-Caveat Lector-
Most of the members of THIS particular IETF discussion list seem to believe
that the IETF's "job" is to make communication as SECURE as possible.
This is nearly the exact OPPOSITE of making email wire-tapping (& VoIP
tapping) easy for Feds or ANYBODY.
One exception seems to be the fella from NORTEL, which is a B-I-G Defense
contractor. (no big surprise about HIS position...)
Everyone else that I've read seems to favor STRONG ENCRYPTION and NO bowing
down to "law enforcement" desires to be able to easily browse through
individual's communications.
Dave Hartley
http://www.Asheville-Computer.com
http://www.ioa.com/~davehart
-----Original Message-----
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Wednesday, October 20, 1999 2:34 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: raven digest, Vol 1 #23 - 14 msgs
Send raven mailing list submissions to
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To subscribe or unsubscribe via the web, visit
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When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than
"Re: Contents of raven digest..."
Today's Topics:
1. RE: Some Considerations (Dave)
2. Re: Some Considerations (Robert Joseph Honan)
3. re: Some Considerations (Paul Ferguson)
4. Another perspective (Carter Bullard)
5. Re: Another perspective (Paul Ferguson)
6. The wiretapping question (gustav)
7. Re: Another perspective (C. Wegrzyn)
8. re: Some Considerations (gustav)
9. re: Some Considerations (Christian Huitema)
10. Directory Service (Turner W. Rentz, III)
11. RE: Another perspective (Carter Bullard)
12. Re: Another Perspective (Richard Payne)
13. RE: Another perspective (Ed Stone)
14. FW: Special Stanford Panel On Government Computer Surveillance (Chris
Savage)
--__--__--
Message: 1
From: "Dave" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 1999 03:46:18 -0400
charset="iso-8859-1"
Subject: [Raven] RE: Some Considerations
Hi All,
Just wanted to comment on what appears to me to be an entirely naive
viewpoint of some commentators with regard to Big Government's insatiable
desire to infringe upon privacy by any means necessary.
My comments will be mostly centered around the U.S., since this is where I
have the greatest degree of understanding.
First of all, it can be indisputably shown that in the U.S. (likely
everywhere else) the largest illicit drug importation is done BY "secret"
elements of the government itself. (not even SO "secret"... our Congress has
had exhaustive "hearings" on the subject)
The "war on DRUGS" is a War on the PEOPLE, an excuse to invade homes with
little or NO "probable cause," and excuse to SEIZE ASSETS of any citizen
merely by accusing them of being involved with drugs, and this "war on
drugs" is being pushed HARD in EVERY direction toward fascist
uber-government.
The GOVERNMENT is CREATING the "menace" and MANIPULATING the media into
HERDING the populace into a state of SUBMISSION- the supposedly "free" U.S.
is rapidly becoming a fascist state, as people are manipulated into giving
up human rights and rights supposedly safeguarded by the U.S. Constitution.
The right to privacy - to "be secure in our homes, our papers & effects" is
guaranteed in writing in the U.S. Constitution.
Illegal search and seizure is now a daily fact of life in the U.S.
The government is an organized criminal enterprise, according to the U.S.
Constitution, and according to some International standards of human rights.
They will quite predictably be jockeying for ever increasing power and
fascist control over the populace. A requirement for a "national I.D. card"
was just beaten back by the angry populace.
Recently, we won another small victory in forbidding our government from
requiring our banks to inform the government of any "suspicious" transaction
which "did not conform to our normal banking habits"...
In a year or two these bastards will be tapping our freakin' sewer lines and
analyzing our SHIT to try and get "evidence."
The other B-I-G rallying cry is "pedophiles"
In the U.S., there are a number of government officials who've been caught
in various sex-crimes (some of which may NOT have been "criminal" in a more
enlightened society) and there is a great body of evidence that much
pornography (incl. the dreaded "pedophiles") is a source of INCOME to the
organized crime portion of the GOVERNMENT.
PROHIBITIONS are the government's way of taking over valuable marketplaces,
and of creating other valuable marketplaces such as the PRISON/INDUSTRIAL
complex.
The "free" U.S. has IMPRISONED a greater percentage of it's population than
A-N-Y other country in the world.
It is high time for all persons worldwide to attempt to CURB
big-government's Orwellian Big-Brother fascism.
Either that, or get used to having every aspect of your life under
surveillance.
Dave Hartley
http://www.Asheville-Computer.com
http://www.ioa.com/~davehart
anarchy black flag STOA MI5 FBI , etc.
-----Original Message-----
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Tuesday, October 19, 1999 10:51 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: raven digest, Vol 1 #21 - 11 msgs
Send raven mailing list submissions to
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
To subscribe or unsubscribe via the web, visit
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or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
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You can reach the person managing the list at
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than
"Re: Contents of raven digest..."
