-Caveat Lector-
>From www.mikenew.com/kosovo_ed.html
> Kosovo: The New World Army Evolves
> Daniel D. New
>
> Based upon the precedent of Macedonia, and the lack of
> Congressional backbone to stop the placement of American troops
> under foreign officers, the New World Army is becoming a reality.
>
>
> When Army Specialist Michael New refused to wear a United Nations
> uniform and serve under a general from Finland, his attorneys
> pointed out that the precedent would lead to more deployments
> based upon the Globalist Agenda of George Bush and Bill Clinton.
>
> The House of Representatives, perhaps because they are closer to
> the pulse of the People, actually passed legislation in 1996 to
> forbid the forced deployment of American troops under the United
> Nations. (HR2540, Tom DeLay). The bill never came out of Senate
> committee. But time has passed and like our society at large, the
> attention span of Congress is short and there are matters more
> pressing.
>
> In 1812-14 we fought a war with Great Britain over the issue of
> His Majesty’s Ships pressing American citizens into service in
> the Royal Navy. We considered our citizenship as sacred, and as
> an issue of sovereignty. We argued, at the point of cannon and
> sword, that no nation could impress the citizens of another
> nation into service against their will – that such was a return
> to feudalism. Washington was burned, but we won the war and
> sovereignty was maintained. For a while.
>
> How ironic that in Kosovo, American citizens will be forced to
> serve under British soldiers, against their will, this time
> ordered there by an American President!
>
> At issue is not the quality of the British officer in question.
> He’s no doubt a gentleman and a fine officer. The entire issue is
> whether it is legal, whether it is lawful, and if so, whether
> American citizens are no longer sovereigns. Is the "Grand
> Experiment" in self government expired? Many say this is the end
> of the Republic, and they may well be right.
>
> When Americans are forced to bear arms in a conflict not their
> own, they are turned into involuntary mercenaries. No semantic
> smokescreen can make it anything else.
>
> When a soldier accepts extra pay for the hazardous duty of
> serving a foreign power, under foreign officers, he becomes a
> voluntary mercenary. Let’s start calling a spade a spade.
>
> When Congress abrogates its responsibility to control the
> military involvement of this country, as clearly stated in the
> Constitution, it has thrown in the towel and is no longer
> functioning as intended by the Framers. Only Congress can declare
> war. George Bush broke the law, but appealed to what he
> maintained was a higher law – the United Nations – when he
> illegally defended Kuwait. At least he acted under color of law.
>
> Bill Clinton has built upon the Bush legacy of
> internationalization of our military by telling Congress AND the
> United Nations that he will do as he pleases, that he does not
> need either of them, and Madelaine Albright has the temerity to
> boldly proclaim the grand lie that the President is acting with
> Constitutional authority.
>
> The only authority he has, if any, for these acts of treason must
> be found in Presidential Decision Directive #25, a top-secret
> document that even your Congressman is not allowed to read! This
> is the document whereby the president has authorized himself (!)
> to ignore Congress, ignore the Constitution, and to place our
> soldiers wherever he feels they are most needed.
>
> Bill Clinton is a rogue head of state. He is acting without any
> authority whatsoever. He is committing impeachable offenses at an
> ever-increasing pace, now that the Senate has capitulated and
> strangled on phony polls and public opinion rather than their
> sworn constitutional duty. The age-old struggle of Rex Lex has
> once again prevailed over Lex Rex. ("The King is over the Law"
> vs. "The Law is over the King.")
>
> Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the
> governed. (Have you heard this somewhere before?) Whenever any
> government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of
> the People to alter or abolish it.
>From www.mikenew.com/pdd25.html
> PDD 25
>
> The document below was allegedly; " Released on the WWW by the
> Bureau of International Organizational Affairs, U.S. Department
> of State, February 22, 1996" This State Department release is no
> more than an unclassified summary. The details of the actual
> Secret PDD 25 are still concealed from public scrutiny.
>
>
>
>
>
> Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace
> Operations (PDD 25) Released on the WWW by the Bureau of
> International Organizational Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
> February 22, 1996
>
> EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
>
> Last year, President Clinton ordered an inter-agency review of
> our nation's peacekeeping policies and programs in order to
> develop a comprehensive policy framework suited to the realities
> of the post-Cold War period. This policy review has resulted in a
> Presidential Decision Directive (PDD 25). The President signed
> this directive, following the completion of extensive
> consultations with Members of Congress. This paper summarizes the
> key elements of that directive.
>
> As specified in the "Bottom-Up Review," the primary mission of
> the U.S. Armed Forces remains to be prepared to fight and win two
> simultaneous regional conflicts. In this context, peacekeeping
> can be one useful tool to help prevent and resolve such conflicts
> before they pose direct threats to our national security.
