-Caveat Lector- Dave Hartley http://www.Asheville-Computer.com http://www.ioa.com/~davehart LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT: CONCEPTS, PRINCIPLES, AND POLICY GUIDELINES Dr. Sam C. Sarkesian SINCE 1945, the coming together of major developments in nuclear weaponry, modern revolutionary doctrine, and Third World developments have reshaped the international arena. Combined with the American experience in Vietnam, they have had a significant impact on American national will, political resolve, and perceptions of international security. One result is that American military involvement in any foreign area outside Europe is likely to create suspicion and provoke domestic political restiveness, which can easily lead to serious internal political opposition to American policy. This situation has made it difficult for the United States to prepare for and deal with small, nonnuclear wars. The difficulty of designing American strategy and political-military policy in response to nonnuclear wars of a lesser order is compounded by a lack of agreement regarding the character of such wars, their boundaries, and the rules of engagement. Some conceptual coherency is necessary even if only as a first step in developing realistic political-military policy. Conceptual Considerations The term low-intensity conflict is in vogue in categorizing nonnuclear conflicts of a lesser order. Lacking a precise definition, this term has come to encompass every type of nonnuclear conflict ranging from the Korean War to terrorism. Earlier attempts at defining or explaining this term/concept were, in the main, based on the size of the forces engaged and the purpose of the conflict.1 The primary distinction however, rests more with the character of the conflict than with its level of intensity or the specific number of forces involved. Although low-intensity conflict is perceived by some to include limited conventional wars and acts of terrorism, the substantive dimensions of such conflicts evolve primarily from revolutionary and counterrevolutionary strategy and causes. In brief, these include unconventional operations, protractedness, and high political-psychological content directly linked to the political-social milieu of the indigenous area. Limited conventional wars and acts of terrorism are outside the boundaries of low-intensity conflicts. Revolution and counterrevolution are the major categories. There is considerable disagreement in the literature and in operational circles regarding the character of revolution and counterrevolution. A variety of terms tend to be used interchangeably: revolt, revolution, rebellion, guerrilla war, people's war, peasant war, and insurgency. This interchangeable use adds confusion to the disagreements. A realistic and operationally relevant approach is suggested by Bernard Fall: "Just about anybody can start a 'little war' (which is what the Spanish word guerrilla literally means), even a New York street gang.... But all this has rarely produced the kind of revolutionary ground swell which simply swept away the existing government."2 Fall goes on to note that " . . . guerrilla warfare is nothing but a tactical appendage of a far vaster political contest and that no matter how expertly it is fought by competent and dedicated professionals, it cannot possibly make up for the absence of a political rationale."3 >From Fall's analysis, several observations emerge. Revolutions are a fundamental challenge to the existing political order and to those holding power in the system. The essence of such conflicts is in gaining control of the governing structure. Although all wars are political in nature, revolutionary wars are unique in that they center on the political-social system as the main battle arena, rather than on the armed forces. This focus is in sharp contrast to the conventional and Clausewitzian notion that the center of gravity in war is the defeat and destruction of the enemy armed forces.4 Revolutionary war is also quite distinct from nuclear war in that it does not attempt to destroy the political-social system but to capture it, and it limits itself to a particular geographic area. Although armed conflict is an important part of revolution, it is not necessarily the most important for revolutionary success. As noted previously, the center of gravity in revolution is the political-social system and its psychological coherency. Thus, political cadre and psychological instruments are most important in determining the outcome of such conflicts. In sum, revolutionary conflict is usually initiated by a competing political system which, at a minimum, consists of a cadre of leaders with an ideology (or cause) who are committed to overthrowing the existing system. Although this competing system may be rudimentary, its purposes, organization, and leadership pose a distinct challenge to the existing system. Further, revolutionary strategy and tactics usually combine all of the components of unconventional warfare with political mobilization to erode the legitimacy and effectiveness of the existing system. What makes revolution so complex is the fact that it usually occurs in Third World systems that are already struggling with serious problems of political change and economic modernization. Consequently, U.S. relationships and policy in Third World areas must deal not only with developmental issues but, in many instances, with low-intensity conflicts––particularly revolution and counterrevolution. The U.S. Political-Military Posture The irony of the U.S. position is that the challenges posed by low-intensity conflicts are largely separate and distinct from American perceptions of war. If the experience of the Vietnam War (and past similar conflicts) is any guide, the American political system and its instruments for carrying out political-military policy are placed in a highly disadvantageous position with respect to low-intensity conflicts. A number of factors contribute to this position. In the American scheme of things, war tends to be viewed as a technological and managerial conflict in which face-to-face combat and conflict involving masses of troops engaged against each other is, in the main, subordinate to the ability to bring to bear sophisticated weapons on the battlefield through electronic commands and machine-oriented strategy and tactics to disrupt or destroy enemy formations. The process of rapid technological substitution has not only led to enhanced capabilities but has gradually turned Western armed forces into technocracies where a declining ratio of combat to support personnel has meant that, though firepower has increased, a decreasing number of individuals are actually involved in combat. This trend holds for forces of all nations, but it is most apparent in Western forces, particularly those of the United States.5 This process was reflected in the U.S. involvement in the Korean and Vietnamese wars. In his analysis of the Vietnam War, General Frederick Weyand notes the relationship between the technology of war and democratic values: As military professionals we must speak out. We must counsel our political leaders and alert the American public that there is no such thing as a "splendid little war." There is no such thing as a war fought on the cheap. War is death and destruction. The American way of war is particularly violent, deadly and dreadful. We believe in using "things"––artillery, bombs, massive firepower–– in order to conserve our soldiers' lives. The enemy, on the other hand, made up for his lack of "things" by expending men instead of machines, and he suffered enormous casualties. The Army saw this happen in Korea, and we should have made the realities of war obvious to the American people before