Today's Topics:
1. re: Some Considerations (William H. Geiger III)
2. re: Some Considerations (Dennis Glatting)
3. Anarchy, key escrow and the masses - mix well, add salt (Turner W.
Rentz, III)
4. Re: Some Considerations ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
5. re: Some Considerations (Richard Payne)
6. re: Some Considerations (Harald Tveit Alvestrand)
7. Re: Some Considerations (Mark Atwood)
8. re: Some Considerations (chefren)
9. Open the flood gate (Dustin Goodwin)
10. re: Some Considerations (chefren)
11. re: The IETF's position on technology to support legal intercept of
data (Computer User)
--__--_
--__--__--
Message: 2
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 1999 01:00:12 -0700
From: Robert Joseph Honan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: raven mailing list <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [Raven] Some Considerations
Thomas Junker wrote:
> The whole *point* of the American Declaration of
> Independence and the Constitution were that rights do not
> come from government but are inherent in and inseparable
> from *people*, and that the only legitimate powers of
> government are those the people choose to allow it and
> that do not encroach on the inalienable rights of others.
> There is a principle in this system that one *cannot* give
> up or waive a fundamental right, that any agreement to do
> so is invalid by definition. (I don't need to hear from
> the lawyers on fine points -- this is discourse, not a law
> course)
Bravo! And it should be pointed out that in the debate on whether or
not to adopt the Bill of Rights many of the delegates argued against
adopting it at all on the grounds that it was unnecessary. They
believed that the concepts were so universally held that there was no
need to enumerate them. Messr. Chefren would do well to read the
writings of John Locke. Jefferson and the rest of the founders were
heavily influenced by Locke's writings on the concept of natural
rights. To bring this back to the concept of a 'Right to Privacy' it
must be remembered that in giving its ruling in _Roe v. Wade_ the U. S.
Supreme Court relied almost exclusively on the natural right to privacy
that they saw as the foundation to the Constitutions protections
regarding speech, religion, assembly, unreasonable search, & ect.
--
Cheers,
Robert Joseph Honan [EMAIL PROTECTED]
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
No animals or electrons were harmed in the production of this missive.
Copyright 1999 Robert Joseph Honan
--__--__--
Message: 3
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 1999 07:10:01 -0400
To: "chefren" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
From: Paul Ferguson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: re: [Raven] Some Considerations
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
At 02:45 AM 10/20/1999 +0200, chefren wrote:
>I always try to define "strong" encryption as everything
>that can't be done by a human being without technical help.
This is a ridiculous definition.
The definition of "strong" crypto is, of course, subjective,
however, it is generally accepted that the most common definition
of "strong" is a strong cipher with a key length of sufficient
length to make computational cracking either (a) inconveniently
expensive, (b) take so may years as to be impractical, or (c) both.
If I'm not mistaken, a key length of 1024 bits is "good enough".
Speaking only for myself,
- - paul
- --
Jam Echelon Day, 21 October 1999
http://www.echelon.wiretapped.net/
_________________________________________________________________
FBI CIA NSA IRS ATF BATF DOD WACO RUBY RIDGE OKC OKLAHOMA CITY
MILITIA GUN HANDGUN MILGOV ASSAULT RIFLE TERRORISM BOMB DRUGS
HORIUCHI KORESH DAVIDIAN KAHL POSSE COMITATUS RANDY WEAVER VICKIE
WEAVER SPECIAL FORCES LINDA THOMPSON SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP
SOG SOF DELTA FORCE CONSTITUTION BILL OF RIGHTS WHITEWATER POM
PARK ON METER ARKANSIDE IRAN CONTRAS OLIVER NORTH VINCE FOSTER
PROMIS MOSSAD NASA MI5 ONI CID AK47 M16 C4 MALCOLM X REVOLUTION
CHEROKEE HILLARY BILL CLINTON GORE GEORGE BUSH WACKENHUT TERRORIST
TASK FORCE 160 SPECIAL OPS 12TH GROUP 5TH GROUP SF
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP Personal Privacy 6.5.1
iQA/AwUBOA2jCFO/Zlz/pwagEQJxeACgjYynclnkz/d4DdhOcx8y8SMooVwAn0Bx
d7HXn/QQntKIbxey1ayzE1d7
=7BhP
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
--__--__--
Message: 4
From: "Carter Bullard" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "'[EMAIL PROTECTED]'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 1999 07:08:06 -0700
Subject: [Raven] Another perspective
Gentle people,
I hope that the list finds this useful.
