-Caveat Lector-
Judge Orders:
<<<ORDERED that defendant's motion [2], for an order authorizing at it to
announce and certify the results of the vote on Initiative 59 in accordance
with D.C. Code � 1-285 (1981) be and hereby is
GRANTED. Defendant District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics is
hereby authorized to tabulate, announce and verify the results of the
November 3, 1998 election on Initiative S9.>>>
From: Peace through Reason <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: MedMJ News <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Med MJ News--Text version of Judge's Order
Date: Sunday, September 19, 1999 7:53 AM
Judge's Order, text version.
Thomas
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
WAYNE TURNER, et al., Civil Action No. 98-2634 (RWR)
Plaintiffs,
Plaintiffs,
FILED
v. Sept 17 1999
NANCY MAYER WHITTINGTON,
CLERK
D.C. BOARD OF ELECTIONS AND ETHICS, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
Defendant
and
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Intervenor.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs, five registered District of Columbia voters and a committee of
such voters, and the defendant, the District or Columbia Board of Elections
and Ethics ("the Board"), seek a declaratory judgment that Sec. 171 of
Congress's 1998 District of Columbia Appropriations Act (the "Barr
Amendment") is unconstitutional if it bars the Board from counting,
releasing, and certifying the results of the November 3, l998 D. C.
referendum known as initiative 59. The Unified States intervenor defending
the constitutionality of the Barr Amendment, claiming that it bars
certifying but not counting and announcing the election results. The Court
held a consolidated hearing on the merits of plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction and on
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the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. Because the Court holds
that the Barr Amendment does not preclude the Board from counting,
announcing or certifying the results of the referendum on Initiative 59,
the Board may release and certify them and the Court need not reach the
constitutional question.
Factual Background
On September 17, 1998, the Board certified a ballot initiative entitled
Initiative 59 as proper for placement on the ballot for the November 1998
District of Columbia elections after the measure garnered the requisite
support through signatures. (Def.'s Mem. Summ. J., Attmts. Ex. 2, Miller
Decl. at 4 ("Miller Decl.".) Initiative 59, known as the Medical Marijuana
Initiative, was designed, in part, to allow chronically ill individuals to
use marijuana without violating criminal provisions of the D.C. Code.
(Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 2-3 ("Def.'s Mem.").) Attmts.' Initiative 59
states in part:
Sec. 1 All seriously ill individuals have the right to obtain and use
marijuana for medical purposes when a licensed physician has found the use
of marijuana to be medically necessary. . . Sec. 2 Medical patients who
use, and their primary caregivers who obtain for such patients, marijuana
for medical purposes upon the recommendation of a licensed physician do
no[t] violate the District of Columbia Uniform Controlled Substances Act of
1981....
(Def.'s Mem., Attmts., Ex. 3.)
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On October 21, 1998, Congress enacted the Barr Amendment as part of the
District of Columbia Appropriations Act. Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Bill of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-150 (1998)
The Barr Amendment provides that:
None of the funds contained in [the District of Columbia Appropriations
Act] may be used to conduct any ballot initiative which seeks to legalize
or otherwise reduce penalties associated with the possession, use, or
distribution of any schedule I subs substance under the Controlled
Substances Act . . . or any tetrahydrocannabinols derivative.
Id, Because Initiative 59 attempts to reduce penalties for some use and
possession of marijuana, it falls under the purview of the Barr Amendment.
On November 3, 1998, residents of the District of Columbia voted on
Initiative 59 since it had been printed on the ballots prior to passage of
the Barr Amendment. (Def.'s Mem. at 8.) The Board has not released the
results of the vote on initiative 59, however, for fear of violating the
Barr Amendment.
Interpreting the Barr Amendment
The text of the Barr Amendment prevents the Board from using funds to
"conduct any ballot initiative" regarding any measure designed to lesser
penalties for drug possession, use, or distribution. The question, then)
is, whether counting,
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releasing, and certifying the results of the election is part of conducting
a ballot initiative.
The plaintiffs argue in their motion for summary judgment that the
Amendment should apply to the activity that takes place only up to and
including election day but not any of the duties required of the Board
after election day. (Pls.' Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 18 ("Pls.' Mem.").) This
election, they argue, was conducted and concluded on November 3, 1998.