they witnessed it on their television screens. The Army must make the price of involvement clear before we get involved, so that America can weigh the probable costs of involvement against the dangers of noninvolvement ... for there are worse things than war.6 Seeing conflicts through conventional lenses heavily influenced by the Judeo-Christian heritage, Americans tend to categorize wars into good and evil protagonists. It follows that the character of the enemy must be clear and the threat to the United States must be immediate and challenging. U.S. involvement must be clearly purposeful and in accord with democratic norms. This "Pearl Harbor" mentality is more-or-less reflected in America's current posture. Revolution and counterrevolution are asymmetrical with respect to their relationships with American involvement. For the revolutionary system, the conflict is a total war––one of survival. For the indigenous counterrevolutionary system, the conflict eventually evolves into a war for survival. For the United States engaged as a third (external) force in counterrevolution, the conflict is limited. Thus, commitments, morale, national will, and political resolve differ in degree and purposes between the protagonists. Moreover, the nature of revolution is such that it creates a morality and ethics of its own. These do not necessarily conform to democratic norms, nor do they follow the established rules of Western warfare. These are neither splendid little wars nor gentlemanly encounters. They are dirty, unconventional, no-holds-barred conflicts. Revolutionaries justify any means that contribute to their ends. The center of gravity of such conflicts is not on the battlefield per se but in the political-social system of the indigenous state. Thus, the main battle lines are political and psychological rather than between opposing armed units. "Body counts," real estate, and prisoners taken are not true indicators of success or progress. Political and psychological factors are more important indicators, but they cannot be measured by conventional means. The most important elements for success in such conflicts are trained and committed political cadres and effective political-psychological machinery. In such conflicts, the U.S. military is postured on secondary issues. Revolutionary conflicts are likely to be protracted and unconventional. The revolutionary system is unlikely to challenge directly either the existing system or U.S. forces in conventional settings. Rather, the revolutionary will pick a time and place when he can ensure an overwhelming superiority and when success is virtually assured––keeping in mind that success is perceived in political-psychological terms. (The Tet offensive in Vietnam in 1968 is a prime example of how total military defeat was turned into a major political-psychological victory by the Vietcong and North Vietnamese forces.) The nature of the conflict is likely to include a variety of tactics ranging from ambushes, assassinations, hit-and-run raids, sabotage, and terror, to periodic conventional operations. The revolutionary system is likely to follow a pattern of nibbling away at the counterrevolutionary forces, particularly American forces, in order to achieve a political-psychological victory over the long haul. U.S. forces engaged in counterrevolutionary operations are likely to be involved in an alien culture, dealing with indigenous persons who have as little understanding of Americans as Americans have of them. The experience of one U.S. officer in Vietnam is a case in point. A Vietnamese counterpart said to him, " . . . you can't help it if you're an American, but you should always remember that very few of our people are capable of genuine positive feelings towards you. You must assume that you are not wholly liked and trusted, and not be deceived by the Asian smile."7 Differences between Third World and American cultures are particularly sharp in regard to the democratic socialization process. Democratic norms, based on justice and human rights, among other things, give most Americans a perspective on government and politics that is generally incompatible with most Third World systems. Americans operating in such areas are therefore not likely to sympathize greatly with the indigenous governing elite or with the goals and purposes of existing systems. Not only does this disparity negatively affect the American commitment to existing systems in the Third World, but it makes it difficult for Americans to shape the effectiveness and role of the indigenous military to conform to acceptable American standards. Finally, revolutionary and counterrevolutionary conflicts are "labor"-intensive. Technology and modern weapons play an important role, to be sure. But the essence of success for revolutionary and counterrevolutionary systems is primarily contingent upon the commitment and skill of political cadre, political organization, and psychological "warfare––that is, by people on the ground in face-to-face contact with the indigenous population. The nature of the conflict is such that mass destruction weapons likely to be used by counterrevolutionary systems are usually inappropriate except in rare instances where revolutionary armed forces are caught in the open and in mass formations or where revolutionary armed forces have developed a fortified area or base camp. It is essential that once the United States is involved, it adopt a policy and posture that does not "Americanize" the conflict. The prime emphasis needs to be placed on maintaining the autonomy of the existing system. Among other things, this means that political-military operations that are likely to project the United States into a dominant role over the existing system must be avoided. In commenting on the Americanization of the Vietnamese conflict, one former high-ranking official of the South Vietnamese government said the following about American involvement: American support, even when it was militarily effective, was not an unmixed blessing…The enemy, of course…was solidly dependent on foreign support, too. However, he had the advantage of having no foreign troops in his own ranks, and his allies…disguised their influence quite effectively, whereas the United States did not…8 To be successful in accepting support and preventing Americanization of the conflict, the existing system must understand the requirements for successful counterrevolution, be flexible enough to make a serious attempt at redressing internal grievances, and develop the necessary leadership and cadre to govern effectively. In brief, such conflicts require effective operations aimed at the political-social system with all of its political-psychological nuances. High-tech warfare and sophisticated weaponry cannot substitute for skillful political organizers who have penetrated deeply into the political-social fabric of the indigenous system. The term people's war is a most appropriate label for such conflicts. These characteristics of low-intensity conflicts make an effective U.S. response difficult, but the problem does not end here. The nature of counterrevolutionary conflict is such that it must be viewed in two dimensions: defense and offense. Each dimension necessitates a mix of political-military forces, a focus on differing political-social components of the revolutionary system, and a political psychological effort. The Two Dimensions of Counterrevolutionary Operations Much of the attention that has been given to low-intensity conflicts tends to focus on support of the existing system under attack (counterrevolution against the revolutionaries). The counterrevolutionary system is forced to start from a defensive posture, by and large, because the revolution has already