-Caveat Lector- >From Intellectual Capital http://www.intellectualcapital.com/issues/issue294/item6411.asp "" This is the myth of the humanitarian impulses of British Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Clinton. The contrast between their approach toward the conflicts in Kosovo and East Timor are a direct illustration of the gap between the ideology and the chaos that is the new world order. "" > A Tale of Timor and New World Disorder > by Susan Tillou > Thursday, September 16, 1999 > Comments: 25 posts > > > > <Picture: This Issue's TOC> > <Picture: IC Archives> > <Picture: Sign Up to the IC Mailing List> > <Picture: Related IC articles> > One World? Think Again : Patrick Smith goes in search of the meaning of the > Indonesian elections. > > > > <Picture> > <Picture> > <Picture> > > > Search > > <Picture: Previous Article><Picture: Next Article><Picture><Picture>It was > early afternoon when our United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) electoral > team arrived at the small village of Kaimege in the Western district of Liquica. > Men, women and children ran to the street to greet our vehicle with the only > English phrase universally known throughout East Timor: "Hello, Mister." > > The excitement level was high, and there was no doubt the Timorese saw the > United Nations as the vehicle for their expression of self-determination. After > 24 years of harsh Indonesian rule in the territory, the East Timorese finally > felt justice would prevail. > > Full faith in UNAMET > > Curious and somewhat hesitant, the villagers had been waiting some time for our > arrival. My teammates -- another district electoral officer from Germany and two > Timorese local staff -- and I opened the doors of our Land Rover and used the > car stereo to broadcast a recorded message from U.N. Secretary-General Kofi > Annan. The message was simple: UNAMET would be the neutral facilitator of the > Aug. 30 popular consultation, the East Timorese voters' choice would be secret, > and no matter the outcome of the referendum, UNAMET would remain in East Timor. > > At the conclusion of our voter education session, we solicited questions. A > middle-aged farmer named Afonso stood up. "What will UNAMET do to guard our > safety after the vote?" he asked. > > Until now we had understood the main security concern to be the run-up to the > election. The intimidation in our district had been especially severe. Militia > had control over the town and, we had understood, were in collusion with local > government officials, police and the military. > > In the months prior, a majority of the town’s people sympathetic to the > independence cause had been tortured, killed or run into the nearby hills. The > town recently had become notorious after militia and army in coordination with > police massacred at least 40 civilians who sought refuge from recent fighting in > the town's church. Liquica proper, with an estimated population of 22,000, had > become a veritable ghost town. Little did we know this was a small glimpse of > something worse to come. > > <Picture: Punishment for the freedom to vote would come> > Punishment for the > freedom to vote > would come > As our team continued to other villages that day, this particular question was > posed again and again. Even our locally recruited UNAMET staff asked what kind > of protection UNAMET would provide them as they left the voting sites. Quickly, > it became evident to us in the field that the Timorese would have no problem > risking their lives -- even coming down from the hills to villages they had > escaped in fear -- just to cast their votes. But all knew the punishment for > this freedom of choice would come later. > > The following morning, Afonso came to see me at our registration center. He had > been hiding in nearby bushes waiting for our electoral team to arrive. He told > me that during the evening, two militiamen had come with guns to his house under > orders from the village chief to kill him. His wife delayed them at the door, > and he escaped out the back of the house. He had been sought because he attended > the UNAMET voter-education meeting and dared to ask a question. > > In a short amount of time on the ground, the collusion between the militia and > the local authorities -- including the police and army -- became glaringly > obvious. Yet, bound by the security arrangements established in the May 5 accord > signed by Annan and the Portuguese and Indonesian foreign affairs ministers, > UNAMET was forced to place shaky trust in Indonesian security forces to protect > its operations and staff. > > In the ensuing days, we learned of similar situations of intimidation and > threats directly related to our presence and interaction with the people in > Liquia. Reports to the police were futile, most times even working against our > best intentions because of the close collaboration between the militia and > police. The reality was sobering: UNAMET had no secondary recourse to ensure the > safety of the voters or the local or international staff. > > At the same time, the resolve of the East Timorese to meet with us and even work > for us was astounding. They put their full faith in the 72-nation presence that > was the U.N. mission to allow their voices to be heard and, ultimately, to > protect their interests. > > A two-month window of opportunity for trouble > > <Picture: To rely on Indonesian authorities for security was flawed > > To rely on Indonesian > authorities for security > was flawed > To be sure, it was no small miracle that the United Nations was able to > orchestrate such an elaborate election functionally, logistically and in such a > short time. The electoral