> Peacekeeping can also serve U.S. interests by promoting
> democracy, regional security, and economic growth.
>
> The policy directive (PDD) addresses six major issues of reform
> and improvement:
>
> 1. Making disciplined and coherent choices about which peace
> operations to support -- both when we vote in the Security
> Council for UN peace operations and when we participate in such
> operations with U.S. troops. To achieve this goal, the policy
> directive sets forth three increasingly rigorous standards of
> review for U.S. support for or participation in peace operations,
> with the most stringent applying to U.S. participation in
> missions that may involve combat. The policy directive affirms
> that peacekeeping can be a useful tool for advancing U.S.
> national security interests in some circumstances, but both U.S.
> and UN involvement in peacekeeping must be selective and more
> effective.
>
> 2. Reducing U.S. costs for UN peace operations, both the
> percentage our nation pays for each operation and the cost of the
> operations themselves. To achieve this goal, the policy directive
> orders that we work to reduce our peacekeeping assessment
> percentage from the current 31.7% to 25% by January 1, 1996, and
> proposes a number of specific steps to reduce the cost of UN
> peace operations.
>
> 3. Defining clearly our policy regarding the command and control
> of American military forces in UN peace operations. The policy
> directive underscores the fact that the President will never
> relinquish command of U.S. forces. However, as
> Commander-in-Chief, the President has the authority to place U.S.
> forces under the operational control of a foreign commander when
> doing so serves American security interests, just as American
> leaders have done numerous times since the Revoluntary War,
> including in Operation Desert Storm. The greater the anticipated
> U.S. military role, the less likely it will be that the U.S. will
> agree to have a UN commander exercise overall operational control
> over U.S. forces. Any large scale participation of U.S. forces in
> a major peace enforcement operation that is likely to involve
> combat should ordinarily be conducted under U.S. command and
> operational control or through competent regional organizations
> such as NATO or ad hoc coalitions.
>
> 4. Reforming and improving the UN's capability to manage peace
> operations. The policy recommends 11 steps to strengthen UN
> management of peace operations and directs U.S. support for
> strengthening the UN's planning, logistics, information and
> command and control capabilities.
>
> 5. Improving the way the U.S. government manages and funds peace
> operations. The policy directive creates a new "shared
> responsibility" approach to managing and funding UN peace
> operations within the U.S. Government. Under this approach, the
> Department of Defense will take lead management and funding
> responsibility for those UN operations that involve U.S. combat
> units and those that are likely to involve combat, whether or not
> U.S. troops are involved. This approach will ensure that military
> expertise is brought to bear on those operations that have a
> significant military component. The State Department will retain
> lead management and funding responsibility for traditional
> peacekeeping operations that do not involve U.S. combat units. In
> all cases, the State Department remains responsible for the
> conduct of diplomacy and instructions to embassies and our UN
> Mission in New York.
>
> 6. Creating better forms of cooperation between the Executive,
> the Congress and the American public on peace operations. The
> policy directive sets out seven proposals for increasing and
> regularizing the flow of information and consultation between the
> executive branch and Congress; the President believes U.S.
> support for and participation in UN peace operations can only
> succeed over the long term with the bipartisan support of
> Congress and the American people.
>
> KEY ELEMENTS OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY ON REFORMING
> MULTILATERAL PEACE OPERATIONS (AS SPECIFIED IN PDD 25, MAY 1994)
>
> Introduction: The Role of Peace Operations in U.S. Foreign Policy
> Serious threats to the security of the United States still exist
> in the post-Cold War era. New threats will emerge. The United
> States remains committed to meeting such threats. When our
> interests dictate, the U.S. must be willing and able to fight and
> win wars, unilaterally whenever necessary. To do so, we must
> create the required capabilities and maintain them ready to use.
> UN peace operations cannot substitute for this requirement.
> (Note: For simplicity, the term peace operations is used in this
> document to cover the entire spectrum of activities from
> traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement aimed at defusing
> and resolving international conflicts.) Circumstances will arise,
> however, when multilateral action best serves U.S. interests in
> preserving or restoring peace. In such cases, the UN can be an
> important instrument for collective action. UN peace operations
> can also provide a "force multiplier" in our efforts to promote
> peace and stability.
>
> During the Cold War, the United Nations could resort to
> multilateral peace operations only in the few cases when the
> interests of the Soviet Union and the West did not conflict. In
> the new strategic environment such operations can serve more
> often as a cost-effective tool to advance American as well as
> collective interests in maintaining peace in key regions and
> create global burden-sharing for peace.
