessible to the public at the Los Alamos laboratory. Employees and researchers were receiving little, if any, training or instruction regarding espionage threats. Multiple chains of command and standards of performance negated accountability, resulting in pervasive inefficiency, confusion, and mistrust. Competition among laboratories for contracts, and among researchers for talent, resources, and support distracted management from security issues. Fiscal management was bedeviled by sloppy accounting. Inexact tracking of the quantities and flows of nuclear materials was a persistent worry. Geographic decentralization fractured policy implementation and changes in leadership regularly depleted the small reservoirs of institutional memory. Permeating all of these issues was a prevailing cultural attitude among some in the DOE scientific community that regarded the protection of nuclear know–how with either fatalism or naiveté. Twenty years later, every one of these problems still existed. Most still exist today. __________________________________ The panel found a department saturated with cynicism, an arrogant disregard for authority, and a staggering pattern of denial. In response to these problems, the Department has been the subject of a nearly unbroken history of dire warnings and attempted but aborted reforms. A cursory review of the open-source literature on the DOE record of management presents an abysmal picture. Second only to its world–class intellectual feats has been its ability to fend off systemic change. Over the last dozen years, DOE has averaged some kind of major departmental shake–up every two to three years. No President, Energy Secretary, or Congress has been able to stem the recurrence of fundamental problems. All have been thwarted time after time by the intransigence of this institution. The Special Investigative Panel found a large organization saturated with cynicism, an arrogant disregard for authority, and a staggering pattern of denial. For instance, even after President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 61 ordering that the Department make fundamental changes in security procedures, compliance by Department bureaucrats was grudging and belated. Time after time over the past few decades, officials at DOE headquarters and the weapons labs themselves have been presented with overwhelming evidence that their lackadaisical oversight could lead to an increase in the nuclear threat against the United States. Throughout its history, the Department has been the subject of scores of critical reports from the General Accounting Office (GAO), the intelligence community, independent commissions, private management consultants, its Inspector General, and its own security experts. It has repeatedly attempted reforms. Yet the Department’s ingrained behavior and values have caused it to continue to falter and fail. PROSPECTS FOR REFORMS We believe that Secretary of Energy Richardson, in attempting to deal with many critical security matters facing the Department, is on the right track in some, though not all, of his changes. We concur with and encourage many of his recent initiatives, and we are heartened by his aggressive approach and command of the issues. But we believe that he has overstated the case when he asserts, as he did several weeks ago, that “Americans can be reassured: our nation’s nuclear secrets are, today, safe and secure.” After a review of more than 700 reports and studies, thousands of pages of classified and unclassified source documents, interviews with scores of senior federal officials, and visits to several of the DOE laboratories at the heart of this inquiry, the Special Investigative Panel has concluded the Department of Energy is incapable of reforming itself—bureaucratically and culturally—in a lasting way, even under an activist Secretary. The panel has found that DOE and the weapons laboratories have a deeply rooted culture of low regard for and, at times, hostility to security issues, which has continually frustrated the efforts of its internal and external critics, notably the GAO and the House Energy and Commerce Committee. Therefore, a reshuffling of offices and lines of accountability may be a necessary step toward meaningful reform, but it almost certainly will not be sufficient. Even if every aspect of the ongoing structural reforms is fully implemented, the most powerful guarantor of security at the nation’s weapons laboratories will not be laws, regulations, or management charts. It will be the attitudes and behavior of the men and women who are responsible for the operation of the labs each day. These will not change overnight, and they are likely to change only in a different cultural environment—one that values security as a vital and integral part of day–to–day activities and believes it can coexist with great science. We are convinced that when Secretary Richardson vacates the office his successor is not likely to have a comparable appreciation of the gravity of the Department’s past problems, nor a comparable interest in resolving them. The next Secretary of Energy will not have spent months at the tip of the sword created by the recent public outcry over DOE mismanagement of national secrets. Indeed, the core of the Department’s bureaucracy is quite capable of undoing Secretary Richardson’s reforms, and may well be inclined to do so if given the opportunity. Ultimately, the nature of the institution and the structure of the incentives under a culture of scientific research require great attention if they are to be made compatible with the levels of security and the degree of command–and–control warranted where the research and stewardship of nuclear weaponry is concerned. Yet it must be done. THE PFIAB INQUIRY The PFIAB panel is fully aware of the many recent allegations of management failures surrounding the Department of Energy and questions about the subsequent roles of entities such as the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Much