According to the plaintiffs, the plain a language of the Barr Amendment
should not prevent release and certification of the election results
because those activities are not part of the conduct of a ballot
initiative. (Id.)
The United States agrees with this interpretation to a point. 1/ It argues
that the Barr Amendment does not prevent the Board from counting and
releasing the election results in this case. (Tr. Motions Hr'g at 50;
Intervenor's Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 24 ("Int.'s Mem.").) The United States
maintains that the Barr Amendment prohibits only certification of the
results. (Id.) Certification would make the language of a winning
_______________________________
1/ The parties in this case are oddly configured. The plaintiffs and the
defendant are united in their argument That the Barr Amendment is
unconstitutional while the intervenor argues in favor or the Amendment's
constitutionality. As is discussed below, the difference of opinion between
the plaintiffs and the defendant seems to be their construction of the Barr
Amendment and whether it allows the elect on results to be released.
-5-
initiative become law unless Congress disapproved it within 30 days. See
D.C. Code Ann. �� 1-233, 1-285 (1981). The United States draws this
conclusion not from a plain reading of the amendment's text, but rather
from the supposition that Congress did not want Initiative 59 to become law
at all. (Tr. Motions Hr'g at 50; Int.'s Mem. at 2, 10, 19, 23.)
The lone litigant who has not addressed the meaning of "conduct any ballot
initiative" is the Board. However, in its motion for summary judgment and
attachments, the Board describes what is required in order for it to count,
release, and certify the result of last fall's election. To count and
release the result of the election on Initiative 59, a member of the Board,
or its staff, would have to request the count from the computer on those
ballots that were tabulated by computer. (Miller Dec'. at 7 . ) The
expenditure would be "minimal." (Id. at 8) The Board may also have to hand
count some votes, which also involves minimal expenditure. (Def.'s Stmt. of
Material Facts Not in Genuine D Dispute at 5.) To certify the vote, the
Board would have to convene a meeting at which the result of the election
would be recorded on a certification form and adopted by the Board. (Miller
Decl. at 8. ) The costs of these actions would also be minimal. (Id.)
Certification is mainly a ministerial task which would take no longer than
five minutes. (Id.) Based on this recitation, and the fact that the Board
has not taken those
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actions, it seems apparent that the Board views any expenditure on
initiative 53 -- whether before, during or after the election -- as
violating the Barr Amendment.
The Barr Amendment. itself provides no guidance on exactly what "conduct
any ballot initiative" is meant to entail. The sparse legislative history
offers scant clarification. 144 Cong. Rec. H73883 3 (daily ed. Aug. 6,
1998). The plaintiffs' argument that the Board's activities after election
day are excluded finds support, however, in the D.C. Code section
describing the Board of Elections' responsibilities in D.C. elections. The
D.C. Code directs the Board to, among other things, "(3) Conduct elections;
(4) Provide for recording and counting votes by means of ballets or
machines or both; [and] . . . (11) Certify . . . the results of elections."
C.C. Code Ann. � l- 1306 (1981). By listing these tasks separately, the D
C. Code implies that each is a distinct responsibility, and that conducting
an election does not encompass counting or certifying the vote.
A plain language reading of the Barr Amendment does little to undercut the
plaintffs' position. It also offers little support for the position on that
the Barr Amendment prevents certifying the results of this election but not
counting or releasing the results, as the United States argues. There are
two possible constructions of the phrase "conduct any ballot "initiative"
in this context. It could entail the entire process
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of the election, from the moment an Initiative is proposed for the ballot
until the results are certified to Congress. Alternatively, it could mean
merely managing election activity on the day of the election. There is no
reason to distinguish between counting, release and certification when
defining this phrase. All of these tasks are ministerial. All involve
minimal expenditure. All occur after the voting is over.
Courts must accord acts of Congress the presumption of constitutionality.