>
> Territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars (many of
> which could spill across international borders) and the collapse
> of governmental authority in some states are among the current
> threats to peace. While many of these conflicts may not directly
> threaten American interests, their cumulative effect is
> significant. The UN has sought to play a constructive role in
> such situations by mediating disputes and obtaining agreement to
> cease-fires and political settlements. Where such agreements have
> been reached, the interposition of neutral forces under UN
> auspices has, in many cases, helped facilitate lasting peace. UN
> peace operations have served important U.S. national interests.
> In Cambodia, UN efforts led to an election protected by
> peacekeepers, the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees and
> the end of a destabilizing regional conflict. In El Salvador, the
> UN sponsored elections and is helping to end a long and bitter
> civil war. The UN's supervision of Namibia's transition to
> independence removed a potential source of conflict in strategic
> southern Africa and promoted democracy. The UN in Cyprus has
> prevented the outbreak of war between two NATO allies.
> Peacekeeping on the Golan Heights has helped preserve peace
> between Israel and Syria. In Former Yugoslavia, the UN has
> provided badly-needed humanitarian assistance and helped prevent
> the conflict from spreading to other parts of the region.
> UN-imposed sanctions against Iraq, coupled with the peacekeeping
> operation on the Kuwait border, are constraining Iraq's ability
> to threaten its neighbors. Need for Reform
>
> While serving U.S. interests, UN peace operations continue to
> require improvement and reform. Currently, each operation is
> created and managed separately, and economies of scale are lost.
> Likewise, further organizational changes at UN Headquarters would
> improve efficiency and effectiveness. A fully independent office
> of Inspector General should be established immediately. The U.S.
> assessment rate should be reduced to 25 per cent.
>
> Since it is in our interest at times to support UN peace
> operations, it is also in our interest to seek to strengthen UN
> peacekeeping capabilities and to make operations less expensive
> and peacekeeping management more accountable. Similarly, it is in
> our interest to identify clearly and quickly those peace
> operations we will support and those we will not. Our policy
> establishes clear guidelines for making such decisions.
>
> Role in U.S. Foreign Policy UN and other multilateral peace
> operations will at times offer the best way to prevent, contain
> or resolve conflicts that could otherwise be more costly and
> deadly. In such cases, the U.S. benefits from having to bear only
> a share of the burden. We also benefit by being able to invoke
> the voice of the community of nations on behalf of a cause we
> support. Thus, establishment of a capability to conduct
> multilateral peace operations is part of our National Security
> Strategy and National Military Strategy.
>
> While the President never relinquishes command of U.S. forces,
> the participation of U.S. military personnel in UN operations
> can, in particular circumstances, serve U.S. interests. First,
> U.S. military participation may, at times, be necessary to
> persuade others to participate in operations that serve U.S.
> interests. Second, U.S. participation may be one way to exercise
> U.S. influence over an important UN mission, without unilaterally
> bearing the burden. Third, the U.S. may be called upon and choose
> to provide unique capabilities to important operations that other
> countries cannot.
>
> In improving our capabilities for peace operations, we will not
> discard or weaken other tools for achieving U.S. objectives. If
> U.S. participation in a peace operation were to interfere with
> our basic military strategy, winning two major regional conflicts
> nearly simultaneously (as established in the Bottom Up Review),
> we would place our national interest uppermost. The U.S. will
> maintain the capability to act unilaterally or in coalitions when
> our most significant interests and those of our friends and
> allies are at stake. Multilateral peace operations must,
> therefore, be placed in proper perspective among the instruments
> of U.S. foreign policy.
>
> The U.S. does not support a standing UN army, nor will we earmark
> specific U.S. military units for participation in UN operations.
> We will provide information about U.S. capabilities for data
> bases and planning purposes.
>
> It is not U.S. policy to seek to expand either the number of UN
> peace operations or U.S. involvement in such operations. Instead,
> this policy, which builds upon work begun by previous
> administrations and is informed by the concerns of the Congress
> and our experience in recent peace operations, aims to ensure
> that our use of peacekeeping is selective and more effective.
> Congress must also be actively involved in the continuing
> implementation of U.S. policy on peacekeeping.