of the research we conducted has relevance to these allegations. However, the depth and the complexity of the issues call for examinations by institutions with greater resources and a wider charter: namely, Congress and standing executive agencies of the federal government. In the 90 days of our inquiry, the PFIAB panel conducted numerous interviews with senior federal officials who agreed to speak candidly—with the understanding that they would not be identified by name—about DOE’s problems and recent events. On balance, the panel finds that some very damaging security compromises may have occurred, as alleged by some in recent weeks. But we believe that in matters of intelligence and counterintelligence, one cannot brush off the reality that conclusions are often intrinsically based on probabilities, rather than certainties. Leaders, of course, are often obliged to act, and should act, based on the probability of impending danger, not only its certainty. And those entrusted with the public weal are indisputably served better by having more information about risks than less. So the panel would like to note the contributions of those who have helped to raise the public’s awareness of the risks to national security posed by problems at DOE. Although we do not concur with all of their conclusions, we believe that both intelligence officials at the Department of Energy and the members of the Cox Committee made substantial and constructive contributions to understanding and resolving security problems at DOE. As we note later in this report, we concur on balance with the damage assessment of espionage losses conducted by the Director of Central Intelligence. We also concur with the findings of the independent review of that assessment by Admiral David Jeremiah and his panel. Our mandate from President Clinton was restricted to an analysis of the structural and management problems in the Department’s security and counterintelligence operations. We abided by that. We also recognize the unique nature of the assignment given to us by the President. Never before in its history of more than 35 years has the PFIAB prepared a report for release to the general public. As a result, we have taken pains to ensure that the language of this report is “plain English,” not bureaucratese, and that the findings of the report are stated directly and candidly, not with the indirection and euphemisms often employed by policy insiders. SOLUTIONS Our panel has concluded that the Department of Energy, when faced with a profound public responsibility, has failed. Therefore, this report suggests two alternative organizational solutions, both of which we believe would substantially insulate the weapons laboratories from many of DOE’s historical problems and promote the building of a responsible culture over time. We also offer recommendations for improving various aspects of security and counterintelligence at DOE, such as personnel assurance, cyber–security, program management, and interdepartmental cooperation under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. The weapons research and stockpile management functions should be placed wholly within a new semi–autonomous agency within DOE that has a clear mission, streamlined bureaucracy, and drastically simplified lines of authority and accountability. Useful lessons along these lines can be taken from the National Security Agency (NSA) or Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) within the Department of Defense or the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) within the Department of Commerce. The other alternative is a wholly independent agency, such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). There was substantial debate among the members of the panel about these two alternatives. Both have strengths and weaknesses. In the final analysis, the decision rests in the hands of the President and the Congress, and we trust that they will give serious deliberation to the merits and shortcomings of the alternatives before enacting major reforms. We all agree, nonetheless, that the labs should never be subordinated to the Department of Defense. With either proposal it will be important for the weapons labs to maintain effective scientific contact on nonclassified scientific research with the other DOE labs and the wider scientific community. To do otherwise would work to the detriment of the nation’s scientific progress and security over the long run. This argument draws on history: nations that honor and advance freedom of inquiry have fared better than those who have sought to arbitrarily suppress and control the community of science. __________________________________ The nuclear weapons and research functions of DOE need more autonomy, a clearer mission, a streamlined bureaucracy, and increased accountability. However, we would submit that we do not face an either/or proposition. The past 20 years have provided a controlled experiment of a sort, the results of which point to institutional models that hold promise. Organizations such as NASA and DARPA have advanced scientific and technological progress while maintaining a respectable record of security. Meanwhile, the Department of Energy, with its decentralized structure, confusing matrix of cross–cutting and overlapping management, and shoddy record of accountability has advanced scientific and technological progress, but at the cost of an abominable record of security with deeply troubling threats to American national security. Thomas Paine once said that “government, even in its best state, is but a necessary evil; in its worst state, an intolerable one.” This report finds that DOE’s performance, throughout its history, should have been regarded as intolerable. We believe the results and implications of this experiment are clear. It is time for the nation’s leaders to act decisively in the defense of America’s national security. Warren Rudman Chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Ms. Ann