See e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U. S. 173, 190-31 (1991). Where at all
possible, courts are required to construe Congressional legislation in a
way that avoids constitutional infirmities. Id. The original parties in
this case argue that if the Barr Amendment prohibits counting, releasing
and certifying these election results, then it violates the constitutional
rights of freedom of expression and equal protection. With "conduct any
ballot Initiative" interpreted as referring only to conducting election day
affairs, the Boar-d would be allowed to count, release and certify the vote
on Initiative 59. The constitutional claims would not be reached. Because a
plain reading of the amendment supports this interpretation, and because
the opposite interpretation is constitutionally infirm for the reasons
discussed below, the Court holds that the phrase "conduct any ballot
initiative" in the Barr Amendment does not prevent the District of Columbia
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Board of Elections and Ethics from counting, releasing and certifying the
vote on Initiative 59 taken on November 3, 1998 . 2/
II
Congress's Power over the District of Columbia
Constitutional issues would be implicated if the Barr Amendment precluded
the Board from announcing and certifying the election results. One
question, though, is whether Congress's unique relationship to the District
creates a different analytical context in which to consider the alleged
burden on -First Amendment rights. It may be that because Congress has the
power to withdraw the ballot initiative process from D.C. voters in its
entirety, Congress could therefore take the lesser step of withdrawing
particular kinds of ballot initiatives from D.C. voters.
That is not the question to be decided in this case, however. The issue
here is not whether the Barr Amendment is constitutional as applied to a
proposed initiative that was kept off the ballot. In this case, D.C. voters
were properly given the opportunity to vote on a ballot initiative and did
so. The ___________________
2/ This conclusion does not necessarily render the Barr Amendment
meaningless. For example, from the day the amendment was enacted up through
the election day, the amendment precluded other initiative-related
expenditures such as "publicity surrounding that ballot." 144 Cong. Rec.
H7389 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1998) Statement or Rep. Barr).
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issue here is whether Congress's plenary power over the District of
Columbia encompasses the power to prevent political speech, in the form of
the results of votes proper y cast in a properly conducted ballot
referendum, from being made public. to that question must be no.
Congress' s power over the District is granted my the Constitution and is
very broad. Congress may exercise exclusive legislation in all Cases
whatsoever, over such District . . . as may . . . become me Seat of the
Government of the United States." U.S. Const. art. I � 8 (the "D.C.
Clause"). That clause has been Interpreted to grant plenary power to
Congress over the District of Columbia. See Palmore v. United States, 411
U.S. 389, 397 (1973). Congress acts as a local legislative body for D.C.
Id. Home Rule and other subsequent legislation have allowed District
residents some measure of governmental power. See D.C Code Ann. �� 1-201 to
299 (1981). Even after the passage of Home Rule, however, Congress retains
broad authority to pass local laws on any subject. See D.C. Code Ann. �
1-206 (1981). Thus, this Court is mindful of Congress's broad legislative
powers over the District, as granted by the D.C. Clause.
The D.C. Clause may not be read in isolation from the rest of the
Constitution, however, any more than any other constitutional clause may be
read alone. In this area, as in all
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others, Congress's actions are constrained by the Constitution itself, as
the Supreme Court has explained. See Palmore, 411 U.S. at 397 ("Congress
'may exercise within the District all legislative powers that the
legislature of a state might exercise within the Stare . . . so long as it
does not contravene any provision of the constitution of the United
States'" (quoting Capital Traction v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 5 (1899))) (emphasis
added)) cf. Grant v. Meyer, 828 F.2d 1446, 1456 (10th Cir. 1987) (having
granted citizens the right of an initiative procedure, the State was
obligated to confer the right in a manner consistent with the
Constitution), aff'd, 486 U.S. 414 '1988).
It is no surprise that Congress is so limited. In other areas where the
Constitution grants Congress virtually total control over legislation, the
Constitution always prescribes the boundaries of its abilities. See New
York v United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) (finding limits upon the
kind of legislation that Congress constitutionally may pass under the
Commerce Clause); accord Printz v United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24
(1997), (finding the Commerce Clause in combination with the Necessary and
Proper Clause as _insufficient sources of power for Congress to force local
law enforcement agencies to take part in federal laws on background checks
for gun sales. The Supreme Court has also found, similarly, that the power
to regulate federal elections was modified by Congress's responsibility not
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to interfere with First Amendment rights. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
13-20 (1976). Indeed, the very idea of judicial review is premised on the
idea that the courts exist, in part, in order to ensure that Congress does
not overstep the lines described by the Constitution. See Marbry v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (stating that "law is repugnant
to the Constitution is void").