My perspective is that the issue of support for
CALEA exists only because there are privacy protections
in our various societies. I believe that we should
recognize that these protections exist and attempt to
ensure that these protections are supported in our technology.
In the U.S. it is illegal to intercept, or even attempt
to intercept in any way, any voice communication, without
the permission of the parties involved.
This is a very good thing. It is specifically designed
to ensure privacy, and you would expect a law such as this
in a free society where there is abusive behavior.
(who needs laws if their isn't abuse?) Without this law,
there would be no privacy protection in the U.S with regard
to wire voice communication.
It would seem logical that if we, in the U.S., hold privacy
to be an extremely important thing, then we would be trying
in the U.S. to ensure that the laws that guaranty privacy in our
voice communications, can be enforced.
Carter
--__--__--
Message: 5
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 1999 10:47:06 -0400
To: "Carter Bullard" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
From: Paul Ferguson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [Raven] Another perspective
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
aynetworks.com>
At 07:08 AM 10/20/1999 -0700, Carter Bullard wrote:
> In the U.S. it is illegal to intercept, or even attempt
>to intercept in any way, any voice communication, without
>the permission of the parties involved.
Well, yes -- a lot of things are illegal, but that doesn't
mean that people in places of power (or even those in the
public at-large) will not abuse the system. Situations like
these [below] should not be quickly forgotton:
http://cnn.com/US/9910/13/lapd.suit.01/
The point here is that the IETF (nor any other "standards"
organizations, in my opinion) should make it any easier for
law enforcement to wiretap by modifying existing or
yet-to-be-defined protocols.
Speaking only for myself,
- paul
--
Jam Echelon Day, 21 October 1999
http://www.echelon.wiretapped.net/
_________________________________________________________________
FBI CIA NSA IRS ATF BATF DOD WACO RUBY RIDGE OKC OKLAHOMA CITY
MILITIA GUN HANDGUN MILGOV ASSAULT RIFLE TERRORISM BOMB DRUGS
HORIUCHI KORESH DAVIDIAN KAHL POSSE COMITATUS RANDY WEAVER VICKIE
WEAVER SPECIAL FORCES LINDA THOMPSON SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP
SOG SOF DELTA FORCE CONSTITUTION BILL OF RIGHTS WHITEWATER POM
PARK ON METER ARKANSIDE IRAN CONTRAS OLIVER NORTH VINCE FOSTER
PROMIS MOSSAD NASA MI5 ONI CID AK47 M16 C4 MALCOLM X REVOLUTION
CHEROKEE HILLARY BILL CLINTON GORE GEORGE BUSH WACKENHUT TERRORIST
TASK FORCE 160 SPECIAL OPS 12TH GROUP 5TH GROUP SF
--__--__--
Message: 6
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 1999 08:01:01 -0700 (PDT)
From: gustav <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [Raven] The wiretapping question
I believe that the IETF's standard should be compliant with RFC1984,
and not include wiretapping provisions.
It's not the IETF's job to make wiretapping easy. A place where
police work is easy is called a "police state". Encryption is not
anti-social. The war on privacy is anti-social.
The real purpose of back doors in protocols is not for law enforcement
wiretapping, but for national security wiretapping, like Echelon,
which is probably illegal. The IETF doesn't want to support illegal
activities, does it?
--__--__--
Message: 7
From: "C. Wegrzyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Carter Bullard" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [Raven] Another perspective
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 1999 11:02:16 -0400
charset="iso-8859-1"
Seems sort of idealistic to me. In fact the U.S. government has been the
biggest abuser of communication interception without court order. The FBI,
the CIA, the Justice Department, etc. So I take a more skeptical view - if
you build it, they will come! Irregardless of what supposed safeguards we
have in place. Government isn't made up of Angels, to paraphrase T.
Jefferson.
Chuck Wegrzyn
----- Original Message -----
From: Carter Bullard <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Wednesday, October 20, 1999 10:08 AM
Subject: [Raven] Another perspective
>
> Gentle people,
> I hope that the list finds this useful.
>
> My perspective is that the issue of support for
> CALEA exists only because there are privacy protections
> in our various societies. I believe that we should
> recognize that these protections exist and attempt to
> ensure that these protections are supported in our technology.
>
> In the U.S. it is illegal to intercept, or even attempt
> to intercept in any way, any voice communication, without
> the permission of the parties involved.
>
> This is a very good thing. It is specifically designed
> to ensure privacy, and you would expect a law such as this
> in a free society where there is abusive behavior.
> (who needs laws if their isn't abuse?) Without this law,
> there would be no privacy protection in the U.S with regard
> to wire voice communication.