Caracristi Board Member Dr. Sidney Drell Board Member Mr. Stephen Friedman Board Member ------------------------------------------------------------------------ FINDINGS On March 18, 1999, President Clinton tasked the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to review the history of the security and counterintelligence threats to the nation’s weapons labs and the effectiveness of the responses by the U.S. government. He also asked the Board to propose further improvements. This report, based on reviews of hundreds of source documents and studies, analysis of intelligence reports, and scores of interviews with senior level officials from several administrations, was prepared over the past 90 days in fulfillment of the President’s request. BOTTOM LINE Our bottom line: DOE represents the best of America’s scientific talent and achievement, but it has also been responsible for the worst security record on secrecy that the members of this panel have ever encountered. The national labs of the Department of Energy are among the crown jewels of the world’s government–sponsored scientific research and development organizations. With its record as the incubator for the work of many talented scientists and engineers—including many Nobel prize winners—it has provided the nation with far–reaching advantages. Its discoveries not only helped the United States to prevail in the Cold War, they will undoubtedly provide both technological benefits and inspiration for the progress of generations to come. Its vibrancy is derived to a great extent from its ability to attract talent from the widest possible pool, and it should continue to capitalize on the expertise of immigrant scientists and engineers. However, the Department has devoted far too little time, attention, and resources to the prosaic but grave responsibilities of security and counterintelligence in managing its weapons and other national security programs. FINDINGS The preponderance of evidence accumulated by the Special Investigative Panel, spanning the past 25 years, has compelled the members to reach many definite conclusions—some very disturbing—about the security and well–being of the nation’s weapons laboratories. As the repository of America’s most advanced know-how in nuclear and related armaments and the home of some of America’s finest scientific minds, these labs have been and will continue to be a major target of foreign intelligence services, friendly as well as hostile. Two landmark events, the end of the Cold War and the overwhelming victory of the United States and its allies in the Persian Gulf War, markedly altered the security equations and outlooks of nations throughout the world. Friends and foes of the United States intensified their efforts to close the technological gap between their forces and those of America, and some redoubled their efforts in the race for weapons of mass destruction. Under the restraints imposed by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, powerful computers have replaced detonations as the best available means of testing the viability and performance capabilities of new nuclear weapons. So research done by U.S. weapons laboratories with high performance computers stands particularly high on the espionage hit list of other nations, many of which have used increasingly more sophisticated and diverse means to obtain the secrets necessary to join the nuclear club. ______________________________________ Snapshot: DOE Weapons Operations Percentage of Budget: Roughly $6 billion, a third of the Department’s $18 billion FY99 budget. Allocation of Weapons-Related Budget: Defense Programs $4.4 billion Nonproliferation/Nat. Sec. 0.7 Fissile Material Disposal 0.2 Naval Reactors 0.7 Number of Contract Employees: 34,190 Number of Contract Employees Per Lab Los Alamos 6,900 Sandia 7,500 L. Livermore 6,400 Pantex 2,860 Oak Ridge (Y-12) 5,500 Kansas City 3,150 Nevada Test Site 1,880 SOURCE: DEPT. OF ENERGY FIELD FACTBOOK, MAY 1998 More than 25 years worth of reports, studies and formal inquiries—by executive branch agencies, Congress, independent panels, and even DOE itself—have identified a multitude of chronic security and counterintelligence problems at all of the weapons labs (See Appendix). These reviews produced scores of stern, almost pleading, entreaties for change. Critical security flaws—in management and planning, personnel assurance, some physical security areas, control of nuclear materials, protection of documents and computerized information, and counterintelligence—have been cited for immediate attention and resolution … over and over and over … ad nauseam. The open–source information alone on the weapons laboratories overwhelmingly supports a troubling conclusion: their security and counterintelligence operations have been seriously hobbled and relegated to low-priority status for decades. The candid, closed–door testimony of current and former federal officials as well as the content of voluminous classified materials received by this panel in recent weeks reinforce this conclusion. When it comes to a genuine understanding of and appreciation for the value of security and counterintelligence programs, especially in the context of America’s nuclear arsenal and secrets, the DOE and its weapons labs have been Pollyannaish. The predominant attitude toward security and counterintelligence among many DOE and lab managers has ranged from half–hearted, grudging accommodation to smug disregard. Thus the panel is convinced that the potential for major leaks and thefts of sensitive information and material has been substantial. Moreover, such security lapses would have occurred in bureaucratic environments that would have allowed them to go undetected with relative ease. Organizational disarray, managerial neglect, and a culture of arrogance—both at DOE headquarters and the labs themselves—conspired to create an espionage scandal waiting to happen. The physical security efforts of the weapons labs (often called the “guns, guards, and gates”) have had some isolated shortcomings, but on balance they have developed some of the most advanced security technology in the world. However, perpetually weak systems of personnel assurance, information security, and counterintelligence have invited attack by foreign intelligence services. Among the defects this panel found: Inefficient personnel clearance programs, wherein haphazard background investigations could take years to complete and the backlogs numbered in the tens of thousands. Loosely controlled and casually monitored programs for thousands of unauthorized foreign scientists and assignees—despite more than a decade of critical reports from the General Accounting Office, the DOE Inspector General, and the intelligence community. This practice occasionally created bizarre circumstances in which regular lab employees with security clearances were supervised by foreign nationals on temporary assignment. Feckless systems for control of classified documents, which periodically resulted in thousands of documents being declared lost. Counterintelligence programs with part–time CI officers, who often operated with little experience, minimal budgets, and employed little more than crude “awareness” briefings of foreign threats and perfunctory and sporadic debriefings of scientists travelling to foreign countries. A lab security management reporting system that led everywhere but to responsible authority. Computer security methods that were naive at best and dangerously irresponsible at worst. Why were these problems so blatantly and repeatedly ignored? DOE has had a dysfunctional management structure and culture that only occasionally gave proper credence to the need for rigorous security and counterintelligence programs at the weapons labs. For starters, there has been a persisting lack of real leadership and effective management at DOE. The nature of the intelligence–gathering methods used by the People’s Republic of China poses a special challenge to the U.S. in general and the weapons labs in particular. More sophisticated than some of the blatant methods employed by the former Soviet bloc espionage services, PRC intelligence operatives know their strong suits and play them extremely well. Increasingly more nimble, discreet and transparent in their spying methods, the Chinese services have become very proficient in the art of seemingly innocuous elicitations of information. This modus operandi has proved very effective against unwitting and ill–prepared DOE personnel. Despite widely publicized assertions of wholesale losses of nuclear weapons technology from specific laboratories to particular nations, the factual record in the majority of cases regarding the DOE weapons laboratories supports plausible inferences—but not irrefutable proof—about the source and scope of espionage and the channels through which recipient nations received information. The panel was not charged, nor was it empowered, to conduct a technical assessment regarding the extent to which alleged losses at the national weapons laboratories may have directly advanced the weapons development programs of other nations. However, the panel did find these allegations to be germane to issues regarding the structure and effectiveness of DOE security programs, particularly the counterintelligence functions. The classified and unclassified evidence available to the panel, while pointing out systemic security vulnerabilities, falls short of being conclusive. The actual damage done to U.S. security interests is, at the least, currently unknown; at worst, it may be unknowable. Numerous variables are inescapable. Analysis of indigenous technology development in foreign research laboratories is fraught with uncertainty. Moreover, a nation that is a recipient of classified information is not always the sponsor of the espionage by which it was obtained. However, the panel does concur, on balance, with the findings of the recent DCI–sponsored damage assessment. We also concur with the findings of the subsequent independent review, led by retired Admiral David Jeremiah, of that damage assessment. The Department of Energy is a dysfunctional bureaucracy that has proven it is incapable of reforming itself. Accountability at DOE has been spread so thinly and erratically that it is now almost impossible to find. The long traditional and effective method of entrenched DOE and lab bureaucrats is to defeat security reform initiatives by waiting them out. They have been helped in this regard by the frequent changes in leadership at the highest levels of DOE—nine Secretaries of Energy in 22 years. Eventually, the reform–minded management transitions out, either due to a change in administrations or as a result of the traditional “revolving door” management practices at DOE. Then the bureaucracy reverts to old priorities and predilections. Such was the case in December 1990 with the reform recommendations carefully crafted by a special task force commissioned by then–Energy Secretary Watkins. The report skewered DOE for unacceptable “direction, coordination, conduct, and oversight” of safeguards and security. Two years later, the new administration rolled in, redefined priorities, and the initiatives all but evaporated. Deputy Secretary Charles Curtis in late 1996 investigated clear indications of serious security and CI problems and drew up a list of initiatives in response. Those initiatives also were dropped after he left office. Reorganization is clearly warranted to resolve the many specific problems with security and counterintelligence in the weapons laboratories, but also to address the lack of accountability that has become endemic throughout the entire Department. Layer upon layer of bureaucracy, accumulated over the years, has diffused responsibility to the point where scores claim it, no one has enough to make a difference, and all fight for more. Convoluted, confusing, and often contradictory reporting channels