process was immensely successful, but the imperative > to rely only on the Indonesian authorities for security was flawed from the > beginning. > > In addition, there was an illogical and dangerous gap between the U.N. > administered popular consultation and implementation of the outcome of the vote. > Because the latter could not begin until the Indonesian Parliament (MPR) met and > considered ratifying the results of the vote, a temporal no man's land loomed > between the announcement of the results Sept. 4 and the MPR session scheduled > for sometime in November -- a period when chaos could rule with little, if any, > repercussions. > > UNAMET was bound by the May 5 agreement to retain a presence after the vote and > before the MPR session, but no role had been established for the civil-affairs > officers on the ground during these two months. It remains difficult to > understand why the vote was not scheduled closer to the time of the new MPR > session to avoid this gap. > > On the day before the popular consultation, I held one last meeting with my > local staff to run through each of their duties. Again, the issue of their > personal security arose. Frustrated by a lack of contingency planning, I told > each staff member to pack his or her bags and to be prepared to go wherever they > needed for safety directly after the polling. I even drove one local staff > member too frightened to stay in Liquica to a bishop's compound in Dili as the > rest of my team continued to the airport to leave the country. > > Even considering our difficult security circumstances and living conditions, the > most difficult part of the mission for many UNAMET staff was having to leave > behind those who risked so much in order to vote -- and those who risked even > more to work for UNAMET. > > As evidenced by the killings of local staff directly after the polling, and the > ensuing destruction and carnage since the Sept. 4 announcement of the results, > Indonesian President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie has not been able to control the > military-backed militias running rampant in East Timor. There had been some > debate about whether Habibie retained enough power to control the situation, but > the one man who surely did, Armed Forces chief and Defense Minister General > Wiranto, was not held accountable soon enough. > > As East Timorese ran for the hills or were forcefully deported to militia-run > camps in West Timor, the United Nations announced that it was evacuating all > remaining staff in Dili. Although this statement later was revised to say that a > small presence would remain, it sent a clear message to the East Timorese voters > that they had been abandoned by the international community that had promised > them so much. > > Unfortunately, as the United States and the West considered slapping Indonesia's > hand by invoking trade and economic sanctions, the militia and the army were > given time and space to complete their mission of revenge. The belief that > economic sanctions might have somehow influenced the Indonesian military's will > and actions was a logical stretch. > > The Indonesian military's actions at the highest levels more likely are based on > internal Indonesian politics than international relations. Why would military > officials with so much invested in the old Suharto regime not want to promote > anarchy in order to avert peaceful transition to a more reform-minded government > -- especially one that might support the secession of an Indonesian province? > > Of course, the lower ranks of the military and the militia have an additional > incentive to seek revenge through a scorched-earth policy. Although possibly for > different reasons, there is no doubt that the various levels of Indonesian > security authorities collaborated in this campaign of terror. > > New world disorder > > The lessons to be drawn from the experience in East Timor are difficult: Freedom > of choice and placing trust in the United Nations may have a high cost, and > there is no legitimate and competent region-wide security regime through which > such regional crises can be addressed. > > In addition, through its failure to provide security for the U.N. mission, > Indonesia has tarnished its image worldwide, potentially ruining chances for a > quick and stable transition to democracy and recovery from the recent financial > crisis. The ability of the military to spotlight Habibie's lack of power also > undercuts his chances of being elected president this fall and even suggests a > potential for a military coup. > > Embarrassingly pushed aside in Kosovo, the United Nations had the chance to > regain credibility with its mission in East Timor. Instead, its failure to > ensure effective security measures to buttress work on the ground allowed for > yet another stain on the United Nations. > > A larger question is why a coalition of nations would unilaterally intervene for > humanitarian purposes in Kosovo and not in East Timor. Because of the Indonesian > annexation, more than 200,000 Timorese have lost their lives -- possibly > thousands more in the past week alone. > > This is the myth of the humanitarian impulses of British Prime Minister Tony > Blair and President Clinton. The contrast between their approach toward the > conflicts in Kosovo and East Timor are a direct illustration of the gap between > the ideology and the chaos that is the new world order. > > Susan Tillou is the research associate and coordinator of Asia > StudiesProgramming at the Council on Foreign Relations. She served this summer > as a district electoral officer with the U.N. Mission in East Timor. 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