Congress's acts controlling The District are no exception to that
fundamental rule. See Palmore, 421 U.S. at 397. Congress's laws for the
District must pass constitutional muster as much as any other Congressional
enactment must. Congress's power over the District therefore does not
exempt the Barr Amendment from First Amendment review.
The First Amendment
The Barr Amendment purports to restrict activity that involves voting by
D.C citizens. The vote has long been considered the crux of the democratic
system.. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U,S. 23, 31, (1968) (describing the
right to vote as among the "more precious in a free country" (quoting
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) ))) . The right to speak to our
governing bodies, through the vote, ensures our nation's ability to
function as a democracy, with legislatures responsive to thei-r voting
constituents. See id. ("'Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if
the right to vote is undermined'"); see
- 12 -
also Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S.
173, 184 (1979) (stating that "voting is of the most fundamental
significance under our constitutional structure").
The right to vote has been most powerfully raised in Equal Protection
claims where burdened parties sought relief from the inability to cast
their votes ''effectively." See Socialist Workers, 440 U.S. at 164. When
the right to vote is raised In the context of the First Amendment, it gives
rise to layered standards of review. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,
433-34 (1992) (stating that "the rigorousness of our inquiry into the
propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a
challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights").
Debates about the standard of review, however, only reinforce the idea that
the results of votes properly cast in a properly conducted ballot
referendum are due some level of First Amendment protection.
Symbolic speech is accorded constitutional protection. The First Amendment
shields a symbolic act if it has sufficient communicative power such that
it "'inten[ds] to convey a particularized message . . . and . . . the
likelihood was great that the message could be understood.'" See Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S.
405, 420-11 (1974)). This principle has protected a variety of acts. See
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406 (holding that
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burning a flag is protected by the First Amendment); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. S03, 514 (1969) (holding that wearing
black armbands to protest the war in Viet Nam was protected under the First
Amendment).
When a citizen steps into the voting booth to cast a vote on a matter
properly on the ballot, he or she intends to send a message in support of
or in opposition to the candidate or ballot measure at issue See Socialist
Workers Party, 440 U.S. at 184 (describing limits on ballot access as
"impair[ing] the voter's ability to express their political preferences")
(emphasis added). The message of the vote is received when the election
results are released thereby completing an important communication by the
public to the government. Through election voting, the public affects
public governance by determining who holds office or which referenda
properly before the voters will or will not become law. See Burdick, 504
U.S. at 438 (stating that "the function of the electoral process is to
'winnow out and finally reject all but the chosen candidates'") (citation
committed). 3/ Because voters in properly conducted elections
___________________________
3/ The Burdick Court added that the purpose of an election is "not to
provide a means of giving vent to 'short-range political goals, pique, or
personal quarrels. ' Attributing to elections a more generalized expressive
function would undermine the ability of States to operate elections fairly
and efficiently. " Burdick, 504 U.S. at 438 (internal citation omitted).
This quote does not undermine the fact that voting is speech in this case.
In Burdick the issue was what level of protection should be granted to
voters' desire to cast a protest vote by writing in
- 14 -
intend to send a particularized message which is received by those who act
on the results of the elections, voting results can be categorized as
protected symbolic speech under the Texas v. Johnson test.
Core political speech. is also constitutionally shielded. It is accorded
"the broadest protection" under the First Amendment. McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995). Unfortunately, not every
variety of "core political speech" has been clearly catalogued. It has
involved mostly pre-election activity and speech. See, e.g., id. at 347
(finding that handing out anonymous leaflets about an upcoming election is
core political speech); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988) (finding
that circulation of an initiative petition involves core political speech).