penetrated the existing system. That is, the governing institutions have not proved effective enough and have provoked or failed to discourage the emergence of a competing system. In this respect, there may be some truth in the observation that revolution is one sign of the ineffectiveness of the existing system. On the other hand, there may be validity in the observation that revolution is endemic to Third World systems because of the character of the modernization process and the inherent instability generated by political change. Starting from a defensive posture, the existing system faces difficult challenges if it is to be successful in shifting the momentum away from the revolutionaries. Initial counterrevolutionary operations must be aimed at restoring security in threatened areas and protecting installations, key individuals, and areas of importance to government control and order. Further, a reasonably firm counterrevolutionary policy must be based on the existing system's recognition of the seriousness of the challenge and a commitment to more effective governance and police-military operations. Proper engagement in the initial phase of defensive operations usually entails stationing a static force for guard duty and creating a mobile force for response to revolutionary threats. This necessitates large police and military forces, which must be both adequately trained and efficiently employed. More important, increasingly effective governing institutions must evolve. Unfortunately, in most instances, the existing system lacks in all of these areas. American support and assistance is usually necessary to shore up the existing system, establish some political and military leverage, and provide a training program to increase military effectiveness. The most effective strategy for successful counterrevolution is the creating of a "revolution" against the revolutionary system. In brief, the existing system must take the revolution out of the hands of the revolutionaries. To do so requires success in the defensive phase of counterrevolution and taking the fight to the enemy. The enemy's political-social structure must be penetrated, key leaders must be identified and captured or eliminated, and the political and psychological instruments of the revolution must be destroyed. This strategy is not likely to be in accord with democratic norms or compatible with conventional military posture. Support and assistance for the offensive phase of counterrevolution are likely to create political and moral dilemmas for Americans, both in the domestic political sphere and in the military, particularly as Americans involved in the defensive phase are drawn into the offensive dimension of counterrevolution. Such American involvement is not only likely but dangerous, since only special units within the American military (Special Forces) are trained in and capable of conducting special operations. Moreover, American military personnel are in an extremely untenable moral and ethical position if they are engaged in offensive counterrevolutionary operations. While such actions may have some acceptance as part of covert operations conducted by U.S. intelligence agencies, political and military difficulties arise when they involve other agencies and institutions. In sum, American involvement in the defensive phase of counterrevolution carries with it a number of difficulties and dangers. As the revolution progresses, a broader and increasingly intensive counterrevolutionary effort is required. American involvement is likely to expand accordingly. Moreover, an offensive posture must be adopted at some point if counterrevolution is to succeed. It is clear, therefore, that continued American involvement will require a policy that considers a number of contingencies and options. Equally important, the types of forces and their missions must be appropriate to the various phases. These latter considerations add a particularly complex dimension to American involvement in revolutionary and counterrevolutionary efforts. Levels of American Involvement A serious analysis of the scope, intensity, and implications of American involvement in counterrevolutionary conflict must begin with an operational categorization according to degree of involvement. Such involvement must be designed with an appropriate balance of force mix, including numbers, types of units, and nature of the deployment. Additionally, planning must include the probability that force mixes must be changed as the conflict passes through various phases. Equally important, the degree of involvement affects the conditions under which the United States can withdraw.9 Defensive phase During the defensive phase, standard U.S. policies of military and economic assistance may be appropriate, providing a mix of civilian and military personnel with the requisite financial and material wherewithal to support and assist the existing system. Revolutionary-counter- revolutionary conflicts require a well-designed and consistent effort. Any American involvement is likely to become broader and more pervasive as the conflict progresses. Beyond standard economic and military assistance, Special Forces personnel may be involved in both training and operations. The final part of the defensive phase occurs when indigenous forces are unable to stop the revolution. If the United States continues its involvement, it must be prepared to inject ground forces into a combat role in conjunction with indigenous forces. This kind of operation requires capabilities beyond those of Special Forces units. In the past, conventionally postured units have rarely been trained or mentally disposed for unconventional warfare. If history is any guide, conventionally postured forces will engage the "enemy" in accordance with standard tactical doctrine, conventional weaponry, and standard rules of engagement. This Clausewitzian notion of war with its center of gravity on enemy armed forces is unlikely to be effective in low-intensity conflicts. Combined or joint operations with indigenous military forces places U.S. forces in difficult cultural and linguistic situations. Understanding the motivations and psychological world of indigenous forces of the existing system is almost as difficult as understanding those of the revolutionaries. In such circumstances, Americans are likely to engage in their own version of warfare regardless of the kind of war being conducted by the revolutionaries and the counterrevolutionaries. The conventional posturing of U.S. ground forces makes them poor substitutes for indigenous groups. Moreover, the sophisticated weapons that are standard in American units may be inappropriate in unconventional conflicts. Indeed, the use of such weapons by Americans may create nationalistic sympathy for the revolutionaries. And finally, commitment of U.S. combat and support personnel in the quantity necessary can easily lead to "Americanization," seriously eroding the legitimacy of the existing system. offensive phase If the magnitude of the problems facing the United States in the defensive phase of counterrevolution is great, that in the offensive phase is greater. Implementation of the offensive phase cannot wait for culmination of the defensive phase. The sooner the offensive phase is begun, the more likely it will succeed. Most existing indigenous systems, however, will not be able to implement the offensive phase quickly because the defensive phase will demand most of their time and resources. Regardless of when it is possible, an offensive posture must be assumed by counterrevolutionary forces if they are to be eventually successful. From the American perspective, it is likely that the offensive phase will require specially trained units