>
> I. Supporting the Right Peace Operations
>
> i. Voting for Peace Operations
>
> The U.S. will support well-defined peace operations, generally,
> as a tool to provide finite windows of opportunity to allow
> combatants to resolve their differences and failed societies to
> begin to reconstitute themselves. Peace operations should not be
> open-ended commitments but instead linked to concrete political
> solutions; otherwise, they normally should not be undertaken. To
> the greatest extent possible, each UN peace operation should have
> a specified timeframe tied to intermediate or final objectives,
> an integrated political/military strategy well-coordinated with
> humanitarian assistance efforts, specified troop levels, and a
> firm budget estimate. The U.S. will continue to urge the UN
> Secretariat and Security Council members to engage in rigorous,
> standard evaluations of all proposed new peace operations. The
> Administration will consider the factors below when deciding
> whether to vote for a proposed new UN peace operation (Chapter VI
> or Chapter VII) or to support a regionally-sponsored peace
> operation:
>
> -- UN involvement advances U.S. interests, and there is an
> international community of interest for dealing with the problem
> on a multilateral basis.
>
> -- There is a threat to or breach of international peace and
> security, often of a regional character, defined as one or a
> combination of the following:
>
> - International aggression, or; - Urgent humanitarian disaster
> coupled with violence; - Sudden interruption of established
> democracy or gross violation of human rights coupled with
> violence, or threat of violence.
>
> -- There are clear objectives and an understanding of where the
> mission fits on the spectrum between traditional peacekeeping and
> peace enforcement.
>
> -- For traditional (Chapter VI) peacekeeping operations, a
> ceasefire should be in place and the consent of the parties
> obtained before the force is deployed.
>
> -- For peace enforcement (Chapter VII) operations, the threat to
> international peace and security is considered significant.
>
> -- The means to accomplish the mission are available, including
> the forces, financing and mandate appropriate to the mission.
>
> -- The political, economic and humanitarian consequences of
> inaction by the international community have been weighed and are
> considered unacceptable.
>
> -- The operation's anticipated duration is tied to clear
> objectives and realistic criteria for ending the operation.
>
> These factors are an aid in decision-making; they do not by
> themselves constitute a prescriptive device. Decisions have been
> and will be based on the cumulative weight of the factors, with
> no single factor necessarily being an absolute determinant.
>
> In addition, using the factors above, the U.S. will continue to
> scrutinize closely all existing peace operations when they come
> up for regular renewal by the Security Council to assess the
> value of continuing them. In appropriate cases, the U.S. will
> seek voluntary contributions by beneficiary nations or enhanced
> host nation support to reduce or cover, at least partially, the
> costs of certain UN operations. The U.S. will also consider
> voting against renewal of certain long-standing peace operations
> that are failing to meet established objectives in order to free
> military and financial resources for more pressing UN missions.
>
> ii. Participating in UN and Other Peace Operations
>
> The Administration will continue to apply even stricter standards
> when it assesses whether to recommend to the President that U.S.
> personnel participate in a given peace operation. In addition to
> the factors listed above, we will consider the following factors:
>
>
> -- Participation advances U.S. interests and both the unique and
> general risks to American personnel have been weighed and are
> considered acceptable.
>
> -- Personnel, funds and other resources are available;
>
> -- U.S. participation is necessary for operation's success;
>
> -- The role of U.S. forces is tied to clear objectives and an
> endpoint for U.S. participation can be identified;
>
> -- Domestic and Congressional support exists or can be
> marshalled;
>
> -- Command and control arrangements are acceptable. Additional,
> even more rigorous factors will be applied when there is the
> possibility of significant U.S. participation in Chapter VII
> operations that are likely to involve combat:
>
> -- There exists a determination to commit sufficient forces to
> achieve clearly defined objectives;
>
> -- There exists a plan to achieve those objectives decisively;
>
> -- There exists a commitment to reassess and adjust, as
> necessary, the size, composition, and disposition of our forces
> to achieve our objectives.
>
> Any recommendation to the President will be based on the
> cumulative weight of the above factors, with no single factor
> necessarily being an absolute determinant.
>
> II. The Role of Regional Organizations
>
> In some cases, the appropriate way to perform peace operations
> will be to involve regional organizations. The U.S. will continue
> to emphasize the UN as the primary international body with the
> authority to conduct peacekeeping operations. At the same time,
> the U.S. will support efforts to improve regional organizations'
> peacekeeping capabilities. When regional organizations or
> groupings seek to conduct peacekeeping with UNSC endorsement,
> U.S. support will be conditioned on adherence to the principles
> of the UN Charter and meeting established UNSC criteria,
> including neutrality, consent of the conflicting parties, formal
> UNSC oversight and finite, renewal mandates.
>
> With respect to the question of peacekeeping in the territory of
> the former Soviet Union, requests for "traditional" UN
> blue-helmeted operations will be considered on the same basis as
> other requests, using the factors previously outlined (e.g., a
> threat to international peace and security, clear objectives,
> etc.). U.S. support for these operations will, as with other such
> requests, be conditioned on adherence to the principles of the UN
> Charter and established UNSC criteria.