make the relationship between DOE headquarters and the labs, in particular, tense, internecine, and chaotic. In between the headquarters and the laboratories are field offices, which the panel found to be a locus of much confusion. In background briefings of the panel, senior DOE officials often described them as redundant operations that function as a shadow headquarters, often using their political clout and large payrolls to push their own agendas and budget priorities in Congress. Even with the latest DOE restructuring, the weapons labs are reporting to far too many DOE masters. The criteria for the selection of Energy Secretaries have been inconsistent in the past. Regardless of the outcome of ongoing or contemplated reforms, the minimum qualifications for an Energy Secretary should include experience in not only energy and scientific issues, but national security and intelligence issues as well. The list of former Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries, and Under Secretaries meeting all of these criteria is very short. Despite having a large proportion of its budget (roughly 30 percent) devoted to functions related to nuclear weapons, the Department of Energy has often been led by men and women with little expertise and background in national security. The result has been predictable: security issues have been a low priority, and leaders unfamiliar with these issues have delegated decisionmaking to lesser–ranking officials who lacked the incentives and authority to address problems with dispatch and forcefulness. For a Department in desperate need of strong leadership on security issues, this has been a disastrous trend. The bar for future nominees at the upper levels of the Department needs to be raised significantly. DOE cannot be fixed with a single legislative act: management must follow mandate. The research functions of the labs are vital to the nation’s long term interest, and instituting effective gates between weapons and nonweapons research functions will require both disinterested scientific expertise, judicious decisionmaking, and considerable political finesse. Thus both Congress and the executive branch—whether along the lines suggested by the Special Investigative Panel or others—should be prepared to monitor the progress of the Department’s reforms for years to come. This panel has no illusions about the future of security and counterintelligence at DOE. There is little reason to believe future DOE Secretaries will necessarily share the resolve of Secretary Richardson, or even his interest. When the next Secretary of Energy is sworn in, perhaps in the spring of 2001, the DOE and lab bureaucracies will still have advantages that could give them the upper hand: time and proven skills at artful dodging and passive intransigence. The Foreign Visitors’ and Assignments Program has been and should continue to be a valuable contribution to the scientific and technological progress of the nation. Foreign nationals working under the auspices of U.S. weapons labs have achieved remarkable scientific advances and contributed immensely to a wide array of America’s national security interests, including nonproliferation. Some have made contributions so unique that they are all but irreplaceable. The value of these contacts to the nation should not be lost amid the attempt to address deep, well–founded concerns about security lapses. That said, DOE clearly requires measures to ensure that legitimate use of the research laboratories for scientific collaboration is not an open door to foreign espionage agents. Losing national security secrets should never be accepted as an inevitable cost of obtaining scientific knowledge. In commenting on security issues at DOE, we believe that both Congressional and Executive Branch leaders have resorted to simplification and hyperbole in the past few months. The panel found neither the dramatic damage assessments nor the categorical reassurances of the Department’s advocates to be wholly substantiated. We concur with and encourage many of Secretary Richardson’s recent initiatives to address the security problems at the Department, and we are heartened by his aggressive approach and command of the issues. He has recognized the organizational dysfunction and cultural vagaries at DOE and taken strong, positive steps to try to reverse the legacy of more than 20 years of security mismanagement. However, the Board is extremely skeptical that any reform effort, no matter how well–intentioned, well–designed, and effectively applied, will gain more than a toehold at DOE, given its labyrinthine management structure, fractious and arrogant culture, and the fast–approaching reality of another transition in DOE leadership. Thus we believe that he has overstated the case when he asserts, as he did several weeks ago, that “Americans can be reassured: our nation’s nuclear secrets are, today, safe and secure.” Similarly, the evidence indicating widespread security vulnerabilities at the weapons laboratories has been ignored for far too long, and the work of the Cox Committee and intelligence officials at the Department has been invaluable in gaining the attention of the American public and in helping focus the political will necessary to resolve these problems. Nonetheless, there have been many attempts to take the valuable coin of damaging new information and decrease its value by manufacturing its counterfeit, innuendo; possible damage has been minted as probable disaster; workaday delay and bureaucratic confusion have been cast as diabolical conspiracies. Enough is enough. Fundamental change in DOE’s institutional culture—including the ingrained attitudes toward security among personnel of the weapons laboratories—will be just as important as organizational redesign. Never have the members of the Special Investigative Panel witnessed a bureaucratic culture so thoroughly saturated with cynicism and disregard for authority. Never before has this panel found such a cavalier