and a mix of civilian and military forces (Special Forces units and other personnel trained in special operations). Such operations are generally covert, at least initially, and better suited for civilian agency operations.10 Later offensive operations may require a visible military effort. Nevertheless, offensive operations cannot succeed without effective indigenous counterrevolutionary units capable of taking the fight to the enemy both politically and militarily. Actions must be accomplished in accord with policy and strategy aimed specifically at eroding and destroying the political-social system of the revolution––creating a revolution within the ranks and domain of the revolutionaries. multiphased operations The fact that the defensive and offensive phases of counterrevolution usually must be addressed simultaneously compounds the dilemmas facing the United States. As the revolution progresses, it becomes necessary for the counterrevolutionaries to carry out multidimensional operations that require a variety of force mixes. These political-military necessities make it unlikely that the U.S. forces can successfully engage in such operations beyond a certain point without threatening basic democratic norms. In both defensive and offensive phases, there is a serious operational and capability gap; that is, there is no balanced mix of American military and civilian forces that can conduct operations beyond those envisioned by Special Forces. Thus, if indigenous forces are incapable of success with American assistance, the only remaining option (assuming no withdrawal) is commitment of conventional forces to ground combat operations. withdrawal One of the most important, albeit neglected, considerations governing U.S. involvement in low-intensity conflicts has to do with withdrawal. Once there is a visible American commitment to an existing counterrevolutionary system, at what point does or can the United States withdraw? Withdrawal following a successful counterrevolution is one issue; withdrawal as a result of impending collapse of the existing system or because of a change in U.S. policy is another matter. In the first instance, withdrawal can be accomplished under the most favorable circumstances. In the latter case, withdrawal has to be carried out "under fire," when it is difficult to extract American personnel safely, while the withdrawal itself serves as a visible sign that the U.S. effort has failed. Given all of the domestic and international repercussions that are likely to result, timely withdrawal––withdrawal when experts and authorities recognize that the existing system is not performing effectively and that American effort will not be able to shift the tide in favor of that system––requires bold leadership. Only a strong and forceful U.S. administration is likely to have the necessary resolve to make such an important policy change. Withdrawal under these latter circumstances is best undertaken before there is a deep U.S. involvement and while American presence is at a low visibility level. If withdrawal is to come in a later phase, American forces will be placed in an extremely dangerous position. Withdrawal under fire is a very difficult maneuver, even with the most experienced personnel. Losses are likely to be high, both militarily and politically. Because the potential for serious problems exists, serious questions need to be addressed prior to U.S. involvement in counterrevolutionary conflicts. What kind of political-social system should be left in place? Is U.S. involvement designed to bolster the existing system without expectation of a changed political-social environment? Under what conditions can the United States presume that its involvement was a success? An American decision to engage in low-intensity conflict must consider the character of the conflict, its costs and consequences, the system's political-military capability, and the conditions under which the United States will (and can) withdraw. Once committed, American forces are likely to become enmeshed in a "no withdrawal without honor" situation. Continuing commitment (and, indeed, incremental increases in that commitment) then may be rationalized in the name of achieving policy goals, even after the conflict has gone beyond repairability.11 U.S. Policy and Strategy: Guidelines for the Future The general principles discussed thus far in this examination of low-intensity conflict lead to a number of guidelines for future U.S. policy and strategy. These guidelines are intended to point a direction, identify a perspective, and create an intellectual environment that may serve as a useful basis for analyzing and/or establishing U.S. policy for involvement (or noninvolvement) in low-intensity conflicts. asymmetry Low-intensity conflicts tend to be asymmetrical; and asymmetry pervades virtually every aspect of U.S. involvement, from the strategic to the operational, affecting morale, commitment, and staying power. While the revolutionaries and the indigenous counterrevolutionaries are involved in the conflict as a matter of survival, American involvement (indeed, any third-power involvement) is usually on a limited basis. For the United States, therefore, it is generally difficult to develop a firm and coherent response to sustain operations to the degree necessary to overcome revolutionary forces in the conflict area. U.S. commitments are global, and national survival is viewed primarily in terms of nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union. For many Americans, involvement in low-intensity conflicts can hardly be justified. American view of war The American view of war is generally incompatible with the characteristics and demands of counterrevolution. Although the United States has a long history of counterrevolutionary involvement, the American Civil War and World Wars I and II are the cornerstones of the American view of war. The threat of nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union has given this view a particularly compelling dimension. In this context, while the morality of nuclear conflicts may be open to question, the issues of survival and challenges to the American system seem clear. Thus, in the debates over nuclear war, the major disagreements appear to be how to prevent war rather than what the outcome might be (although this latter consideration may also be argued). Policy goals tend to be viewed on a global scale by most U.S. policymakers and by most of the American public. Refocusing U.S. perspectives to those associated with low-intensity conflicts requires major psychological shifts. The Judeo-Christian heritage and the American political system focus attention on values of human existence and behavior that are far removed from a revolutionary-counterrevolutionary environment. One result is that many Americans are convinced neither that low-intensity conflicts are threatening to the United States nor that U.S. involvement is essential. The American difficulty in comprehending the fundamental issues of revolution and counterrevolution is magnified by the fact that revolution has a morality and ethics of its own, subordinating everything to revolutionary success. Any means that are effective are morally acceptable. Countering such measures (assassination, sabotage, terror, etc.) usually requires more than conventional military operations. Equally disconcerting for Americans, the counterrevolutionary system may also manifest "unusual" moral/ethical values of its own. Thus, neither revolutionaries nor counterrevolutionaries conduct war according to "acceptable norms"––at least from the American perspective. The perception and policy gap between American support for major wars and lack of support for low-intensity