>
> III. Reducing Costs
>
> Although peacekeeping can be a good investment for the U.S., it
> would be better and more sustainable if it cost less. The
> Administration is committed to reducing the U.S. share of
> peacekeeping costs to 25% by January 1, 1996, down from the
> current rate of 31.7%. We will also inform the UN of Congress's
> likely refusal to fund U.S. peacekeeping assessments at a rate
> higher than 25% after Fiscal Year 1995. The Administration
> remains concerned that the UN has not rectified management
> inefficiencies that result in excessive costs and, on occasion,
> fraud and abuse. As a matter of priority, the U.S. will continue
> to press for dramatic administrative and management improvements
> in the UN system. In particular, the U.S. is working hard to
> ensure that new and on-going peace operations are cost-effective
> and properly managed. Towards this end, the U.S. is pursuing a
> number of finance and budget management reforms, including:
>
> -- immediate establishment of a permanent, fully independent
> office of Inspector General with oversight responsibility that
> includes peacekeeping;
>
> -- unified budget for all peace operations, with a contingency
> fund, financed by a single annual peacekeeping assessment;
>
> -- standing cadre of professional budget experts from member
> states, particularly top contributing countries, to assist the UN
> in developing credible budgets and financial plans;
>
> -- enlargement of the revolving peacekeeping reserve fund to $500
> million, using voluntary contributions;
>
> -- Required status of forces/mission agreements that provide
> preferential host nation support to peacekeeping operations;
>
> -- prohibit UN "borrowing" from peacekeeping funds to finance
> cash shortfalls in regular UN administrative operations;
>
> -- revise the special peacekeeping scale of assessments to base
> it on a 3-year average of national income and rationalize Group C
> so that higher income countries pay their regular budget rate.
>
> Moreover, the U.S. will use its voice and vote in the Fifth
> Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations to
> contain costs of UN peace operations once they are underway.
>
> IV. Strenghening the UN
>
> If peace operations are to be effective and efficient when the
> U.S. believes they are necessary, the UN must improve the way
> peace operations are managed. Our goal is not to create a global
> high command but to enable the UN to manage its existing load
> more effectively. At present each UN operation is created and
> managed separately by a still somewhat understaffed UN Department
> of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). As a result, support to the
> field may suffer, economies of scale are lost, and work is
> duplicated. Moreover, the UN's command and control capabilities,
> particularly in complex operations, need substantial improvement.
> Structural changes at UN Headquarters, some of which are already
> underway, would make a positive difference.
>
> A. The U.S. proposals include the reconfiguration and expansion
> of the staff for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to
> create:
>
> -- Plans Division to conduct adequate advance planning and
> preparation for new and on-going operation;
>
> -- Information and Research Division linked to field operations
> to obtain and provide current information, mange a 24 hour watch
> center, and monitor open source material and non-sensitive
> information submitted by governments;
>
> -- Operations Division with a modern command, control and
> communications (C3) architecture based on commercial systems;
>
> -- Logistics Division to manage both competitive commercial
> contracts (which should be re-bid regularly on the basis of price
> and performance) and a cost-effective logistics computer network
> to link the UN DPKO with logistics offices in participating
> member nations. This system would enable the UN to request price
> and availability data and to order materiel from participating
> states;
>
> -- Small Public Affairs cell dedicated to supporting on-going
> peace operations and disseminating information within host
> countries in order to reduce the risks to UN personnel and
> increase the potential for mission success;
>
> -- Small Civilian Police Cell to manage police missions, plan for
> the establishment of police and judicial institutions, and
> develop standard procedures, doctrine and training. B. To
> eliminate lengthy, potentially disastrous delays after a mission
> has been authorized, the UN should establish:
>
> -- a rapidly deployable headquarters team, a composite initial
> logistics support unit, and open, pre-negotiated commercial
> contracts for logistics support in new mission;
>
> -- data base of specific, potentially available forces or
> capabilities that nations could provide for the full range of
> peacekeeping and humanitarian operations;
>
> -- trained civilian reserve corps to serve as a ready, external
> talent pool to assist in the administration, management, and
> execution of UN peace operations;
>
> -- modest airlift capability available through pre-negotiated
> contracts with commercial firms or member states to support
> urgent deployments.
>
> C. Finally, the UN should establish a professional Peace
> Operations Training Program for commanders and other military and
> civilian personnel.