attitude toward one of the most serious responsibilities in the federal government—control of the design information relating to nuclear weapons. Particularly egregious have been the failures to enforce cyber–security measures to protect and control important nuclear weapons design information. Never before has the panel found an agency with the bureaucratic insolence to dispute, delay, and resist implementation of a Presidential directive on security, as DOE’s bureaucracy tried to do to the Presidential Decision Directive No. 61 in February 1998. The best nuclear weapons expertise in the U.S. government resides at the national weapons labs, and this asset should be better used by the intelligence community. For years, the PFIAB has been keen on honing the intelligence community’s analytic effectiveness on a wide array of nonproliferation areas, including nuclear weapons. We believe that the DOE Office of Intelligence, particularly its analytic component, has historically been an impediment to this goal because of its ineffective attempts to manage the labs’ analysis. The office’s mission and size (about 70 people) is totally out of step with the Department’s intelligence needs. A streamlined intelligence liaison body, much like Department of Treasury’s Office of Intelligence Support—which numbers about 20 people, including a 24–hour watch team—would be far more appropriate. It should concentrate on making the intelligence community, which has the preponderance of overall analytic experience, more effective in fulfilling the DOE’s analysis and collection requirements. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ROOT CAUSES The sources of DOE’s difficulties in both overseeing scientific research and maintaining security are numerous and deep. The Special Investigative Panel primarily focused its inquiry on the areas within DOE where the tension between science and security is most critical: the nuclear weapons laboratories.1 To a lesser extent, the panel examined security issues in other areas of DOE and broad organizational issues that have had a bearing on the functioning of the laboratories. Inherent in the work of the weapons laboratories, of course, is the basic tension between scientific inquiry, which thrives on freewheeling searches for and wide dissemination of information, and governmental secrecy, which requires just the opposite. But the historical context in which the labs were created and thrived has also figured into their subsequent problems with security. AN INTERNATIONAL ENTERPRISE U.S. research laboratories have always had a tradition of drawing on immigrant talent. Perhaps the first foreign–born contributor to our nation’s nuclear program was Albert Einstein. In his letter to President Roosevelt on August 2, 1939, Einstein advised the President of the possibility of the atomic bomb and the urgent need for government action. By 1943, the ranks of the Manhattan project at Los Alamos, New Mexico were filled with scientists and engineers from Italy (Fermi), Germany (Bethe), Poland (Ulam), Hungary (Wigner, Szilard, Von Neumann, and Teller), Russia (Kistiakovsy) and Austria (Rabi). Indeed, it is possible that the atomic bomb would never have been completed but for immigrant talent, and the diversity of talent applied to the project was hailed at the time as a model of international cooperation. Eleanor Roosevelt, in a 1945 radio address, declared that the development of the atomic bomb by “many minds belonging to different races and different religions sets the pattern for the way in which in the future we may be able to work out our difficulties.”2 The role of and reliance on immigrant talent in the United States—particularly at the graduate school and doctoral levels where much of the nation’s research is performed—has increased over the years. >From 1975 to 1992, the aging of America’s baby boomers resulted in a decline in the overall size of the college–age population and, unlike other industrialized nations, the U.S. saw a decline in the number of American students receiving science and engineering degrees.3 >From the 1950s until 1995, the number of non–U.S. citizens who earned doctorates in scientific and engineering fields from American universities steadily climbed, reaching 27 percent by 1985 and 40 percent by 1995. Two–thirds of those receiving those doctorates in 1995 held temporary residency visas, and Chinese doctoral recipients outnumbered recipients from all other regions combined.4 But the willingness to draw on foreign talent also has meant a greater risk of falling prey to those with foreign allegiances. One of the earliest and most infamous espionage scandals at the nation’s nuclear laboratories was centered on the physicist Klaus Fuchs, a German native and naturalized British citizen who spied on researchers at Los Alamos for the Soviet Union. More recent instances of actual and alleged foreign espionage at the nuclear weapons laboratories are detailed in the Classified Appendix to this report. As growth of the U.S. talent pool in science and engineering stagnated, and the amount of available talent abroad grew rapidly, the U.S. has had to rely on more foreign–born talent in national scientific research and development programs in order to maintain the best research facilities in the world. At the same time, since the end of the Cold War, DOE has entered into more extensive cooperative programs with foreign nations in efforts to reduce the threats of proliferation and diversion of nuclear weapons material. By June 1990, DOE had entered into 157 bilateral research and development agreements for scientific exchange purposes. Among others, parties to the agreements were the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, Soviet bloc nations and countries that posed nuclear proliferation threats.5 In December 1990, a report to the DOE Secretary noted “a high probability of greatly increasing numbers of foreign visits and assignments to DOE facilities in future years.”6 