>
> It would seem logical that if we, in the U.S., hold privacy
> to be an extremely important thing, then we would be trying
> in the U.S. to ensure that the laws that guaranty privacy in our
> voice communications, can be enforced.
>
>
> Carter
>
> _______________________________________________
> raven mailing list
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven
--__--__--
Message: 8
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 1999 08:26:29 -0700 (PDT)
From: gustav <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: re: [Raven] Some Considerations
> A short quiz (primarily for chefren, but others can play) to aid in the
> ongoing task of clarifying everybody's assumptions:
>
> 1. Do you believe that strong crypto should be under government control?
No. To put it under government control would mean that some people
who want to use it would have to be coerced not to use it. Because
using strong crypto doesn't violate anyone else's rights (ie, there is
no victim of crypto use), there is no basis for coercing someone not
to use it.
> 2. Do you believe that all governments are democracies? For bonus points,
is
> the majority always right?
Not all governments are democracies. Democracy basically means rule
of the people, and is taken to mean rule by periodic voting of all the
people. Not very many countries are democracies.
> 3. Do you believe that all government agencies are always subject to
> effective regulation?
No. For instance, in the US, the budgets of the national security
agencies, which have broad extra-legal powers, are in the billions of
dollars, are classified information, not even known to most
congressmen. There can be no effective regulation of agencies if
their budgets and activities are secret.
--__--__--
Message: 9
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 1999 11:24:17 -0400
To: "chefren" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED], "Richard Payne"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
"William H. Geiger III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
From: Christian Huitema <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: re: [Raven] Some Considerations
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
At 02:45 AM 10/20/99 +0200, chefren wrote:
>On 19 Oct 99, at 13:04, William H. Geiger III wrote:
>> How about banning curtains, god only know what people
>might
>> be doing in the privacy of their own homes!!
>
> [Joke/serious: Long time ago calvinists in the
> Netherlands asked people not to close their curtains of
> their rooms so everybody could see the people inside
> werent drunk or playing games.]
.. which is why these houses ended up having a very orderly "fake" living
room, with very clean furniture, a curtainless window to the street, and a
closed door to the backroom, where you could do pretty much what you
wanted. And the analogy to the Internet applies. Unless you are ready to
live in a full police state, in which the police can search any house at
any time, or ask children to rat about the private matters of their
parents, there is always a way to hide. Which means that, in our age of
computers, efforts to guarantee wiretapping are essentially futile.
It seems that the initial debate has diverged quite a bit. We were merely
asking whether a desire to minimally comply with the law resulted in a need
to alter protocols, for example altering Internet Telephony call set up so
that it could on demand set up a branch to the wiretap office. The rough
consensus answer, so far, is no -- whoever wants to perform wiretap should
use existing tools such as RMON.
-- Christian Huitema
--__--__--
Message: 10
Reply-To: "Turner W. Rentz, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
From: "Turner W. Rentz, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 1999 12:29:04 -0700
Organization: Advanced Technology and Research, Inc.
charset="iso-8859-1"
Subject: [Raven] Directory Service
Directory Services are like
online banking. They are convenient
and help make PKI easier to use.
But they are +drastically+ underutilized on
the net right now, and victim of competing
standards (ldap versus x500 , etc.)
We could recommend the formation of
an authoritative, and usable,
key escrow for general internet users
that can be done by govt subsidy.
The threat of competing standards
or enemy country activity can be
shored up in a national identity.
It's a digital passport.
And if you don't use it, that's fine!
Right now, the net has no nation states.
--__--__--
Message: 11
From: "Carter Bullard" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "'Paul Ferguson'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: RE: [Raven] Another perspective
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 1999 10:05:19 -0700
Hey Paul,
> The point here is that the IETF (nor any other "standards"
> organizations, in my opinion) should make it any easier for
> law enforcement to wiretap by modifying existing or
> yet-to-be-defined protocols
You seem to have missed the point. By actively supporting
privacy laws you are actively helping in the cause of ensuring
privacy. If the IETF, as an organization, thinks that privacy is
important, then it should actively seek out opportunities to
support the enforcement of existing privacy law. This is how
the world basically works. Failure to do so will, by definition,
undermine global voice privacy.
But beyond that, if the IETF's answer to your above question is
"No" for whatever reason, WHOA, talk about an Internet stock down
turn. "IETF refuses to support global voice privacy enforcement
laws. News at 11."
What type of message would the IETF be sending to the planet
if it basically stated that the collective global communications
law is flawed and the IETF after careful consideration refuses
to recognize and support it? Who do you think will eventually
win? The easy answer is IETF --- NOT.
Communications standards organizations can deal with these
issues with out any problem at all. The ability for the IETF
to come to a responsible position on this topic may help in
understanding whether the IETF will be a communications standards
organization or not.