The phrase usually has been used to encompass _______________________
(footnote continued from previous page) the names of candidates not listed
on the ballot and to have those votes counted. Id. at 430. The Supreme
Court held that a state need not allow voters the opportunity to express
their opinions on every possible candidate or subject in any given
elections where candidates' ballot access and voters' rights to cast a vote
were otherwise provided for adequately. Id. at 438. States were therefore
not required to count write-in votes. Id. The issue in this case is the
level of protection to be granted to votes lawfully cast on an issue
properly placed before the voting public. Burdick held that there was not a
sufficient First Amendment interest in voting for write in candidates to
outweigh the state's Everest in efficient elections. Id. at 440. The matter
before this Court concerns the First Amendment rights of citizens of the
District of Columbia to have made known the results of their votes properly
cast on an issue properly placed on the ballot.
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speech about political candidates or ideas, see id., but not necessarily
the vote itself.
The reasons or protecting core political speech shed some light or the
nature of what that term should entail. Core political speech is given the
broadest protection in order "'to assure [t]he unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social charges desired by the
people.'" McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 346 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 484 (1957 ). If discussion about social and political change is
core political speech, it follows that the instrumentality used to bring
about political and social change, that is, a lawful vote and its results,
should be given the same kind of protection.
The United States has not argued to this Court that voting results are not
speech. Rather, the government suggests avoiding the First Amendment
question altogether. The United States' position is that the Barr Amendment
does not prevent` release of the election result but that certification of
the result is not protected by the First Amendment. (Tr. of Motion Hr'g at
51.) Calling Congress's act through the Barr Amendment "prospective
repeal," the government argues Chat the Barr Amendment has the same effect
as a law stating that marijuana is illegal in the District of Columbia. No
First
- 16 -
Amendment rights are implicated, the government argues, because the Barr
Amendment has the same effect as such a law.
There is no doubt that Congress could pass such a law that would have full
force in the District As described above, Congress is fully empowered to
enact substantive local laws for the District That fact, however, does not
change the nature of a vote tally on a matter properly placed on a ballot.
Speech does not charge its character for having taken place in the District
of Columbia Cf. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (discussing restrictions
on picketing in the District and finding that Congress's power over the
District did not change the analysis of First Amendment rights in that
case). Congress's power over the District cannot change the fundamental
nature and meaning of the acts of lawful voting and communicating voting
results Cf, Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13-14 (stating that "the critical
constitutional questions presented here go not to the basic power of
Congress to legislate in this area, but to whether the specific legislation
that Congress has enacted interferes with First Amendment freedoms"). The
legal status of the vote remains constant. Congress did not choose to pass
a law only about drug possession, use and distribution. It chose to pass a
law about elections. Based on the votes strong communicative content and
the history of the vote's central importance to a democratic system of
government, this Court concludes that the
- 17 -
results of votes properly cast in a properly conducted election are core
political speech.
If the Barr Amendment precluded release and certification of the results of
the referendum, it would have to pass constitutional muster. The proper
level of review would be strict scrutiny for at least three reasons. First,
as discussed above, denying D.C. citizens access to the outcome of the
election held on November 3, l998 burdens core political speech. The
Supreme Court instructs that "[w]hen a law burdens core political speech,
we apply 'exacting scrutiny' and we uphold the restriction only if it is
narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest." McIntyre, 514
U.S. at 347 (citing First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
786 (1978)).
Second, the amendment would. be a content-based restriction on speech.
Content based restrictions are those that restrict speech "based on its
substantive content or the message it conveys." Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 815, 828 (1995). The Barr Amendment
language purports to prevent the Board from conducting ballot initiatives
on reducing penalties for certain drug possession Congress may have
entirely understandable motives for attempting to curb drug possession,
use, and distribution in the District. That does not change the fact that
keeping a veil over the results of a
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properly conducted referendum would cut short public expression about the
topic of drug legalization -- either pro, con or neutral. As a
content-based restriction, the Barr Amendment would be subject to strict
scrutiny. See Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found., 119 S. Ct.
636, 651 (1999) (Thomas, J. concurring)
Burdick instructs yet a third way to characterize this issue while still
arriving at the same end :
[T]he rigorousness of our inquiry into the law depends upon the extent to
which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Thus, as we have recognized when those rights are subjected to
"severe" restrictions, the Regulation must be "narrowly drawn to advance a
state interest of compelling importance."
Burdick, 405 U.S. at 434 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)).