conflicts is wide; and it has its political and psychological counterparts within the military. It can seriously affect America's military capability. military capability U.S. military capability is linked to American perceptions of war and to the American military heritage. These, in turn, are fashioned by the Clausewitzian notion of war, focusing on the defeat of enemy armed forces. The past is perceived primarily in terms of grand battles and major wars. Battles across the plains of Europe and combined operations such as the 1983 invasion of Grenada are elaborately planned. In general, American training, planning, and weaponry are designed to enhance capability in a conventional military environment or to deter nuclear attack. Vietnam and a number of other similar experiences (e.g., the Seminole wars in Florida and the Philippine-American War at the turn of the century) seem to have been lost amidst efforts to establish a credible strategic posture and a conventional capability in Europe. To be sure, American military capability does extend to conventional conflicts on a smaller scale and in special environments. The Army's recent establishment of a Light Division is one attempt to respond to future security needs. Envisioned is a division of approximately 10,000 soldiers, with about 46 percent of them designated as the actual fighting force, available for commitment to less-developed areas. It will require less logistical support than other comparable-size units, will be highly mobile, and will be armed with modern light-infantry weapons. Unless all personnel receive the requisite training to engage in unconventional conflicts, organizational innovations will have little impact, however. A Light Division may make it easier to engage in Grenada-type operations or in limited conventional wars in less-developed areas, but revolution and counterrevolution remain outside the scope of conventionally organized military units. The 1st Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is another attempt to respond to warfare in less-developed areas. More specifically focused on unconventional conflicts, this command includes Special Forces, Ranger units, psychological warfare and civic action units, and special units from other services designated to cooperate in joint ventures. This is a major step in the right direction, but it still reflects a conventional organizational wisdom. It links Special Forces operations, small-unit commando raids, and limited conventional war capabilities under one organizational structure suggesting the same posture for all "special" contingencies. military professionalism The full import of military capability includes the characteristics and effectiveness of the military profession. The American military profession is closely linked to American society in terms of skills and value orientation. Occupational and professional patterns in American society have influenced the military profession, shifting many of these bases of military leadership to technological and managerial skills. The "heroic" leadership role of the past has been overshadowed by the modern soldier-technician-manager.12 Although there are a number of implications evolving from this development, two are of particular importance here: the technological thrust within the profession and its value linkage with society. These are intermingled with a number of other considerations within the profession, but they are important in their own right and need to be considered separately. The technological or high-tech drive within the military has given birth to the electronic battlefield and increasingly sophisticated weaponry. The "Star Wars" or "high frontier" concept is only the latest in a long series of technological evolutions. In turn, military leadership must encompass the demands of a capital-intensive, machine-oriented environment. The traditional nature of leadership will, by necessity, focus more specifically on high-intensity wars––those that have the potential of an immediate direct threat to U.S. survival. Thus, nuclear war and major conventional conflicts with a foe similarly postured are likely to remain the primary focus of U.S. political-military efforts. Although the focus on high tech and the electronic battlefield may seem new, there has been a consistent pattern incorporating new developments into the operational mode of the military establishment over the past two decades. This has also been the case with the military profession, where education and skill have integrated new weapons developments and high-tech concepts. One danger of this orientation is that the need for human resources may seem secondary in the overall scheme of things. There is a commitment to fighting wars with "weaponry" and "things" in order to save the lives of military personnel. This is, to be sure, a necessary commitment: it is compatible with the democratic concerns for life, justice, and humanity, even in times of war. However, the very nature of this commitment erodes (at times, imperceptibly) the military's ability to engage in low-intensity conflicts. Linkage between the American military and American society provides a psychological and philosophical support system for the military profession. This support system evolves from American perceptions that the Soviets and nuclear war are the most immediate and challenging threats. Thus, the prevailing environment inextricably meshes the concept of war with a "Pearl Harbor" mentality; and the military finds it less difficult philosophically, morally, and practically to posture itself for major war and the Soviet threat than for low-intensity conflict. This circumstance lessens the need to grapple with the serious ethical and operational dilemmas of low-intensity conflicts. Of course, the military is concerned with its capability (or lack thereof) to respond across the conflict spectrum. Indeed, there is some uneasiness because low-intensity conflicts do not easily fit into traditional boundaries. This is reinforced by an underlying concern, probably produced by the Vietnam experience, that the military cannot long operate in a foreign area without substantial support from the American people––a necessary component of "staying power." Nonetheless, the educational curricula in senior military schools are driven by grand battles, high-tech warfare, electronic battlefields, and the standard command and staff functions, with only a nod in the direction of low-intensity conflicts. Successful military career patterns are determined by command and staff assignments in traditional career fields even though Special Operations has been approved by the Army as a career field. Equally important, major parts of defense procurement are guided by strategic and general-purpose force requirements. While some of these improve U.S. capability to engage in low-intensity conflicts, their primary focus remains on "major war." Finally, the military profession interacts with the military institution's planning, training, and weaponry; and these components reinforce each other. This reinforcement, conventional in nature, evolves from mind-sets rooted in an American system whose values are at odds with those necessary for success in low-intensity conflicts. All conflicts, by and large, are seen through conventional lenses. Such an orientation militates against the evolution of special operations as a major component of the military profession. Indeed, the concept of special operations has historically fostered professional antagonism, as Colonel Francis J. Kelly has observed: An elite group has always appeared within the Army during every war in which the United States has been engaged…As surely as such groups arose,there arose also the grievances