Carter
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Paul Ferguson [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Sent: Wednesday, October 20, 1999 10:47 AM
> To: Bullard, Carter [NYPAR:DS46-I:EXCH]
> Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: Re: [Raven] Another perspective
>
>
> At 07:08 AM 10/20/1999 -0700, Carter Bullard wrote:
>
> > In the U.S. it is illegal to intercept, or even attempt
> >to intercept in any way, any voice communication, without
> >the permission of the parties involved.
>
> Well, yes -- a lot of things are illegal, but that doesn't
> mean that people in places of power (or even those in the
> public at-large) will not abuse the system. Situations like
> these [below] should not be quickly forgotton:
>
> http://cnn.com/US/9910/13/lapd.suit.01/
>
> The point here is that the IETF (nor any other "standards"
> organizations, in my opinion) should make it any easier for
> law enforcement to wiretap by modifying existing or
> yet-to-be-defined protocols.
>
> Speaking only for myself,
>
> - paul
>
>
> --
> Jam Echelon Day, 21 October 1999
> http://www.echelon.wiretapped.net/
> _________________________________________________________________
> FBI CIA NSA IRS ATF BATF DOD WACO RUBY RIDGE OKC OKLAHOMA CITY
> MILITIA GUN HANDGUN MILGOV ASSAULT RIFLE TERRORISM BOMB DRUGS
> HORIUCHI KORESH DAVIDIAN KAHL POSSE COMITATUS RANDY WEAVER VICKIE
> WEAVER SPECIAL FORCES LINDA THOMPSON SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP
> SOG SOF DELTA FORCE CONSTITUTION BILL OF RIGHTS WHITEWATER POM
> PARK ON METER ARKANSIDE IRAN CONTRAS OLIVER NORTH VINCE FOSTER
> PROMIS MOSSAD NASA MI5 ONI CID AK47 M16 C4 MALCOLM X REVOLUTION
> CHEROKEE HILLARY BILL CLINTON GORE GEORGE BUSH WACKENHUT TERRORIST
> TASK FORCE 160 SPECIAL OPS 12TH GROUP 5TH GROUP SF
>
>
--__--__--
Message: 12
From: "Richard Payne" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [Raven] Another Perspective
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 1999 13:36:05 -0400
charset="iso-8859-1"
Carter Bullard wrote:
> But beyond that, if the IETF's answer to your above question is
> "No" for whatever reason, WHOA, talk about an Internet stock down
> turn. "IETF refuses to support global voice privacy enforcement
> laws. News at 11."
> What type of message would the IETF be sending to the planet
> if it basically stated that the collective global communications
> law is flawed and the IETF after careful consideration refuses
> to recognize and support it? Who do you think will eventually
> win? The easy answer is IETF --- NOT.
I'm confused. Is the collective global communications law CALEA? Or
something else? Is there in fact such a thing?
And if supporting strong encryption isn't supporting "privacy enforcement"
in the only real sense, what is? Or is this a tacit redefinition: Privacy =
Surveillance, Orwell-style?
OK, make that "I'm _very_ confused." Please clarify.
Richard Payne
--__--__--
Message: 13
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 1999 13:49:33 -0400
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: Ed Stone <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: RE: [Raven] Another perspective
aynetworks.com>
At 01:05 PM 10/20/1999 , you wrote:
>Hey Paul,
>
> > The point here is that the IETF (nor any other "standards"
> > organizations, in my opinion) should make it any easier for
> > law enforcement to wiretap by modifying existing or
> > yet-to-be-defined protocols
>
>You seem to have missed the point. By actively supporting
>privacy laws you are actively helping in the cause of ensuring
>privacy.
Here, you tacitly equate establishing a wiretap-friendly IP with "privacy
laws" and "ensuring privacy". You bear the burden of explaining how
"wiretap-friendly" equals "privacy-friendly". Next, you bear the burden of
explaining how laws with "Privacy" in the title always actively help
actually ensure privacy, and not tyranny, for example.
> If the IETF, as an organization, thinks that privacy is
>important, then it should actively seek out opportunities to
>support the enforcement of existing privacy law.
Any and all law with "Privacy" in its title? "Privacy" laws in China,
Sudan, Myanmar, and the UK?
> This is how
>the world basically works. Failure to do so will, by definition,
>undermine global voice privacy.
IP has to be wiretap-friendly in order to be privacy-friendly? We have to
destroy the village to save it?
You seem to be saying that we need to have weak locks so law enforcement
can easily enter to check for theft and possession of stolen goods.
Do we want to facilitate the checking for "theft of privacy" MORE than we
want to protect privacy?