4/
In this case, First Amendment speech through the vote would have been
effectively extinguished if the Barr Amendment had blocked releasing and
certifying the results. To cast a lawful vote only to be told that that
vote wall not be counted or _____________________________
4/ Burdick applied a lesser standard to the law in that case because the
master involved facially neutral election laws propounded in the name of
efficiency. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 438. The state's asserted interest in
that case was in conducting elections uncluttered by extraneous, write-in
votes for candidates. Id. There is no such asserted interest in this case.
As described below, the asserted state interest is in preventing drug
legalization.
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released is to rob the vote of any communicative meaning whatsoever.
Speaking within the context of a congressional election, the Supreme Court
specifically stated that "[o]bviously included within the right to choose,
secured by the Constitution, is the right of qualified voters within a
state to cast their ballots and have them counted." United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941) (emphasis added). If thee Barr Amendment
were to keep the votes on Initiative 59 from being released and certified,
the vote would be muzzled expression and a meaningless right. Such a
restriction on the vote would be severe and would appropriately trigger
strict scrutiny.
Congress's interest in preventing the legalization of marijuana presumably
would be the compelling government interest in this case. (Int.'s Memo.. at
10.) The United States chose not to brief the issue of the proper standard
of review or its application, however, believing First Amendment analysis
has necessary. (Id. 21 25.)
Assuming that prevention of marijuana's legalization is a compelling state
interest, blocking the release and certification of the results of votes
properly cast in a properly conducted ballot referendum would not appear to
be a narrowly tailored means to achieve that interest. As all sides admit,
Congress is empowered to disapprove Initiative 59, if it passes, during a
review period after the election or to defeat it by repeal. See
- 20 -
D.C. Code Ann. �� 1-206, 1-233 (1981). If Congress's interest here is to
assure that drug possession, use, and distribution are not legalized in the
District, that interest readily can be met without burdening First
Amendment rights.
The United States argues that the Barr Amendment is a "prospective repeal."
(Int.'s .Mem. at 15). The government contends that because Congress could
gave passed a local law criminalizing drug possession, 1t could instead
pass the Barr Amendment to prevent the conduct of a ballot initiative on
that same topic. (Id.) Presumably, under that reasoning, Congress could
enact a law that precluded the release and certification of the results of
lawfully cast votes on matters properly placed on a D.C. ballot.
Just because one end can be accomplished constitutionally does not suggest
that any means possible to accomplish the desired end is constitutional. In
Clinton v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998), Congress argued that the
line item veto must be constitutional because the President could
accomplish the same ends without the benefit of the line item veto, See id.
at 2105 (quoting the governments argument that "the substance of the
authority to cancel tax and spending items 'is, in practical effect, no
more and no less than the power to "decline to spend" specified sums of
money, or to "decline to implement" specified tax measures'"). That law,
however, was held to be
- 21 -
unconstitutional because it was deemed an unconstitutional means of vetoing
legislation. See id. at 2108. Similarly, in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983), the fact that Congress, by bicameral enactment signed by the
President, could amend or repeal a statute in order to alter the way the
Executive Branch enforced it, did not justify a one-house veto of executive
act. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 954, 956-59 (finding that although the
constitutional structure for passing laws is cumbersome and difficult,
Congress is bound by it).
In this case, simply because Congress could prevent Initiative 59 from
becoming law another way does not mean that it could do so in any manner.
Passing a local law to apply in the District that outlaws marijuana
possession, use, and distribution is perfectly permissible. See D. C. Code
Ann. � 1-206. An enactment that precluded the Board from releasing and
certifying the results of a proper election, achieves the same result but
infringes on D.C. citizens' First Amendment rights. That would be not
permissible, Indeed, Congress's ability to achieve its purpose another way
would tend to show that the law should not be not narrowly tailored enough
to meet the asserted compelling state interest.