of the normally conservative military men who rejected whatever was distinctive or different or special…In the conduct of conservative military affairs, revisions of current military modes are frequently resisted with missionary zeal and emotional fervor simply because they mean change, they are different…If a new military program or unit is being developed in order to meet new needs, new threats, or new tactics, consideration should be given to the use of elite US Army units despite the customary resistance to change or elitism usually found in conservative establishments.13 American military professionalism and capability, perceptions of war, and the value system of society must be in reasonable equilibrium if symmetry is to be maintained between the U.S. military and society. A symmetry is necessary if the military is to develop and maintain its effectiveness. American ideology and democratic norms If the U.S. military seems unprepared for successful participation in low-intensity wars, this lack of readiness appears at least partially due to the fact that the American political system is not prepared to engage in revolutionary and counterrevolutionary conflicts. The general perceptions justifying U.S. involvement in conflict must evolve from the American value system of democratic ideology and established behavioral norms. These values derive from Judeo-Christian principles and the philosophical principles expounded by the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution. The American democratic value system includes concern for or belief in the sacredness of life, individual autonomy, freedom of choice, justice, and a government that serves individuals. These values usually conflict with the character of revolutions and counterrevolutions. A number of Americans, however, tend to view revolutions as either "glorious" affairs where a freedom-loving people rise up against tyrants (the American Revolution) or as essentially anticolonial affairs. While these views provide an implicit democratic rationalization and justification for revolution, a study of revolutions that have occurred over the past two decades reveals that most of these conflicts are complex and multidimensional affairs that do not generally conform to such conceptions. In many of these conflicts, in fact, it is difficult to delineate friend from foe and to identify political orientations. The fact that revolution and counterrevolution can become internationalized quickly also plays upon the sensitivity of the American people. For many, revolutions are perceived to be internal affairs that must be allowed to run their course. Simultaneously, various revolutionary spokesmen inject their views into the American media, playing on American idealized views of revolution, freedom, and justice and achieving sympathy or support from important, often vocal, segments of the American populace. Whenever the United States becomes involved in low-intensity conflicts, political repercussions are likely to develop rather quickly. This phenomenon is a function of both democratic ideology and the American system of openness. Information regarding American politics and policy is readily transmitted to the public. Media access to the conflict area, the American freedom of information tradition, the public's right to know, and the technological capabilities of a wide variety of information sources make it extremely difficult to isolate American military operations from the outside world, even when official U.S. policy is deliberately designed to do so––the Grenada operation notwithstanding. It is likely, therefore , that any American involvement will be on television screens, on the radio, and in newspapers almost immediately. The differences between a democracy, such as the United States, and a dictatorial system, such as the Soviet Union, are sharply drawn with respect to low-intensity conflicts––a fact well illustrated by the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. According to an experienced French observer who was in Afghanistan during a part of the Soviet invasion, the Soviets' views of not only insurgency but counterinsurgent methods are quite different from those generally held by Americans: Guerrilla warfare has already demonstrated its effectiveness elsewhere, and until recently no one has known how to counter it. The scattering of population, the creation of village strongholds, and control and card-indexing of inhabitants have proved to be very useful means of restricting guerrilla advances, but the resistance fighters have always won out in the end ... The Soviets are not as naive as the Westerners. They understood long ago ... that a war involving guerrillas and anti-guerilla fighters would never be won by either side if the emphasis was placed on being in the good graces of the population. On the contrary,the war would be won by the side that succeeded in making terror reign.14 The author explains in detail how Soviet counterrevolutionary warfare differs from the democratic West, pointing out, for example, that Soviet tactics include the deliberate destruction of villages to force Afghans to fleet he country. The author also points out: The Soviet strategy involves two aspects that may make the outcome in Afghanistan differ from the Western experience; one, already mentioned, is the use of mass terror, completely unlike any of the more moderate types of intervention. The second is that the Soviets can afford a protracted war in the short term for the sake of a long-term victory.... The Russians do not need smashing victories to announce to their citizenry, as Soviet public opinion does not influence Soviet policy.15 Further, the Soviet system has the ability to prevent access to the conflict area. Control of the media and the nature of a "closed" society allow the Soviets to prevent internal and external dissemination of information about what is happening in Afghanistan except as determined by the Soviet state. Democratic ideology and openness within the American system are the bases for shaping American public attitudes and for developing and sustaining national will; they also are the cornerstones for political resolve in responding to crises. In combination with the quality of national leadership, these factors determine the nature of U.S. political-military capability and the effectiveness of its response to low-intensity conflicts. As General Weyand pointed out with respect to Vietnam, Vietnam was a reaffirmation of the peculiar relationship between the American Army and the American people. The Army really is a people's army in the sense that it belongs to the American people who take a jealous and proprietary interest in its involvement. When the Army is committed, the American people are committed; when the American people lose their commitment, it is futile to try to keep the Army committed. In the final analysis, the American Army is not so much an arm of the Executive Branch as it is an arm of the American people. The Army, therefore, cannot be committed lightly.16 In brief, American national will must be firm enough to accept the commitment of American forces to low-intensity conflicts. Equally important, the national will must be of such nature that it will sustain the established U.S. policy over a period of time, even under adverse conditions. American national will and political resolve are difficult to galvanize in response to low-intensity conflicts, however, and a firm American posture is not likely to develop without the emergence of a perspective that justifies support of a counterrevolutionary system. American involvement is likely to follow standard practice during the early defensive phase, providing economic and military assistance in modest