>But beyond that, if the IETF's answer to your above question is
>"No" for whatever reason, WHOA, talk about an Internet stock down
>turn. "IETF refuses to support global voice privacy enforcement
>laws. News at 11."
Or, alternatively: "IETF refuses to grant China access to wiretapping
nuclear and missile secrets". Makes as much sense as your headline...
>What type of message would the IETF be sending to the planet
>if it basically stated that the collective global communications
>law is flawed
If it stated that? I am not aware that IETF has or intends to make a review
of or a statement about "global communications law". It is a technical
group, essentially.
Further, would they comment on communications law that requires the death
penalty for possession of a modem? On Maryland's informed consent
requirement for telephone recording?
If you know of a "global law" that requires some action on the part of IETF
with regard to modifying the IP for ease of wiretapping, please post it.
> and the IETF after careful consideration refuses
>to recognize and support it?
It? "It" is not that simple...
> Who do you think will eventually
>win? The easy answer is IETF --- NOT.
You mean that IETF will no longer be allowed its current role in the
standards setting process, by decree of the United Nations or some
international commission? Explain...
>Communications standards organizations can deal with these
>issues with out any problem at all. The ability for the IETF
>to come to a responsible position on this topic may help in
>understanding whether the IETF will be a communications standards
>organization or not.
Do you see any reasonable alternative to the IETF assisting in making the
IP wiretap-friendly by altering the IP, or must it simply rubber stamp the
demand in order to remain in its current role?
>Carter
>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Paul Ferguson [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> > Sent: Wednesday, October 20, 1999 10:47 AM
> > To: Bullard, Carter [NYPAR:DS46-I:EXCH]
> > Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > Subject: Re: [Raven] Another perspective
> >
> >
> > At 07:08 AM 10/20/1999 -0700, Carter Bullard wrote:
> >
> > > In the U.S. it is illegal to intercept, or even attempt
> > >to intercept in any way, any voice communication, without
> > >the permission of the parties involved.
> >
> > Well, yes -- a lot of things are illegal, but that doesn't
> > mean that people in places of power (or even those in the
> > public at-large) will not abuse the system. Situations like
> > these [below] should not be quickly forgotton:
> >
> > http://cnn.com/US/9910/13/lapd.suit.01/
> >
> > The point here is that the IETF (nor any other "standards"
> > organizations, in my opinion) should make it any easier for
> > law enforcement to wiretap by modifying existing or
> > yet-to-be-defined protocols.
> >
> > Speaking only for myself,
> >
> > - paul
> >
> >
> > --
> > Jam Echelon Day, 21 October 1999
> > http://www.echelon.wiretapped.net/
> > _________________________________________________________________
> > FBI CIA NSA IRS ATF BATF DOD WACO RUBY RIDGE OKC OKLAHOMA CITY
> > MILITIA GUN HANDGUN MILGOV ASSAULT RIFLE TERRORISM BOMB DRUGS
> > HORIUCHI KORESH DAVIDIAN KAHL POSSE COMITATUS RANDY WEAVER VICKIE
> > WEAVER SPECIAL FORCES LINDA THOMPSON SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP
> > SOG SOF DELTA FORCE CONSTITUTION BILL OF RIGHTS WHITEWATER POM
> > PARK ON METER ARKANSIDE IRAN CONTRAS OLIVER NORTH VINCE FOSTER
> > PROMIS MOSSAD NASA MI5 ONI CID AK47 M16 C4 MALCOLM X REVOLUTION
> > CHEROKEE HILLARY BILL CLINTON GORE GEORGE BUSH WACKENHUT TERRORIST
> > TASK FORCE 160 SPECIAL OPS 12TH GROUP 5TH GROUP SF
> >
> >
>
>_______________________________________________
>raven mailing list
>[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven
--
--------------------------
Ed Stone
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
--------------------------
--__--__--
Message: 14
From: Chris Savage <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "IETF Wiretapping List (E-mail)" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 1999 14:35:20 -0400
charset="iso-8859-1"
Subject: [Raven] FW: Special Stanford Panel On Government Computer
Surveillance
Perhaps of interest to those of this group in/near New York. Forwarded from
CYBERIA:
Please mark your calendar and join us for this special event. You'll hear a
spirited debate about the government's computer surveillance activities and
FIDNet in particular. Thanks! -- Chris Morgan, ACM
Anne Wilson, ACM
212-626-0505
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Christopher Morgan, ACM
617-262-2044
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Stanford University Panel To Discuss The Government's Role in Computer
Surveillance and the Federal Intrusion Detection Network (FIDNet) on
November 9th
John Markoff of The New York Times To Moderate; Co-Hosted by the
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), Stanford Law School's Program in
Law, Science and Technology, and the Stanford University Computer Science
Department
New York, Oct. 19, 1999 -- A special panel will discuss the implications of
a possible Federal Intrusion Detection Network (FIDNet) and the general
issue of the government's role in computer surveillance on Tuesday,
November 9th from 5:45 8 PM PST at Stanford University's Kresge
Auditorium. The panel, co-sponsored by the Association for Computing
Machinery (ACM), Stanford Law School's Program in Law, Science and
Technology, and the Stanford University Computer Science Department, will
be free and open to the public.