Under our Constitutional structure, the way government accomplishes it
purposes matters. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 958--59. In legislating for the
District, Congress is as bound by the
-22 -
Constitution as it is when it legislates for the country as a whole. In
this case, the principle of prospective repeal to justify not releasing and
certifying the results of the Initiative 59 referendum woo d not comport
with the First Amendment rights and the narrow tailoring requirement
imposed by the Bill of Rights and the Supreme Court. 5/
In summary, if the Barr Amendment precluded counting, releasing, and
certifying the results of votes properly cast in a proper referendum it
would burden core political speech. and would not be sufficiently narrowly
tailored to meet the government's interest in criminalizing drug possession
or use. It would not survive strict scrutiny. 6/
_______________________________
5/ The United States argues that the First Amendment does not prevent
restrictions against plainly improper or unconstitutional initiatives being
placed on referendum ballots. (Int. 's Memo at 18-20.) Initiative 59 is
neither. The government cites no D.C. Code provision that precludes ballot
initiatives on reducing local penalties for possession of marijuana. It
does not argue that the Board was wrong in approving the proposed
initiative as a proper subject or in certifying Initiative 59 to the
ballot. (Miller Decl. at 4.) In addition, whatever else Initiative 59
purports to do, it proposes making local penalties for drug possession
narrower that the comparable federal ones. Nothing in the Constitution
precludes such an action.
6/ The amended complaint alleges that the Barr Amendment denied plaintiffs
due process of law and the equal protection of the laws in violation of the
Filth Amendment to the Constitution. The Board moved for summary judgment
on the equal protection claim, agreeing with the plaintiffs' amended
complaint. Neither the plaintiffs nor the United States address the Fifth
Amendment claims in their motions for summary judgment. Because the Court
has interpreted the Barr Amendment as not prohibiting the Board from
counting, releasing and certifying the results of the votes on Initiative
59, the Fifth Amendment claims need not be reached.
Conclusion
The Barr Amendment precluded use of funds appropriated for the District of
Columbia in 1998 to conduct election day activities related to Initiative
59. It did not preclude counting, announcing and certifying the results of
the vote on Initiative 59 thereafter. If it had precluded handling the
results, it would have violated plaintiffs' First Amendment rights.
However, the court does not decide the constitutional issues since this
interpretation of the statute avoids the need to reach them.
There are too genuine issues of material fact concerning plaintiffs' motion
for summary judgment [11] on count two of the original complaint, insofar
as it argues that the Barr Amendment does not prevent the Board from
computing and certifying the results o the referendum on Initiative 59.
That portion of plaintiffs' action. will be GRANTED. The remainder of
plaintiffs' motion will be DENIED. The defendant's motion [2] for an order
authorizing it to announce and certify the results of the vote on
Initiative 59 in accordance with D.C. Code � 1-285 (1981) will be GRANTED.
The Defendant's motions for a declaratory judgment that the Barr Amendment
violates the first amendment [2] and for summary judgment [13] will be
DENIED. The United States' motion for summary judgment [12] will be DENIED.
An appropriate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.
-24-
ENTERED this 17th day of September, 1999/
(signed) Richard W. Roberts United States District Judge
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
WAYNE TURNER, et al., Civil Action No. 98-2634 (RWR)
Plaintiffs, FILED v. Sept 17
1999 NANCY MAYER WHITTINGTON, CLERK D.C. BOARD OF ELECTIONS AND
ETHICS, U.S. DISTRICT COURT Defendant
and
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Intervenor.
ORDER
For the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion issued
today in this case, it is hereby
ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment [11] on count two of
the original complaint, insofar as it argues that the Barr Amendment does
not prevent the Board from computing and certifying the results of the
referendum on Initiative 59, be and hereby is GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that the remainder of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment [11]
be and hereby is DENIED. It is further
ORDERED that defendant's motion [2], for an order authorizing at it to
announce and certify the results of the vote on Initiative 59 in accordance
with D.C. Code � 1-285 (1981) be and hereby is
GRANTED. Defendant District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics is
hereby authorized to tabulate, announce and verify the results of the
November 3, 1998 election on Initiative 59. It is further
ORDERED that the defendant's motions for a declaratory judgment that the
Barr Amendment violates the First Amendment [2] and for summary Judgment
[3] be and hereby are DENIED. It is further
ORDERED that the United States' motion for summary judgment [12] be and
hereby is DENIED.
ENTERED this 17th day of September, 1999.
. _
(signed)
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
United States District Judge
qf
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