amounts and stationing some American advisors in the conflict area. Beyond this, however, the national leadership must tread cautiously if it is to avoid a commitment that leads to negative public reaction. The options for our leaders are limited. Once the United States decides to engage in low-intensity conflict, a critical limitation is the fact that the United States must operate through the existing indigenous system, regardless of that system's politics and ideology. Equally important, America's formal institutions and government agencies are usually limited to certain kinds of actions. The nature of the American commitment imposes the limitations. For example, the United States might want to identify nonrevolutionary moderate groups that could replace an existing repressive governing elite and be a more effective barrier to revolutionary expansion. But such a course of action could destroy the fragile legitimacy of the existing system and project the United States into a policy position that is even more difficult to implement and maintain than offensive counterrevolutionary operations. On one hand, the United States would be trying to support the existing system. On the other hand, it would be trying to overthrow that very system. Regardless of any morality or ethics that might be involved, chaos is likely to result. The nature of democracy also limits and constrains intelligence agencies. Congressional oversight and an inherent American fear of secret activities establish boundaries for the intelligence establishment, albeit these boundaries are at times unclear to both intelligence agencies and the public.17 Pressures on the executive branch, as well as on Congress, tend to create political and legalistic guidelines for most intelligence activities. Moreover, many Americans are uncomfortable with the necessity for maintaining a wide-ranging intelligence establishment. As a result, U.S. intelligence agencies are bound by democratic perceptions of proper behavior and legal strictures even when dealing with a protagonist not similarly bound. This is not to deny "dirty tricks" by U.S. intelligence agencies; but regardless of the kind of activity, officials are held accountable. The more important issue, however, is the ability of intelligence agencies to undertake activities in support of U.S. counterrevolutionary policy. Although the intelligence establishment has more leeway than other political-military instruments, it is not free to engage in certain kinds of activities that might be essential for successful counterrevolutionary operations. Further, even when intelligence agencies do an effective job, their information and analyses often are ignored by those in the field and those at the national command level. Revolution and counterrevolution are characterized by purposes, protagonists, and patterns of struggle that are essentially alien to American democratic concepts. Furthermore, the American political system and its political-military and intelligence instruments are in a highly disadvantageous position with respect to low-intensity conflicts. The question is, "What can be done to reduce the disadvantage?" An important starting point is a philosophical and practical reassessment of American perceptions and perspectives. American national leaders, as well as the public in general, must develop a more realistic view of the nature of revolution and counterrevolution. An even more pressing need is to understand the limits and constraints of policy and capability in responding to such conflicts. Part of the education must focus on an understanding of the nature of the Third World––its nondemocratic character, its volatility, and, in many instances, its political instability. Americans must understand that certain systems are aggressively antithetical to democracy and Western interests. At the same time, they must recognize that American national security interests are directly linked with a number of Third World states because of their geopolitical importance and resources. If American involvement is justified and necessary, then national leaders and the public must understand that low-intensity conflicts do not conform to democratic notions of strategy or tactics. Revolution and counterrevolution develop their own morality and ethics that justify any means to achieve success. Survival is the ultimate morality. Americans must understand the dilemmas they face in supporting an existing counterrevolutionary system. Neither revolution nor counterrevolution is likely to be democratic. Neither is likely to conform to democratic ideals of just and humane behavior on the battlefield. The conflict is focused on political psychological factors. All of the ingredients for a "dirty," ungentlemanly, terror-oriented conflict are there; and participation is likely to be protracted and increasingly costly. American national will and political resolve must be rooted in the concept of democracy and in the moral and ethical expectations of the American people. It is difficult to establish and maintain national will and political resolve in response to low-intensity conflicts. A sophisticated understanding of both the nature of revolution and counterrevolution and the requirements for an effective American response must be developed. It will not be easy because such conflicts are complex, contradictory, and ambiguous in nature (American policy may support nondemocratic regimes in the name of democracy). Making the matter even more confusing is the fact that segments of the media promote simplistic solutions and project distorted images of both the nature of low-intensity conflict and the U.S. response. Some elected officials and special groups advocate their own particular interpretations. Political biases and ideological orientations of various groups may distort and confuse the issues. In such a context, it is difficult to develop a coherent American political-military posture. Coherency is achieved when U.S. national objectives are clearly stated and when policy, strategy, and operational doctrine are closely linked for the purpose of achieving these objectives. Americans must understand that not all of these factors may be in accord with democratic norms and with the American political system in morality and ethics. Equally important, coherency cannot be achieved unless the instruments of policy are capable of effective implementation. The U.S. military must develop a capability beyond Special Operations units. If the Army's Light Division is to be charged with operations in less developed areas, for example, it must be prepared to undertake counterrevolutionary and revolutionary operations. It must develop anti-terror operations and a political-military capability, and it must learn how to function in an alien environment. In addition, it must have the ability to melt into the background while supporting indigenous operations––a feature that may require an organizational structure based on teams and functions. Its personnel may need security clearances for access to top-level intelligence and may need to be selected as highly motivated individuals likely to be effective in the unique environment of low-intensity conflict. Finally, the Light Division must reflect a joint operational capability. An organizational strategy that focuses specifically on low-intensity conflict must be developed. Based on goals from the highest levels (National Security Council), this strategy must be supported by other units within the Department of Defense and by civilian agencies. Further, the 1st Special Operations Command needs to function as a joint civilian-military command system under the direct control of a high political authority (an Assistant Secretary of State, for