>
> D. Consistent with the specific proposals outlined above, the
> U.S. will actively support efforts in the Fifth Committee of the
> General Assembly to redeploy resources within the UN to enable
> the effective augmentation of the UN DPKO along the lines
> outlined above. In addition, the U.S. is prepared to undertake
> the following, primarily on a reimbursable basis:
>
> -- detail appropriate numbers of civilian and military personnel
> to DPKO in New York in advisory or support roles;
>
> -- share information, as appropriate, while ensuring full
> protection of sources and methods;
>
> -- offer to design a command, control, and communications systems
> architecture for the Operations Division, using commercially
> available systems and software;
>
> -- offer to assist DPKO to establish an improved, cost-effective
> logistics system to support UN peacekeeping operations;
>
> -- offer to help design the database of military forces or
> capabilities and to notify DPKO to establish an improved,
> cost-effective logistics system to support UN peacekeeping
> operations;
>
> -- offer to help design the database of military forces or
> capabilities and to notify DPKO, for inclusion in the database,
> of specific U.S. capabilities that could be made available for
> the full spectrum of peacekeeping or humanitarian operations.
> U.S. notification in no way implies a commitment to provide those
> capabilities, if asked by the UN;
>
> -- detail public affairs specialists to the UN;
>
> -- offer to help create and establish a training program,
> participate in peacekeeping training efforts and offer the use of
> U.S. facilities for training purposes.
>
> V. Command and Control of U.S. Forces
>
> A. Our Policy: The President retains and will never relinquish
> command authority over U.S. forces. On a case by case basis, the
> President will consider placing appropriate U.S. forces under the
> operational control of a competent UN commander for specific UN
> operations authorized by the Security Council. The greater the
> U.S. military role, the less likely it will be that the U.S. will
> agree to have a UN commander exercise overall operational control
> over U.S. forces. Any large scale participation of U.S. forces in
> a major peace enforcement mission that is likely to involve
> combat should ordinarily be conducted under U.S. command and
> operational control or through competent regional organizations
> such as NATO or ad hoc coalitions.
>
> There is nothing new about this Administration's policy regarding
> the command and control of U.S. forces. U.S. military personnel
> have participated in UN peace operations since 1948. American
> forces have served under the operational control of foreign
> commanders since the Revolutionary War, including in World War I,
> World War II, Operation Desert Storm and in NATO since its
> inception. We have done so and will continue to do so when the
> President determines it serves U.S. national interests.
>
> Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. military personnel have begun
> serving in UN operations in greater numbers. President Bush sent
> a large U.S. field hospital unit to Croatia and observers to
> Cambodia, Kuwait and Western Sahara. President Clinton has
> deployed two U.S. infantry companies to Macedonia in a monitoring
> capacity and logisticians to the UN operation in Somalia.
>
> B. Definition of Command: No President has ever relinquished
> command over U.S. forces. Command constitutes the authority to
> issue orders covering every aspect of military operations and
> administration. The sole source of legitimacy for U.S. commanders
> originates from the U.S. Constitution, federal law and the
> Uniform Code of Military Justice and flows from the President to
> the lowest U.S. commander in the field. The chain of command from
> the President to the lowest U.S. commander in the field remains
> inviolate.
>
> C. Definition of Operational Control: It is sometimes prudent or
> advantageous (for reasons such as maximizing military
> effectiveness and ensuring unity of command) to place U.S. forces
> under the operational control of a foreign commander to achieve
> specified military objectives. In making this determination,
> factors such as the mission, the size of the proposed U.S. force,
> the risks involved, anticipated duration, and rules of engagement
> will be carefully considered.
>
> Operational control is a subset of command. It is given for a
> specific time frame or mission and includes the authority to
> assign tasks to U.S. forces already deployed by the President,
> and assign tasks to U.S. units led by U.S. officers. Within the
> limits of operational control, a foreign UN commander cannot:
> change the mission or deploy U.S. forces outside the area of
> responsibility agreed to by the President, separate units, divide
> their supplies, administer discipline, promote anyone, or change
> their internal organization.
>
> D. Fundamental Elements of U.S. Command Always Apply: If it is to
> our advantage to place U.S. forces under the operational control
> of a UN commander, the fundamental elements of U.S. command still
> apply. U.S. commanders will maintain the capability to report
> separately to higher U.S. military authorities, as well as the UN
> commander. Commanders of U.S. military units participating in UN
> operations will refer to higher U.S. authorities orders that are
> illegal under U.S. or international law, or are outside the
> mandate of the mission to which the U.S. agreed with the UN, if
> they are unable to resolve the matter with the UN commander. The
> U.S. reserves the right to terminate participation at any time
> and to take whatever actions it deems necessary to protect U.S.
> forces if they are endangered.
>
> There is no intention to use these conditions to subvert the
> operational chain of command. Unity of command remains a vital
> concern. Questions of legality, mission mandate, and prudence
> will continue to be worked out "on the ground" before the orders
> are issued. The U.S. will continue to work with the UN and other
> member states to streamline command and control procedures and
> maximize effective coordination on the ground.