The Moderator will be New York Times Technology Reporter John Markoff.
Panelists will include Scott Charney, Chief of the Computer Crime Unit in
the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice; Marc Rotenberg,
Director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and frequent
testifier before Congress; and Whitfield Diffie, Distinguished Engineer
with Sun, and prominent cryptographer. John Markoff has written extensively
in the New York Times about the government's role in computer surveillance.
Some Background:
On August 7, 1999, President Clinton issued an Executive Order establishing
a Working Group on Unlawful Conduct on the Internet. The Group would
prepare recommendations about the need for "new technology tools,
capabilities or legal authorities" to successfully prosecute violations of
the law, including the illegal sale of guns, explosives, controlled
substances and prescription drugs, as well as fraud and child pornography.
The Implications
FIDNet (Federal Intrusion Detection Network) has a number of major privacy
implications. The plan could allow the government to monitor data flowing
over a range of computer networks. The proposed system could allow access
to e-mail and other documents, as well as computer programs. When The New
York Times reporter John Markoff covered the FIDNet story in July, it
wasn't clear how the information would be collected or maintained, and
under what conditions it would be available to law enforcement
officials. The plan was described as "fluid and vague."
This event demonstrates the commitment of the ACM (www.acm.org) to examine
all sides of the critical issues of the day affecting the world of
computing. The ACM is the oldest international professional computing
society. Its 80,000 members represent a critical mass of computer
scientists in education, industry, and government.
Contact Anne Wilson ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) or Chris Morgan ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
for more information.
--__--__--
_______________________________________________
raven mailing list
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven
End of raven Digest
-----Original Message-----
From: Conspiracy Theory Research List [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On
Behalf Of Alamaine Ratliff
Sent: Friday, October 22, 1999 1:55 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [CTRL] Net Bugs
-Caveat Lector-
Didn't John Edgar pass on a while back?
> Now the FBI is telling the Internet Engineering Task Force that they
should
> build in surveillance.
>From IntellectualCapital.CoM
{{<Begin>}}
Will the Government Know What You Type?
by Declan McCullagh
Thursday, October 21, 1999
Comments: 15 posts
If you were already worried about your privacy, prepare to get really
spooked.
In the future the Feds may find it easier than ever before to eavesdrop on
your
e-mail, Web browsing and Internet phone calls.
The group of technical experts who run the Net is weighing whether it should
change technical standards to allow police and other meddlesome government
snoops the right to conveniently wiretap our online actions.
There are so many things wrong with this intrusive idea, which the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) will debate at its November meeting in
Washington
D.C., that it is difficult to know where to start criticizing it.
The Feds may find it easier to eavesdrop on your email
But the biggest problem may be that some members of IETF -- generally a
libertarian-leaning crowd -- are seriously considering adopting this scheme.
The thinking among some veteran participants is that U.S. law may require
Internet snoopability in the future, so it is best to hold their noses, do
the
dirty deed, and get it over with now.
"The basic problem is that the government will probably demand of IP
telephony
the rules that govern wiretaps," says University of Pennsylvania electrical
engineering professor Dave Farber, a board member of the Electronic Frontier
Foundation and the Internet Society. "...I wish we didn't have the law. But
given that the law is there, it's wiser to make sure it just applies to the
stuff that's IP telephony and not all of our data traffic."
Farber might have a point if Congress had approved such a law, the president
had signed it, and the courts had declared it to be constitutional.
But since that has not happened, it makes little sense for the IETF to race
to
support surveillance. "There is no reason for the IETF to build surveillance
capabilities into the architecture of the Net," says Barry Steinhardt,
associate director of the American Civil Liberties Union. (Adding snooping
abilities also introduces security holes, something that IETF has vehemently
opposed in the past.)
Then are also good historical reasons for the IETF to be leery of law
enforcement and wiretaps.
A shabby history
In the past, government agencies have subjected hundreds of thousands of
law-
abiding Americans to unreasonable surveillance, illegal wiretaps and
warrantless searches. Eleanor Roosevelt, Martin Luther King Jr. are just two
prominent examples. Feminists, gay rights leaders and Catholic priests have
also been spied on. The FBI used secret files and hidden microphones to
discredit political opponents, sway the Supreme Court and influence
presidential elections.