example). In addition, some degree of training in counterrevolutionary warfare should be provided to standard military line units. This organizational and training thrust needs an efficient intelligence establishment. Operations in revolutionary-counterrevolutionary conflicts cannot be conducted successfully without the intelligence necessary to identify threats and specifics of the tactical situation, both militarily and in the political-social milieu (particularly during the offensive phase). Indeed, it is difficult to see how any American involvement can succeed absent an intelligence establishment attuned to the distinctive requirements of low-intensity conflict. Finally, the U.S. military needs to give more than lip service to special operations. Although concern regarding their ability to respond across the entire conflict spectrum is growing among some military professionals, technological and managerial components allow little room for emphasis on special operations for low-intensity conflicts. Developing political acumen, political-military sensitivity, and an understanding of the nature and requirements of low-intensity conflict requires, among other things, serious education in these matters at all levels of service schools. Equally important, the profession needs to integrate special operations career patterns realistically with standard command and staff patterns. That is, low-intensity conflict must become a standard component within the profession and in the training of line units. These steps are perhaps the most important initially, but even these will not be easy to implement nor will they be easily accepted. Involvement in low-intensity conflict usually carries risk. Even the most coherent U.S. posture and policy, designed specifically for low-intensity conflict, may not bring expected results. Revolution and counterrevolution create an environment that is not easily influenced by American power. Indeed, in some instances, U.S. involvement may exacerbate the situation––and these matters cannot always be precisely assessed in advance. Further, many of the indigenous systems involved in low-intensity conflicts are nondemocratic; basing U.S. policy on the presumption that only democratic systems can be supported precludes American involvement in many parts of the Third World. Finally, noninvolvement may be the best course. The democratic nature of the American system may prevent involvement even if the conflict has a potential to threaten American interests; or the conflict may be such that U.S. involvement would be irrelevant. Modern revolutions are not necessarily attempts by a downtrodden people to overthrow a dictatorship but may emanate from indigenous groups who are socioeconomically mobile. They may also be the strategy of an external power to overthrow an existing system for the prime purpose of extending its own interests. The United States must weigh the challenges to its own interests against the costs and consequences of involvement; and any involvement must be articulated in clear terms to the American people. Loyola University of Chicago A version of this article, together with related articles by other authors, will appear in Low-Intensity Conflict and Modern Technology, which will be published by the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education in 1985. Notes 1. For a discussion of the meaning of low-intensity conflict, see Sam C. Sarkesian, "Introduction: American Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict: An Overview," in U.S. Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict: Potentials for Military Struggles in the 1980s, edited by Sam C. Sarkesian and William L. Scully (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1981). p. 4. 2. Bernard Fall, Street Without Joy: Insurgency in Indochina, 1946-63, Third Revised Edition (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole, 1963), p. 356. 3. Ibid., p. 357. 4. Anatol Rapoport, editor, Clausewitz on War (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1971). For a critique of classical military theory, see Alexander Atkinson, Social Order and the General Theory of Strategy (London; Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), especially chapter 3. 5. Richard Burt, "New Weapons Technologies: Debate and Directions." in The Impact of New Military Technology, edited by Jonathan Alford (Westmead, Farnborough, Hampshire, England: Gower, 1981), p. 46. 6. This is quoted in Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1981), p. 25. The author documents this as follows: "Vietnam Myths and Realities, CDRS CALL (July-August 1976); also reprinted in Armor (September-October 1976). General Weyand was the last commander of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) and supervised the withdrawal of U.S. military forces in 1973." 7. Stuart A. Herrington, Silence Was a Weapon: The Vietnam Way in the Villages––A Personal Perspective (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1982), p. 23. 8. As quoted in Summers, p. 108. This is from Stephen T. Hosmer et al., The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, December 1978), p. 38. 9. A schematic depicting the conflict spectrum and American capability is contained in Sarkesian and Scully, p. 6. 10. See, for example, Theodore Shackley, The Third Option: An American View of Counterinsurgency Operations (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1981) and Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Covert Action, edited by Roy Godson (Washington, D C.: National Strategy Information Center, 1981). 11. See, for example, David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Fawcett, 1973). 12. See, for example, Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1971), especially pp. vii-lvi. 13. Colonel Francis J. Kelly, Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-1971 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1977), p. 160. See also Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1982). 14. Claude Malhuret, "Report from Afghanistan," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1983/84, pp. 426 and 428. See also Gerard Chaliand, Report from Afghanistan (New York: Penguin Books, 1982). 15. Ibid., pp. 434 and 435. 16. Summers, p. 7. 17. For an excellent discussion of intelligence requirements and the problems of the intelligence establishment, see Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Elements of Intelligence, edited by Roy Godson (Washington, D.C.: National Strategy Information Center, 1979) and Dr. Ray S. Cline, The CIA under Reagan, Bush, and Casey (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1981), especially pp. 11-22, chapters 6 and 7. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- Contributor Sam C. Sarkesian (B.A., The Citadel; M.A., Ph.D., Columbia University) is Professor of Political Science at Loyola University, Chicago, and Chairman, Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. Dr. Sarkesian is a retired lieutenant colonel (U.S. Army) and the author of U.S. Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict: Potentials for Military Struggles in the 1980s(1981). His more recent publications include Presidential Leadership and National Security and America's Forgotten Wars. Dr. Sarkesian's article "America and Third World Conflicts: Prospects for the Future" was published in Conflict Quarterly (Summer 1984). Disclaimer The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- Air Chronicles Home Page | Feedback? Email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion and informational exchange list. Proselyzting propagandic screeds are not allowed. Substance—not soapboxing! 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