>
> E. Protection of U.S. Peacekeepers: The U.S. remains concerned
> that in some cases, captured UN peacekeepers and UN peace
> enforcers may not have adequate protection under international
> law. The U.S. believes that individuals captured while performing
> UN peacekeeping or UN peace enforcement activities, whether as
> members of a UN force or a U.S. force executing a UN Security
> Council mandate, should, as a matter of policy, be immediately
> released to UN officials; until released, at a minimum they
> should be accorded protections identical to those afforded
> prisoners of war under the 1949 Geneva Convention III (GPW). The
> U.S. will generally seek to incorporate appropriate language into
> UN Security Council resolutions that establish or extend peace
> operations in order to provide adequate legal protection to
> captured UN peacekeepers. In appropriate cases, the U.S. would
> seek assurances that U.S. forces assisting the UN are treated as
> experts on mission for the United Nations, and thus are entitled
> to appropriate privileges and immunities and are subject to
> immediate release when captured. Moreover, the Administration is
> actively involved in negotiating a draft international convention
> at the United Nations to provide a special international
> convention at the United Nations to provide a special
> international status for individuals serving in peacekeeping and
> peace enforcement operations under a UN mandate. Finally, the
> Administration will take appropriate steps to ensure that any
> U.S. military personnel captured while serving as part of a
> multinational peacekeeping force or peace enforcement effort are
> immediately released to UN authorities.
>
> VI. Strengthening U.S. Support for Multilateral Peace Operations
>
> Peace operations have changed since the end of the Cold War. They
> are no longer limited to the interposition of small numbers of
> passive, unarmed observers. Today, they also include more complex
> and sometimes more robust uses of military resources to achieve a
> range of political and humanitarian objectives.
>
> The post-Cold War world has also witnessed the emergence of peace
> enforcement operations involving the threat or use of force.
> These missions have been considerably more challenging than
> traditional peacekeeping operations, yet the U.S. and the UN are
> only now beginning to change sufficiently the way they manage
> peace operations. The expansion of peacekeeping operations
> without a commensurate expansion of capabilities has contributed
> to noticeable setbacks. If the U.S. is to support the full range
> of peace operations effectively, when it is in our interests to
> do so, our government, not just the UN, must adapt. It is no
> longer sufficient to view peace operations solely through a
> political prism. It is critical also to bring a clear military
> perspective to bear, particularly on those missions that are
> likely to involve the use of force or the participation of U.S.
> combat units. Thus, the Department of Defense should join the
> Department of State in assuming both policy and funding
> responsibility for appropriate peace operations. We call this
> policy "shared responsibility."
>
> A. Shared Responsibility: DOD will assume new responsibilities
> for managing and funding those UN peace operations that are
> likely to involve combat and all operations in which U.S. combat
> units are participating. The military requirements of these
> operations demand DOD's leadership in coordinating U.S. oversight
> and management. Professional military judgement increases the
> prospects of success of such operations. Moreover, with policy
> managment responsibility comes funding responsibility.
>
> DOD will pay the UN assessment for those traditional UN
> peacekeeping missions (so called "Chapter VI" operation, because
> they operate under Chapter VI of the UN Charter) in which U.S.
> combat units are participating, e.g. Macedonia. DOD will also pay
> the UN assessment for all UN peace enforcement missions (so
> callled "Chapter VII" operations), e.g. Bosnia and Somalia. State
> will continue to manage and pay for traditional peacekeeping
> missions in which there are no U.S. combat units participating,
> e.g. Golan Heights, El Salvador, Cambodia. When U.S. military
> personnel, goods or services are used for UN peace operations,
> DOD will receive direct and full reimbursement; reimbursement can
> only be waived in exceptional circumstances, and only by the
> President.
>
> Our Shared Responsibility policy states: "Unless the President
> determines otherwise, at the request of one of the Principals:
>
> -- The State Department will have lead responsibility for the
> oversight and management of those traditional peacekeeping
> operations (Chapter VI) in which U.S. combat units are not
> participating. The Administration will seek to fund the
> assessments for these operations through the existing State
> Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities account,
> and;
>
> -- The Defense Department will have lead responsibility for the
> oversight and management of those Chapter VI operations in which
> there are U.S. combat units and for all peace enforcement
> (Chapter VII) peace operations. The Administration will seek to
> fund the assessments for these operations through the
> establishment of a new account within DOD established to pay UN
> assessments. Once such an account is established, DOD may receive
> direct reimbursement from the UN for contributions of goods,
> services, and troops to UN peace operations."