The widening of foreign contacts concurrent with a greater influx of foreign–born talent has raised concerns about security compromises by scientists with foreign allegiances and highlighted the need for special care in implementing formal clearance procedures for involvement in classified work. BIG, BYZANTINE, AND BEWILDERING BUREAUCRACY DOE is not one of the federal government’s largest agencies in absolute terms, but its organizational structure is widely regarded as one of the most confusing. That is another legacy of its origins, and it has made the creation, implementation, coordination, and enforcement of consistent policies very difficult over the years. The effort to develop the atomic bomb was managed through an unlikely collaboration of the Manhattan Engineering District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (hence the name, “the Manhattan Project”) and the University of California—two vastly dissimilar organizations in both culture and mission. The current form of the Department took shape in the first year of the Carter Administration through the merging of more than 40 different government agencies and organizations, an event from which it has arguably never recovered. The newly created DOE subsumed the Federal Energy Administration, the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), the Federal Power Commission, and components and programs of several other government agencies. Included were the nuclear weapons research laboratories that were part of the ERDA and, formerly, of the Atomic Energy Commission. Many of these agencies and organizations have continued to operate under the DOE umbrella with the same organizational structure that they had prior to joining the Department. Even before the new Department was created, concerns were raised about how high the nuclear weapons–related operations would rank among the competing priorities of such a large bureaucracy. A study of the issue completed in the last year of the Ford Administration considered three alternatives: shifting the weapons operations to the Department of Defense, creating a new freestanding agency, or keeping the program within ERDA—the options still being discussed more than 20 years later. As one critic of the DOE plan told The Washington Post, “Under the AEC, weapons was half the program. Under ERDA, it was one–sixth. Under DOE, it will be one–tenth. It isn’t getting the attention it deserves.” Although the proportions cited by that critic would prove to be inaccurate, he accurately spotted the direction of the trend. _____________________________________ The DOE Management Challenge MISSION · Lead agency for development of national energy resources and technologies. · Responsible for the largest environmental cleanup effort in history. · Nuclear energy and weapons research and development. · Management of special nuclear materials stockpiles. · Protection of highly sensitive classified and proprietary information against foreign and corporate espionage. SIZE · If included among the Nation’s Fortune 500 firms, would rank in the top 50. · The fourth largest landowner in the United States. · Budget of roughly $18 billion comprises close to 3 percent of total discretionary spending at the federal level. · Employs more than 11,000 Federal employees and more than 100,000 contract employees. · Owns and manages more than 50 major installations spread across 2.4 million acres and 35 states. COMPLEXITY · A diverse workforce of military and civilian per-sonnel; U.S. citizens and foreign nationals; career federal officials and part-time researchers; white collar bureaucrats as well as scientists and engineers specializing in narrow esoteric fields. · Constituencies include the White House, Congress, the power industry, multinational defense and aerospace corporations, major universities, states and municipalities seeking or monitoring environmental cleanups. During 1978, its first year of operation within the new structure, DOE already had in place more than 9,500 prime contracts and more than 1,800 financial assistance awards, which together were spread among 188 universities and more than 3,200 contractors. And the Department was growing: from 1977 to 1978, grants and contracts with university researchers posted an increase of 22 percent.7 LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY Depending on the issue at hand, a line worker in a DOE facility might be responsible to DOE headquarters in Washington, a manager in a field office in another state, a private contractor assigned to a DOE project, a research team leader from academia, or a lab director on another floor of the worker’s building. For example, prior to Secretary Richardson’s restructuring initiative earlier this year, a single laboratory, Sandia, was managed or accountable to nine different DOE security organizations. Last year, after years of reports highlighting the problem of confused lines of authority, DOE was still unable to ensure the effectiveness of security measures because of its inability to hold personnel accountable. A 1998 report lamented that “short of wholesale contract termination, there did not appear to be adequate penalty/reward systems to ensure effective day–to–day security oversight at the contractor level.”8 The problem is not only the diffuse nature of authority and accountability in the Department. It is the dynamic and often informal character of the authority that does exist. The inherently unpredictable outcomes of major experiments, the fluid missions of research teams, the mobility of individual researchers, the internal competition among laboratories, the ebb and flow of the academic community, the setting and onset of project deadlines, the cyclical nature of the federal budgeting process, and the shifting imperatives of energy and security policies dictated from the White House and Congress—all of these dynamic variables contribute to volatility in the Department’s workforce and an inability to give the weapons–related