Malfeasants at the Los Angeles Police Department are doing the same thing
today. Last month the LA county public defender's office filed court papers
detailing police and prosecutors' abuses of power and apparent perjury.
"All of the cases which the Los Angeles District Attorney denied, under
oath,
in November of 1998 were related to a wiretap, were in fact the result of
the
[government's] wiretap operations," the documents say. One single illegal
wiretap produced over 65,000 pages of printed logs -- so many that a
forklift
was required to move them.
Under U.S. law, courts are supposed to review wiretap requests to verify
that
they are reasonable. But judges are often complicit. One judge authorized
the
San Bernadino District Attorney to wiretap public pay phones for four
months.
The cops intercepted 131,202 conversations that the district attorney's
office
kept for a decade -- but never made any arrests.
As a society, we have a choice: We can trust police never to become
overzealous, trust prosecutors never to become too ambitious, and trust
judges
never to become too uncritical. Or we can just simply ditch wiretapping for
good.
A misguided practice
It may seem a radical idea, especially to lazy cops who have come to depend
on
that firehose flow of information. (Of course they could still bug rooms and
use informants.)
Yet some law enforcement officials have in the past suggested exactly that.
Attorney General Ramsey Clark prohibited federal police from using wiretaps
and
told Congress in 1967, "We make cases effectively without wiretapping or
electronic surveillance." Detroit's police commissioner felt the same way,
calling wiretapping "an outrageous tactic" that "is not necessary."
In a famous dissent in a 1928 Supreme Court case, Justice Louis Brandeis
chose
even more dramatic words. "The evil incident to invasion of the privacy of
the
telephone is far greater than that involved in tampering with the mails...
As a
means of espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny
instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wiretapping."
Some modern civil libertarians like the ACLU take Brandeis' point one step
further, arguing that wiretapping by its very nature violates the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition on "unreasonable searches." They point out that
private
conversations with a spouse, doctor, or priest are often intercepted.
If the total cost is taken into account, wiretaps do not seem to be that
efficient an investigative tool. According to government statistics, in 1998
police intercepted 2,313,210 conversations but the taps -- 71% were for
drug-
related crimes -- resulted in only 911convictions.
An equally alarming -- through less obvious -- effect of allowing police to
wiretap is that they become reliant on the tactic and start to demand even
more.
Ever-increasing demands
Consider the Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), which
the FBI pressured Congress into approving in 1994. The so-called digital
telephony law requires taxpayers to pay for phone companies to rewire their
networks for police eavesdropping.
The Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association estimates that
complying
with CALEA will cost over $4 billion. According to the Personal
Communications
Industry Association, local telephone companies will have to spend $1.73
billion -- and this money will come from higher taxes on Americans.
Worse yet, the Federal Communications Commission has indicated that CALEA,
which applies to "telecommunications carriers," will spread to cover some
forms
of Internet telephony too.
What's most disturbing, though, is that CALEA has set an alarming precedent:
The government has the right to alter new technologies for easy
surveillance.
The White House in 1991 planned to do just that. A "top secret" memo
obtained
by the Electronic Privacy Information Center through a Freedom of
Information
Act request said that President Bush had approved a plan to use CALEA's
legislative momentum to ban encryption products that did not have backdoors
for
the Feds. "We will have a beachhead we can exploit for the encryption fix,"
a
top Bush aide wrote.
Now the FBI is telling the Internet Engineering Task Force that they should
build in surveillance.
"If a standards-setting body is going to fully carry out its mission in
addressing the needs of all groups, you've got to recognize government's
legitimate need to protect public safety and, under specific circumstances,
conduct surveillance," Barry Smith, supervisory special agent in the FBI's
digital telephony and encryption policy unit, said.
Perhaps. But an even better way to protect the public's safety from the
government might just be to eliminate wiretapping altogether, and let the
IETF
engineers go back to the much more valuable business of keeping the Internet
humming.
Declan McCullagh is a regular contributor to IntellectualCapital.com,
moderator
of the politech mailing list and the Washington bureau chief of Wired News.
{{<End>}}
A<>E<>R
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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CTRL is a discussion and informational exchange list. Proselyzting propagandic
screeds are not allowed. Substance—not soapboxing! These are sordid matters
and 'conspiracy theory', with its many half-truths, misdirections and outright
frauds is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects
spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. That being said, CTRL
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be wary of what you read. CTRL gives no credeence to Holocaust denial and
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Let us please be civil and as always, Caveat Lector.
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