>
> The Administration will submit legislation to Congress creating a
> new peacekeeping assessment account for DOD and implementing the
> shared responsibility concept. The legislation will stipulate
> that, in all cases, the agency with lead responsibility for a
> given operation will be responsible for assessments associated
> with the operation. Since peace operations are neither wholly
> military nor wholly political in nature, consisting instead of
> military, political, humanitarian and developmental elements in
> varying degrees, no one agency alone can manage all facets of an
> operation effectively. Therefore, the designated lead agencies
> will engage in full and regular interagency consultation as they
> manage U.S. support for peace operations.
>
> In all cases, State remains responsible for the conduct of
> diplomacy and instructions to embassies and our UN Mission in New
> York. DOD is responsible for military assessments and activities.
> NSC facilitates interagency coordination.
>
> B. Reimbursements from the UN: Under the shared responsibility
> policy, and the proposed accompanying legal authorities, DOD
> would receive and retain direct reimbursement for its
> contributions of troops, goods and services to the UN. An
> important advantage will be to limit any adverse impact on DOD
> Operations and Maintenance funds, which are essential to the U.S.
> military readiness. As our draft legislation stipulates, the U.S.
> will seek full reimbursement from the UN for U.S. contributions
> of troops, goods and services. The U.S. will first apply
> reimbursements against DOD incremental costs. Any remaining
> excess after the Services have been made whole would be credited
> to DOD's proposed peacekeeping account when it is a DOD-led
> operation or to State's CIPA account when it is a State-led
> operation. The President may choose to waive UN reimbursement
> only in exceptional circumstances.
>
> C. U.S. Funding of UN Peace Operations: In the short term, the
> Administration will seek Congressional support for funding the
> USG's projected UN peacekeeping arrears. Over the long run, we
> view the shared responsibility approach outlined above as the
> best means of ensuring improved management and adequate funding
> of UN peace operations. Moreover, the Administration will make
> every effort to budget for known peacekeeping assessments and
> seek Congressional support to fund, in the annual appropriation,
> assessments for clearly anticipated contingencies.
>
> D. U.S. Training: The Armed Services will include appropriate
> peacekeeping/emergency humanitarian assistance training in DOD
> training programs. Training U.S. forces to fight and decisively
> win wars will, however, continue to be the highest training
> priority.
>
> VII. Congress and the American People
>
> To sustain U.S. support for UN peace operations, Congress and the
> American people must understand and accept the potential value of
> such operations as tools of U.S. interests. Congress and the
> American people must also be genuine participants in the
> processes that support U.S. decision-making on new and on-going
> peace operations. Traditionally, the Executive branch has not
> solicited the involvement of Congress or the American people on
> matters related to UN peacekeeping. This lack of communication is
> not desirable in an era when peace operations have become more
> numerous, complex and expensive. The Clinton Administration is
> committed to working with Congress to improve and regularize
> communication and consultation on these important issues.
> Specifically, the Administration will:
>
> -- Regularize recently-initiated periodic consultations with
> bipartisan Congressional leaders on foreign policy engagements
> that might involve U.S. forces, including possible deployments of
> U.S. military units in UN peace operations.
>
> -- Continue recently-initiated monthly staff briefings on the
> UN's upcoming calendar, including current, new, and expanded
> peace operations.
>
> -- Inform Congress as soon as possible of unanticipated votes in
> the UNSC on new or expanded peace operations.
>
> -- Inform Congress of UN command and control arrangements when
> U.S. military units participate in UN operations.
>
> -- Provide UN documents to appropriate committees on a timely
> basis.
>
> -- Submit to Congress a comprehensive annual report on UN peace
> operations.
>
> -- Support legislation along the lines of that introduced by
> Senators Mitchell, Nunn, Byrd and Warner to amend the War Powers
> Resolution to introduce a consultative mechanism and to eliminate
> the 60-day withdrawal provisions.
>
> Conclusion
>
> Properly constituted, peace operations can be one useful tool to
> advance American national interests and pursue our national
> security objectives. The U.S. cannot be the world's policeman.
> Nor can we ignore the increase in armed ethnic conflicts, civil
> wars and the collapse of governmental authority in some states --
> crises that individually and cumulatively may affect U.S.
> interests. This policy is designed to impose discipline on both
> the UN and the U.S. to make peace operations a more effective
> instrument of collective security.
> -----------------------------------------------------------------
> ------- U.S. Department of State Publication Number 10161
> Released by the Bureau of International Organization Affairs May
> 1994
>
>
>
> -----------------------------------------------------------------
> ------- Return to Michael New's Home Page
>
A<>E<>R
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