functions the priority they deserved. Newcomers, as a result, have an exceedingly hard time when they are assimilated; incumbents have a hard time in trying to administer consistent policies; and outsiders have a hard time divining departmental performance and which leaders and factions are credible. Such problems are not new to government organizations, but DOE’s accountability vacuum has only exacerbated them. Management and security problems have recurred so frequently that they have resulted in nonstop reform initiatives, external reviews, and changes in policy direction. As one observer noted in Science magazine in 1994: “Every administration sets up a panel to review the national labs. The problem is that nothing is done.” The constant managerial turnover over the years has generated nearly continuous structural reorganizations and repeated security policy reversals. Over the last dozen years, DOE has averaged some kind of major departmental shake–up every two to three years. During that time, security and counterintelligence responsibilities have been “punted” from one office to the next. CULTURE AND ATTITUDES In the course of this inquiry, many officials interviewed by the PFIAB panel cited the scientific culture of the weapons laboratories as a factor that complicates, perhaps even undermines, the ability of the Department to consistently implement its security procedures. Although there seemed to be no universally accepted definition of the culture, nearly everyone agreed that it is distinct and pervasive. One facet of the culture mentioned more than others is an arrogance borne of the simple fact that nuclear researchers specialize in one of the world’s most advanced, challenging, and esoteric fields of knowledge. Nuclear physicists, by definition, are required to think in literally other dimensions not accessible to laymen. Thus it is not surprising that they might bridle under the restraints and regulations of administrators and bureaucrats who do not entirely comprehend the precise nature of the operation being managed. Operating within a large, complex bureaucracy with transient leaders would only tend to accentuate a scientist’s sense of intellectual superiority: if administrators have little more than a vague sense of the contours of a research project, they are likely to have little basis to know which rules and regulations constitute unreasonable burdens on the researchers’ activities. With respect to at least some security issues, the potential for conflicts over priorities is obvious. For example, how are security officials to weigh the risks of unauthorized disclosures during international exchanges if they have only a general familiarity with the cryptic jargon used by the scientists who might participate? The prevailing culture of the weapons labs is widely perceived as contributing to security and counterintelligence problems. At the very least, restoring public confidence in the ability of the labs to protect nuclear secrets will require a thorough reappraisal of the culture within them. CHANGING TIMES, CHANGING MISSIONS The external pressures placed on the Department of Energy in general, and the weapons labs in particular, are also worth noting. For more than 50 years, America’s nuclear researchers have operated in a maelstrom of shifting and often contradictory attitudes. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, nuclear discoveries were simultaneously hailed as a destructive scourge and a panacea for a wide array of mankind’s problems. The production of nuclear arms was regarded during the 1950s and 1960s as one of the best indices of international power and the strength of the nation’s military deterrent. During the 1970s, the nation’s leadership turned to nuclear researchers for solutions to the energy crisis at the same time that the general public was becoming more alarmed about the nuclear buildup and the environmental implications of nuclear facilities. Over the past 20 years, some in Congress have repeatedly called for the dissolution of the Department of Energy, which has undoubtedly been a distraction to those trying to make long–term decisions affecting the scope and direction of the research at the labs. And in the aftermath of the Cold War, the Congress has looked to the nation’s nuclear weapons labs to help in stabilizing or dismantling nuclear stockpiles in other nations. Each time that the nation’s leadership has made a major change in the Department’s priorities or added another mission, it has placed additional pressure on a government agency already struggling to preserve and expand one of its most challenging historical roles: guarantor of the safety, security, and reliability of the nation’s nuclear weapons. ----- Aloha, He'Ping, Om, Shalom, Salaam. Em Hotep, Peace Be, Omnia Bona Bonis, All My Relations. Adieu, Adios, Aloha. Amen. Roads End Kris DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion and informational exchange list. Proselyzting propagandic screeds are not allowed. Substance—not soapboxing! These are sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory', with its many half-truths, misdirections and outright frauds is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. That being said, CTRL gives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and always suggests to readers; be wary of what you read. CTRL gives no credeence to Holocaust denial and nazi's need not apply. Let us please be civil and as always, Caveat Lector. ======================================================================== Archives Available at: http://home.ease.lsoft.com/archives/CTRL.html http:[EMAIL PROTECTED]/ ======================================================================== To subscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: SUBSCRIBE CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED] To UNsubscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: SIGNOFF CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED] Om
